BOLIVIAN DEAL: EVO GETS REFERENDUM, NO THIRD TERM

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002268 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC KDEM PINR KIPR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN DEAL: EVO GETS REFERENDUM, NO THIRD TERM Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: In a welcome day of calm with up to 100,000 pro-Evo Morales demonstrators descending on La Paz, Bolivia's congress began voting October 20 to make changes to the text of the draft Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) constitution and to hold a referendum on the constitution on January 25, 2009. The next national elections have been postponed from June to December 6, 2009 (assuming that the new constitution is approved in the referendum),giving the opposition some breathing room and the hope that economic travails will by then have decreased President Evo Morales' popularity. The changes represent some wins for the opposition, who (at least on paper) have limited Evo to only a potential second term in office while changing other critical details like the procedure to amend the constitution and the structure of autonomies. Whether Evo will abide by the agreement in 2014, when his potential second term ends, is unforeseeable, and both sides may have only bought themselves time to campaign: the opposition for the "No" on the constitution, Evo for the "Yes" to his constitution and his continued reign. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Changes to the Constitutional Text - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) According to current law, congress should not be changing the constitutional text which was supposed to be drafted by an autonomous Constituent Assembly (in fact the text was illegally drafted by the president's MAS advisors and voted on by the Constituent Assembly in an irregular session without opposition participation.) The British Embassy, who were present as international observers during the recent negotiations in congress, tell us that the current plan to get around this legal difficulty is that the congress will also pass a law reconvening the Constituent Assembly for one day in which the Constituent Assembly will be expected to rubber-stamp the congress's textual changes and return the issue to congress, which will then approve the Constituent Assembly's rubber-stamp and send the text to the President. The final text of the new draft MAS constitution (including changes agreed upon October 20) has not yet been made public. ¶3. (C) While a number of the changes made by the congress were to correct minor grammatical errors, a few of the reportedly over-100 modifications were critical in gaining opposition support for the constitutional referendum in January. Most importantly in terms of long-range impact, the final article of the draft constitution dealing with the process to amend the constitution itself was changed to require a two-thirds vote in congress rather than a simple majority. If only a simple majority in one house of congress had been required to amend the constitution (as it was in the original draft of the constitution),Bolivia would have been dangerously unstable and the party in power--in this case the MAS--would have been able to modify the constitution with no checks from the opposition. ¶4. (C) Articles decreeing the maximum size of land holdings, social control, and autonomies were also changed, moving them more in line with opposition demands. Property rights were strengthened by the removal of a requirement that property "fulfill a social function". Unchanged, and still of concern, are certain articles that limit intellectual property rights and freedom of expression and the press. Under the new text, the media will be expected to regulate themselves so as to "respect the principles of truth and responsibility," although another article seems to outlaw self-regulating bodies. Opposition contacts have told us that they will focus on these issues in their campaign for the "No" vote in the January constitutional referendum. The British embassy informs us that two constitutional subcommittees will be formed to address additional "minor adjustments" to the text after the October 20/21 vote. It is not clear whether these changes would be reviewed by the one-day session of the Constituent Assembly. ¶5. (C) Bio Note: A surprise public-stature winner from the negotiations in Cochabamba and congress is Evo's new Development Minister Carlos Romero. Government and opposition politicians have credited Romero with pushing through the compromises needed to reach agreement: the British Embassy also praised Romero's role to us privately. Romero was appointed Minister of Rural Development in September 2008. He is the former national director of the Center of Juridical Studies and Social Investigations (CEJIS),a Santa Cruz-based, MAS-aligned NGO dedicated to indigenous affairs, land reform, and human rights. Romero played a prominent role in shaping the Morales' administration's land law. End note. - - - - - - - - - - - Additional Agreements - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) In order to get his constitutional referendum in January, Evo has agreed not to run for a third term (that is, to count his current term as his first term, so that he is only eligible to run for one other consecutive term, ending his time in office--if reelected--in 2014 rather than 2019. It is not clear whether this agreement is reflected in the modified constitutional text.) The opposition also forced the MAS to agree to delay national elections (if the new constitution passes) until December 6, 2009 rather than June ¶2009. Opposition contacts tell us that they hope the rapidly-worsening economy will damage Evo's popularity, giving them time to regroup after the disastrous August 10 recall referenda and the events in Pando. The opposition feels it has more chance to beat Evo in a December 2009 election. ¶7. (C) Considering the opposition's lack of options, they did fairly well in the compromises of October 20. With their backs to the wall, they had to approve some agreement and they managed to obtain significant concessions from the government, despite the government's pressure tactics as its supporters prepared to besiege congress. Nonetheless, there are no fail-safe legal means for the opposition to enforce the non-textual "gentlemen's agreements" with the MAS. ¶8. (C) Despite the presence of up to a hundred thousand MAS supporters (led by Evo) surrounding Congress and the eleventh-hour threat of an "outdoor congress", Evo seems to have wanted to maintain a veneer of democracy. In this, the presence of international observers at the technical negotiations in congressional working groups may have been essential. Any siege of congress ran the risk of capturing international observers (including OAS representatives, EU diplomats, and church officials) inside the congressional buildings. Although the observers were not allowed to make suggestions during the process, their presence proved useful and this fact should be used to encourage continued international engagement in Bolivia, particularly as Evo and the opposition begin their respective campaigns for 2009. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Short Term Achievement: Relative Calm - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Despite the highly-charged nature of recent Bolivian politics, elections in Bolivia generally avoid violence, and the compromises reached October 20 in congress suggest that Bolivians have a gained a respite of perhaps more than a year without further major violence. In the near term, Evo will be focused on getting out the "Yes" vote for his MAS constitution, while the opposition has already begun plans for the "No" campaign, focusing on controversial articles of the text that remain despite the October 20 compromise. - - - - - - - - - - - - - Getting Out the "No" Vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Ricardo Paz, a member of the ex-President Carlos Mesa administration, met with Charge October 20 and outlined ex-President Mesa's plans to re-enter politics, starting with a campaign for the "No" on the constitution. Paz said that the opposition sees Evo as more vulnerable on the constitution than on re-election, but that a "No" win on the constitution (or even a strong showing of over 40 percent) would weaken Evo and possibly damage his chances of reelection in December. The Mesa "No" campaign will focus on the issue of national unity, capitalizing on fears that the draft constitution's inclusion of 36 indigenous "nations" will fracture the country. Paz admitted, however, that their campaign for the "No" vote on the constitution is weakened by the opposition's negotiated changes and vote to allow a January referendum: voters may question why the opposition is encouraging them to vote against a constitution that the opposition seemingly approved on October 20. Paz also noted that at present the "No" campaign lacks resources and without raising substantial funds, will be at a tremendous disadvantage given the government's near-constant media campaign and Venezuelan backing. ¶11. (C) Mesa has relatively good approval ratings in Bolivia, and a number of opposition contacts have suggested him as a candidate to oppose Evo's re-election in 2009, possibly with an indigenous vice president to "round out the ticket". Mesa suffers, however, from being a white intellectual: while well-spoken and intelligent, he lacks Evo's populist charisma and may be viewed by voters as representing a step back. Evo will likely campaign as the face of "change", something Mesa clearly does not represent. - - - - - - - - - - - Evo's Next Challenges - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (C) Assuming that Evo gets his constitution approved, his big challenge will be to deliver the constitution's promises. The MAS draft constitution is a utopian document, and the opposition may be able to capitalize on the government's inability to deliver its constitutional vision. Even if the economy has not hit voters as hard as the opposition expects by December 2009, the MAS will have a hard time providing voters with dignified work, free education at all levels, and universal equality--all of which are promised in the draft constitution. Since Evo has based his ongoing cult-of-personality campaign on the phrase "Evo delivers", the Bolivian public may actually begin to hold him accountable should he fail to deliver results. Certainly, the opposition is hoping that is the case. URS