WHAT IS MAS THINKING? WHATEVER MORALES DECIDES

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002176 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR SNAR BL SUBJECT: WHAT IS MAS THINKING? WHATEVER MORALES DECIDES Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Four ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) congressmen shared their views with PolOff following an October 1 closed-door session with President Evo Morales. Morales allegedly outlined to MAS congressmen his strategy to pass a MAS-drafted constitution with subsequent national elections in 2009. Morales also said he would replace USG counter-narcotics (CN) assistance and related ATPDEA trade preferences. The congressmen were surprisingly understanding about the U.S. decision to suspend ATPDEA trade benefits; one even admitted the government's CN efforts were a "failure." None of the MAS Congressmen were assured that government plans to replace ATPDEA or USG counter-narcotics cooperation would work. Although the congressmen were disposed to lobby for improved U.S. relations, all were pessimistic that their efforts would accomplish much considering Congress's weak role in the shadow of President Evo Morales and were reluctant to do so considering the political risks. None of the contacts thought the October 13-15 march to Congress would be directed at the Embassy (two are in a position to know). Views on a constitutional referendum ranged from silent objection to the draft constitution itself to endorsement of violence to impose the referendum on opposition-controlled departments (states). End Summary. ¶2. (C) PolOff discussed recent events with three ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party congressmen October 2: Miguel Machaca (El Alto),Tony Condori (El Alto) and Ramiro Venegas (La Paz, alternate). PolOff also spoke with MAS Congresswoman Ana Lucia Reis (Pando) October 5. MAS Congressmen Get Marching Orders, Literally -------------- - ¶3. (C) Reis told PolOff that President Evo Morales addressed MAS Congressmen October 1 to provide broad direction on MAS strategy. He allegedly told the group that there would be encirclement of Congress October 15 to enable MAS representatives to vote through enabling legislation convoking a referendum January 25 on the draft constitution. Morales told congressmen that they needed to rally support for the march to Congress that is scheduled to start October 13 in the rural altiplano and to get into "campaign mode" for the general elections in mid-2009 that will follow the passage of the constitution. Reis said she would participate in the October 15 session and vote for the referendum despite her reservations because "it will be an important event." She said her February boycott of a similar congressional blockade went unnoticed and her alternate, a Morales relative, simply voted in her place. When asked if she could contemplate voting against the constitution, she said, "are you kidding? They would do this to me," as she simulated cutting her throat. Alteno Deputies: Demonstration "Not About You" -------------- - ¶4. (C) Machaca assured PolOff that the October 15 march was strictly focused on forcing Congress to convoke the constitutional referendum and that "100,000" marchers would not descend to the Embassy. "This is not about you, this is about getting around the opposition's legal games and getting our constitution." Condori likewise asserted no large demonstrations were planned or would be planned for October 15 or October 17 (the anniversary of Black October and historically the day El Alto comes to the Embassy to protest former President Sanchez de Lozada's, AKA "Goni," presence in the United States). Both Machaca and Condori are in a position to know about march plans, being intimately associated with El Alto social group leadership. Machaca insisted that despite the poor optics of blockading the Congress, the action was justified as the opposition "does not want us to have our constitution and will make up any excuses to postpone it. We have been patient with them. No more." Condori echoed the sentiment, adding, "this is not Evo forcing the constitution on people; we are only allowing the people to choose." Reis speculated that if opposition legislators attempt to sequester themselves inside the Congress during the siege, they will simply be thrown out by pro-government supporters. (Note: We've also heard rumors the MAS may convoke the session as early as this week to catch the opposition by surprise and convert the large October 13-15 march from vote enforcement to a vote celebration. End Note.) MAS Appetites for Destruction Vary -------------- ¶5. (C) Machaca suggested that the expected October 15 vote would actually improve the chances a new round of successful talks with the opposition by taking the constitution off the table and forcing the opposition to make the best deal it could. He and Condori said the government was prepared to give ground on hydrocarbon revenue sharing "for the good of the country." Venegas dismissed this possibility, predicting instead that opposition prefects would not recognize the referendum. This, Venegas asserted, would lead to bloodshed, but that "every revolution requires this before things stabilize again." He likened such turbulence to U.S.-Bolivian relations, which will re-stabilize after a "necessary adjustment." Machaca, however, said under no circumstances were Altenos eager to participate in the pacification of opposition strongholds. "Who in El Alto cares about Pando? Who wants to die for Pando?" he asked rhetorically. Evo: We "Do Not Need the Empire" -------------- ¶6. (C) According to Reis, Morales also told MAS congressmen October 1 that an end to the "imposition of the empire" was at hand, specifically regarding USG counter-narcotics cooperation. Evo allegedly also promised Venezuela and Iran would make up the cost difference in tariffs for Bolivian exporters once ATPDEA preferences are suspended in November while replacement markets are developed, without mentioning any specifics or time periods. "We do not need the empire my compatriots," Morales allegedly told the gathering. Morales assured the congressman they should not be "afraid" of "life without U.S. assistance or cooperation" and they should reassure their constituents of the same. Underwhelming Response to ATPDEA -------------- ¶7. (C) PolOff fully expected MAS contacts to argue the unfairness of the U.S. decision to suspend ATPDEA benefits for Bolivia. Instead, Reis said "it is about time, there needs to be a consequence for the government's negative actions." Machaca stated he "understood" the decision, and Venegas said "it was predictable (given the state of relations)." Machaca surprisingly conceded that the government's counter-narcotics efforts "are not working." He said he has personally noticed an increase in El Alto drug labs and seen its byproducts in El Alto trash dumps and rivers. Only Condori argued the decision was "unfair," because "we are doing better than Colombia." But even Condori quickly conceded the decertification decision was justified after a cursory explanation of the facts. None of the MAS contacts were remotely assured that foreign sources would make up for the loss of ATPDEA benefits. Making Bush "King of El Alto" and Other Unlikely Scenarios -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Condori insisted that despite the facts, if President Bush were to "make an exception" at the end of the 30-day public comment period and decide not to suspend ATPDEA, "he would save 500,000 jobs and become the king of El Alto." (Note: Estimates vary wildly, but at least 20,000 jobs are at direct risk. End Note.) Then, Condori suggested, MAS leaders could work to persuade Morales to improve relations. ¶9. (C) Machaca said he would lead a delegation of El Alto businessmen to "discuss" the government's handling of U.S. relations and its impact on ATPDEA October 3. When asked about the chances of changing Morales' increasingly anti-U.S. political trajectory, Machaca conceded "not much," shaking his head and looking at the floor. Despite his reputation as a relatively influential MAS congressman, Machaca said ultimately that congressmen "do not have anything to say about politics" in Morales' Bolivia. He added, however, that changing Morales' outlook would be "an incremental task." "Aymara Democracy" -------------- ¶10. (C) Machaca lamented that although business leaders understood what was at stake with ATPDEA, Alteno workers were largely ignorant of "what they lost" because they are focused on survival and often too "drunk and lazy" to pay attention to political decisions that affect them. Machaca explained tribal culture also insulated the government from the kind of open criticism that might lead government leaders to change course. He explained that questioning individual policy decisions was not a part of "Aymara democracy," which values "unity over individualism" and is "not about issues, but about identification." It's Not Easy Being Pro-U.S. and MAS -------------- ¶11. (C) Venegas told PolOff that Condori had also seen the decision coming and personally talked to Morales in June to ask him to please consider the impact on ATPDEA when railing against the United States. Venegas said it took a "great deal of courage" for Condori to approach the Morales in a way that even vaguely seemed to question his judgment. Venegas underscored that both men "have families" and "are taking a big risk" to meet with PolOff in light of government conspiracy charges against the United States, but that "it's worth the risk to get relations better again." Machaca said, apparently half joking, that he had no reservations about meeting with PolOff "now that the Ambassador's gone, it's safe again." ¶12. (C) Condori and Venegas insisted that U.S. outreach and assistance in Bolivia was poor and made it hard for pro-U.S. MAS members to "make a case for better relations." Venegas suggested better integrating social group leaders into USAID and Embassy staff, instead of "people from old administrations who only want you to love the opposition." Venegas also suggested sending explanations of U.S. policy to political and social group leaders and accused the Embassy of "dealing only with government officials in El Alto. They don't have the power, you have to invite social group leaders to project openings and include them in project development. Then they would be your friends and "our lives would be much easier." PolOff explained that the Embassy did reach out to social group leaders. Opposition Conspiring Against Closer Relations -------------- - ¶13. (C) Venegas argued that the opposition is "hoping for bad relations" and "working to divide us." He said the opposition encourages a harder U.S. bilateral line, but then criticizes the U.S. ATPDEA decisions and "is mute" when the Ambassador was expelled September 11 (Note: Though not nearly as black and white as Venegas paints it, some PODEMOS congressmen did in fact criticize the U.S. for picking on Bolivia with the ATPDEA decision; and while many opposition leaders expressed solidarity when Ambassador Goldberg was expelled, they largely left it to the pundits to express public outrage. End Note.) "The opposition is not your friend," said Venegas. He further argued that the government is more naturally aligned with U.S. values of fairness and inclusion and that "you are being tricked to think otherwise." ¶14. (C) Machaca insisted that the opposition and "opposition media" in particular try to "scare" U.S. citizens with the "idea that El Alto hates Americans and we are waiting to storm the Embassy because a few people show up at your door." He argued that even the June 9 protest was "only a few thousand people (we estimated 20,000) when El Alto is a million people." Machaca insisted that "nobody loves" El Alto radical leader Roberto de la Cruz and de la Cruz's rabid anti-U.S. positions were "proof of his desperation; he has no other issues." Machaca asserted only a small group of "not even a hundred" would attack the Embassy "out of conviction," then quickly changed the subject after he realized he had just confirmed the other June 9 protesters were paid for their attendance. Campaign to Equate Evo with Constitution, Inclusiveness -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) As is routine in Morales' meetings with MAS congressmen, he scolded the group for doing too little to support him and demanded that they start campaigning harder for the draft constitution, especially in opposition-controlled departments (states),in conjunction with the government's new media campaign that begins October ¶7. The campaign will focus on equating the constitution with Morales, crimes of the media Luna opposition prefects (governors),and compare an "inclusive" Morales administration with "elitist" prior administrations. ¶16. (C) Reis will star in a television advertisement where she and an indigenous MAS representative approach the Congress where a guard stops them and tells them that woman and indigenous cannot enter. Both, in turn, tells the guard, "get out of my way, this is the new Bolivia where women/indigenous are included." Although she does not agree with the ad, Reis said she felt compelled to participate and that rejecting the role offered by Minister of Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana would be "a battle not worth fighting." Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) What is the MAS thinking? Whatever Morales tells them to think, as our MAS contacts describe it. Many of these national representatives have little or no institutional leadership experience, come from cultures that condone unity at the expense of individuality, and rely on executive "bonuses" for income. Add to this dysfunctional executive/legislative relationship harsh punitive measures for dissenters, for example Santa Cruz's Guido Guardia, who was branded as a "traitor" and lumped in with opposition lawmakers during the February congressional blockade, and it's little wonder dissent is unheard of in meetings between the President and MAS Congressmen. Internal resistance to Morales is futile and risky, according to these MAS Congressmen. End Comment. URS