EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING-LA PAZ 9/23

S E C R E T LA PAZ 002083 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2018 TAGS: AMER ASEC AMGT PTER CASC BL SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING-LA PAZ 9/23 1600 REF: LA PAZ 2000 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: RSO Patrick J. Moore, reasons 1.4c,d ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Emergency Action Committee (EAC, consisting of EXEC, RSO, CONS, MGT, GSO, ECOP, DEA, NAS, USAID, ORA, DAO, MSG, MILGRP, IPC, MED, SSAT, and others) met September 23 at 1600 to discuss the current situation in Santa Cruz, where government supporters (some armed) have surrounded the city. Some government-aligned leaders have announced that they will enter the city on September 24, a local holiday for Santa Cruz Day. The Santa Cruz Consular Agency, which has been open to provide emergency American citizen services, will be closed on September 24 due to the local holiday. Post already sent a warden message warning American citizens about possible violence on September 24 and will send another warden message alerting American citizens to the fact that American Airlines has canceled flights into Bolivia until September 29. All official Americans have been relocated from Santa Cruz. NAS locally engaged staff (LES) assigned to do maintenance in Santa Cruz will also have September 24 off due to the local holiday. NAS Amcit maintenance contractors are also present in Santa Cruz, having declined to be relocated. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - Santa Cruz Situation - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (S/NF) On September 23, the government asked its supporters to temporarily suspend the siege of Santa Cruz for 48 hours. Contacts report that the government-aligned groups are letting some vehicles through blockades, but it is not clear if this is universal nor how long it will last. EAC agreed that even should the 48 hour truce succeed, problems will start up again after that unless the opposition gives in to President Morales' demands. Sources report that both sides are armed with personal weapons and ready to fight, with the opposition-aligned Santa Cruz Youth Union and university students reportedly preparing a trap for the government forces which could lead to a bloodbath. EAC agreed to closely watch the situation, since the events in Santa Cruz could affect Post's decisions on possible further drawdown and defensive posture in La Paz. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Impact of ATPDEA Announcement - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (S/NF) We understand that an announcement of the decision to suspend ATPDEA benefits for Bolivia may come as early as Friday September 26. EAC discussed possibility that this announcement could prompt government-aligned groups to protest at the Embassy: such protests are likely, especially if things go badly for the government forces in Santa Cruz on September 24. EAC discussed the possibility of working with DC to delay the announcement if the situation warrants, while noting that the events of 2003's "Black October" make October a bad month for any USG actions against Bolivia. Delaying the decision until October might not actually be helpful. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Possible Impact of Goni Case - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (S/NF) EAC discussed State Department's planned amicus curae brief in the case against ex-President Goni Sanchez de Lozada (who is a much-hated figure in El Alto and among government supporters.) If the amicus curae brief becomes public in October, this could be another goad to the government and increase the chance of violent protests at the Embassy. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ordered Departure Conditions Not Met - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (S/NF) Currently no ordered-departure tripwires have been passed, although EAC classified three tripwires as "still green but verging to amber": -international airports closed: airports are still open, but cancellation of American Airlines flights significantly decreases ability to leave via commercial means; -level of violence and threats to Amcits: level of violence is still minimal, but the next 48 hours in Santa Cruz could be critical; however, there is no current information on specific threats to Americans or American interests. -evidence suggesting government or military is helping violent groups: some unconfirmed reports suggest that the military has been trucking protesters to the siege blockades in Santa Cruz. ¶6. (S/NF) Post has already taken some of the preliminary steps that precede an ordered departure, however: personnel have been drawn down via authorized departure. Charge spoke with the Vice Foreign Minister to reiterate concern over security and the safety of our personnel. Charge also explained to the Vice Foreign Minister the goals of the SSAT military personnel in assisting with evacuation planning; once the Vice Foreign Minister understood, he agreed to instruct his consular colleagues to issue visas to other SSAT team members which had been refused due to the Bolivian government's concerns about military personnel entering the country. - - - - - - - - - - Actions Considered - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (S/NF) The EAC reviewed actions to take and notifications needed for Mission personnel and U.S. wardens. The following is provided: a. Sections and agencies will look at personnel and assets in El Alto (unmarked USAID warehouses and MILGRP facilities located at the Bolivian air force base at the airport), preparing for possible violent protests after the ATPDEA announcement or in conjunction with the Goni case. b. Post will follow up with Washington to find out more about the probable timing of the ATPDEA announcement and discuss modification of that timing if deemed appropriate. c. EAC will develop, with SSAT, a plan for immediate response in the event of a sudden emergency, i.e. a coup attempt or President Morales' death. Section and agency heads will send inputs to RSO. d. Front office will seek Foreign Ministry assurances that the government will facilitate an evacuation in the event one is needed. (Note: The government has consistently said it will honor its Vienna Convention responsibilities to protect the Mission, although these reassurances were undermined by the government's apparent role in organizing the June 9 demonstrations at the chancery. End note.) e. Sections and agencies will consider where they might set up a secondary office, should access to the Embassy or alternate command centers be compromised. Additionally, EAC and RSO will look at the advisability of "cluster housing" should the mission need to go into hunker-down mode. f. USAID will be prepared to set up the alternate command center on September 24, if needed. g. EAC will meet again on 9/24 to assess situation in Santa Cruz, if needed. h. POCs are RSO Patrick Moore (moorepj@state.gov) and DRSO Daniel Hernandez (hernandezd@state.gov),IVG 547-8300. URS