Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08LAPAZ2052 | 2008-09-22 21:18:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy La Paz |
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHLP #2052/01 2662118 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 222118Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8604 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY |
S E C R E T LA PAZ 002052 |
1. (S/NF) The Emergency Action Committee Working Group (EACWG) met 9/19 with members of SSAT team to discuss contingency planning for low probability but high impact event: President Evo Morales removed from power either by death or coup. EACWG noted that while this remains a low probability event, there has been increased chatter about the possibility in recent weeks. A/DCM explained that Post needs to be fully prepared for immediate action, and requested SSAT assistance in updating hunker-down and evacuation plans compiled by Post with RST help in December 2007. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Likely Scenarios and their Implications - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. (S/NF) Should something befall President Morales, his supporters would doubtless blame the USG. If Morales died and Vice President Garcia Linera took over-as is his constitutional responsibility-Post would anticipate a somewhat-permissive environment, albeit with some anti-USG backlash. If a military coup took place, the coup-leaders would likely cooperate with Post's attempts to evacuate, but resistance in El Alto would be significant, resulting in a non-permissive environment. (Note: EACWG agreed that the military leadership does not seem to want the responsibility of toppling a popular president. The military is also currently deployed around the country, and many conscripts in the divisions still near the capital are indigenous youth naturally loyal to Morales. End note.) 3. (S/NF) All present agreed that there would be very little time--a thirty-minute window, perhaps--to react to news of Evo's death or ouster before the anti-USG reaction began. SSAT team emphasized that a full NEO takes a minimum of two weeks to begin and six weeks to remove 20,000 people from the country (assuming a permissive environment) so it is essential that mission personnel and non-official Amcits be prepared to hunker down for a considerable period. 4. (S/NF) EACWG discussed the fact that the traditional pattern in Bolivia was for the various opposing sides to take matters "to the brink" and then back down. The pattern may have changed with President Evo Morales. Whether Morales "wins" or "loses", the outcome is not positive for Post. If Morales wins, his constitution will allow him a potential two more terms of five years each during which he will be free to further scapegoat the USG. If Morales loses, he has declared multiple times that he will only leave the Palace dead, placing Post in one of the above contingency situations. Some sources suggest that Morales is planning for increased violence in the upcoming weeks. - - - - - - - - - - - - Logistics and Planning - - - - - - - - - - - - 5. (S/NF) SSAT announced that it would use the weekend of 9/20 and 9/21 to begin investigating the locations specified in the current evacuation plan and looking for alternate routes out of La Paz. The SSAT will likely be in Bolivia for two weeks. Additional military personnel may try to come to support, but we need to be mindful that the Foreign Ministry is tracking visa requests and that given the sensitivities of the Morales government we need to be careful about the number or personnel we bring in. 6. (S/NF) Given the extreme logistical difficulty of an evacuation scenario for La Paz and Bolivia as a whole (with no sea access, easily-blockaded roads, altitude issues in La Paz, and a potentially hostile El Alto), SSAT will also look at the advisability having early triggers for considering Ordered Departure. EACWG agreed that the Bolivian government would likely cooperate in a non-emergency Ordered Departure, since much of Morales' rhetoric has been about 'getting rid' of the USG presence. Opposition forces would not be expected to impede an Ordered Departure or a NEO. SSAT mentioned that given La Paz's challenges in an emergency, Ordered Departure might have to be skipped and Post might have to go directly from an initial hunker-down situation to a NEO. EACWG welcomed any recommendations based on SSAT's experience and expertise and will consider them at the country team level. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Possibility of a Public Diplomacy Campaign - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7. (S/NF) SSAT raised the possibility of a public diplomacy campaign emphasizing the USG's policy against coups and the Mission's non-involvement in any so-called "conspiracy" with the opposition. EACWG will look into the possibility, but emphasized the fact that Evo Morales has built a cult of personality around himself, in large part based on demonizing the USG. It is unlikely that, even given many months, a public diplomacy campaign could alter popular perception of the situation, and currently the situation does not allow Post that much time. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and other major cities - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8. (S/NF) Should violence intensify (after the assassination of an opposition prefect, for example) in areas outside of La Paz, fewer official Americans are currently at risk because of the relocation and authorized departure process of the past week. However, there are still non-official Americans throughout the country and roughly thirteen DEA personnel have just returned to Cochabamba. SSAT members pointed out that the DEA and NAS presence in cities outside of La Paz had previously been included in the plans to evacuate non-official Americans from these areas. With these personnel removed to La Paz, the plan for evacuating non-official Americans in other areas must be revised. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Discretion in Contacts, Actions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9. (S/NF) A/DCM reminded SSAT team that Bolivia is a high-risk environment for human intelligence against USG personnel. EACWG also asked that SSAT team use discretion in talking with contacts, since discussion of some of our plans could cause panic or re-enforce government paranoia about our role. - - - - - - - - - Follow-up Action - - - - - - - - - 10. (S/NF) SSAT will brief the EACWG after conducting initial surveys. SSAT agreed to work to develop the contingency plans requested by the EACWG. 11. (U) POCs are RSO Patrick Moore (moorepj@state.gov) IVG 547-8300 and EconOff Beth Mader (maderea@state.gov) IVG 547-8052. URS |