BOLIVIA: INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS RATE DIALOGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002036

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS RATE DIALOGUE

Classified By: ADCM Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d


1. (C) Summary: Opposition prefects and civic leaders are
meeting in Cochabamba with representatives of the central
government in an attempt to negotiate an agreement that would
avoid further violence after clashes have left many dead.
Outside observers including the EU, religious organizations,
and the Friends of Bolivia group will reportedly be joined by
observers from UNASUR, an OAS team headed by Jose Miguel
Insulza, and Brazil's permanent representative in Geneva
Ambassador Luiz Felipe de Macedo Soares. The talks are
complicated by additional demands being brought to the table
(full capital status for Sucre, land holding size, municipal
autonomy) that were not included in the "pre-negotiation
agreement" signed by opposition Tarija Prefect Mario Cossio
and two Vice Ministers. Despite the positive impact of
international observers, our contacts suggest that the deep
distrust each side has for the other may still bring
negotiations to an early and unproductive end. End summary.

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British View Some Hope In One Day's Progress
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2. (C) The British Ambassador is currently in Cochabamba as
one of the international observers. British DCM Steve
Townsend reports that the dialogue had "slow but positive
start" and that the presence of international observers seems
to be keeping things positive and focused on the fact that
there is little room for failure. Reportedly the opening
tone was "tough, playing to the international observers,"
with Vice President Garcia Linera repeatedly mentioning the
August 10 recall referenda and the majority of support for
President Evo Morales. Garcia Linera reportedly said, the
government would "never forget the opposition's actions."
The British note "real distance to be overcome" between the
two sides. Working groups have been formed to discuss the
autonomy/constitution issue and economic issues such as the
return of IDH hydrocarbon tax revenues to the prefectures.
President Morales has not signed the "pre-negotiation
agreement" but reportedly may sign a separate agreement.


3. (C) The British tell us that so far there has been some
progress on the issue of the return of government property
taken by opposition forces and that both sides have agreed to
work toward a referendum on the constitution. The working
group set up to look at the autonomy/constitution issue is
headed by the new Minister of Rural Development and
Agriculture Carlos Romero. Romero has previously worked with
democracy NGOs on the issue of reconciling the autonomy
statues with the draft Movement Toward Socialism (MAS)
constitution and is, in Townsend's opinion, "a surprisingly
good choice" to head the working group. Overall, however,
the British feel that both sides are distrustful and are
currently "agreeing to disagree" in order to have a short
respite of peace. Townsend said that the fact that they have
made it this far without talks collapsing is encouraging,
while noting that it has only been one day.


4. (C) While the British feel that "both sides realize there
has to be an agreement, because there's no other option",
they also note that the government is taking steps that could
prove provocative to the opposition. Opposition Pando
Prefect Leopoldo Fernandez is "almost certain to go to jail,"
and government officials have made public accusations of
sedition and terrorism against the other prefects, as well.
Although Townsend says that he is "personally more optimistic
about these talks than any of the other attempts", he feels
that it will be "very difficult."


5. (C) According to the British, the issue of armed MAS
supporters currently surrounding the opposition city of Santa
Cruz has not been formally tabled at the talks, although it
has been mentioned. The British worry that both sides in
Santa Cruz are arming: the one death so far (of a Santa Cruz
Youth Union member) has not prompted violent reprisals so
far, possibly because he was not shot (he was reportedly
kicked to death.) The British feel that if shooting starts,
however, Santa Cruz could easily explode into real violence,
depending on the prevalence of weapons, which is still an
unanswered question.

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Spanish Not Wanted
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6. (C) Spanish Charge Ricardo Loza told the Charge on
September 18 that the Bolivian government had disinvited
Spain from a role as an observer at the Cochabamba talks.
The day before, Lozahad received word that the EU would be
invited to observe the talks in Cochabamba. He contacted his
home office and asked if he should go and was told yes. He
made arrangements and was ready to depart when late in the
afternoon the French Charge called him up and said that the
invitation to the EU only applied to the EU Troika. Loza
called Hugo Fernandez at the Foreign Ministry and was told
that the Troika was adequate representation for the EU.
Despite Loza's attempts to be included, the Foreign Ministry
was firm in not allowing Spanish participation.

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Foreshadowing Failure
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7. (C) Chairman of the Senate International Relations
Committee Tito Hoz de Villa (opposition party PODEMOS) told
Charge that the opposition feels the government wants the
Cochabamba political negotiations to fail. Hoz de Villa said
that Minister of Presidency Quintana had arranged the arrest
of Fernandez in a deliberate attempt to sabotage the
opposition prefects' will to negotiate, and that Morales'
effort to push up the date of the talks in Cochabamba had the
same purpose. Hoz de Villa noted that Senate President Ortiz
is in Santa Cruz, presumably to coordinate with Ruben Costas.
As other opposition contacts have reported, Hoz de Villa
says the opposition doesn't believe that the government is
genuinely interested in dialogue but wants the government to
be the party that breaks off the talks.


8. (C) A Bolivian Navy contact told Emboff that he believes
that the dialogue could unravel today. He claims Morales'
strategy is for the dialogue to break down when Morales is
not present (today Morales is in Panama) so as to place the
blame squarely on the opposition governors. If the talks
were to end, the Bolivian government would have the
opportunity to send in the MAS-affiliated social movements
(campesinos, miners, cocaleros, and unionists) that the
government has encouraged to encircle the city of Santa Cruz.



9. (C) The Brazilian Ambassador was unwilling to go into
great detail over an unsecured phone line, but in a
discussion with Emboff he characterized the talks as "so-so".
He added that there seems to be a move on the part of the
government to convince UNASUR not to talk with the
opposition, clearly a negative development if UNASUR is to be
seen as an impartial observer.

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Comment
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10. (C) Our contacts with the opposition and the government
have consistently told us that they have little confidence in
the current dialogue; each side is hoping that the other will
be seen as "backing out." In such a situation, the presence
of international observers will hopefully serve to prolong
the process and delay another outbreak in violence. The
chances of a truly successful solution through dialogue still
seem slight, however, despite the participation of the
international community. End comment.
URS