EAC WORKING GROUP MEETING 9/18-CONTINGENCY PLANNING

S E C R E T LA PAZ 002035

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: AEMR AMGT ASEC PTER CASC BL
SUBJECT: EAC WORKING GROUP MEETING 9/18-CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Classified By: ADCM Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d


1. (S/NF) The Emergency Action Committee Working Group
(EACWG, formed by agreement of EAC on 9/17) met 9/18 to
discuss contingency planning for a low probability but high
risk event: President Evo Morales is removed from power
either by death or coup. EACWG core will consist of RSO,
ORA, DEA, MGT, MILGP, and ECOPOL.

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Need to Update Evacuation/NEO Plan
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2. (S/NF) Post has a plan for a NEO evacuation that was
updated in December 2007 in conjunction with RST/SOCOM.
EACWG agreed that the SSAT team (arriving 9/19) should be
asked to help develop an updated plan, including
contingencies both for a permissive and non-permissive
environment. Plan should look at alternate evacuation
routes, safe havens, and rendezvous points, emphasizing the
need for immediate reaction once a trigger event occurs. The
country team's consolidated assessment is that the moment any
action against Morales occurs, El Alto will mobilize and that
we need a plan of action covering the first minutes and
hours.

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Need for Immediate, Coordinated Response
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3. (S/NF) All present concurred that the USG would likely be
blamed, by the government and MAS-aligned social groups,
should anything happen to Morales. Despite our clear policy
of no/no support for coups and our repeated public denials of
any involvement in a conspiracy against Morales, his
relentless media campaign assigning us blame for any actions
by the opposition and portraying us as his enemy has set the
stage so that if anything happens to him (even in an accident
such as a crash of one of the Venezuelan helicopters he uses
for transport) the USG will be viewed as the culprit. EACWG
discussed need for immediate response and advance planning
for such news: for example, any USG personnel working in El
Alto at the moment that news of an action against Morales hit
the radio would likely be in danger of mob violence. We
therefor are developing a plan is that will address how to
advise all personnel and what they should do, including
communicating with the American school and private Amcits.
Other likely flashpoints of mob violence in the event of an
action against Morales are: Cochabamba, Potosi, Oruro, the
Chapare-MAS strongholds.

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Danger Away from La Paz
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4. (S/NF) If something were to happen to opposition prefects,
the violent reaction is more likely to be localized in the
affected department. An action against Costas, for example,
could spark violence in Santa Cruz. (Note: Currently USG
personnel have been relocated from Santa Cruz. End note.)

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Three Broad Contingencies:
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5. (S/NF) Contingency 1: Morales dead (by accident or
assassination.) Succession occurs through he established
constitutional order and Vice President Garcia Linera
becomes president. Violent public reaction is certain, with
demonstrations against USG and USG personnel highly likely.
There will be some suspicion, however, within Masista circles
that the Vice President was behind the event depending on the
circumstances. Regardless, Post immediately considers
Ordered Departure. Garcia Linera is likely to allow ordered
departure, but the government might have trouble controlling
the crowds. Difficult but permissive environment.


6. (S/NF) Contingency 2: Coup against Morales. Despite our
constant refrain that the USG does not support a coup,
chatter and rumors of coup plotting continue. Should one
occur, Morales' El Alto supporters will react in force,
blockading the city and probably attacking the Embassy,
including entering the Zona Sur residential areas where
almost all Embassy families live. While coup-leaders might
be willing to allow USG personnel to leave on Ordered
Departure, they will probably not be able to control El Alto.
USG personnel forced to hunker down in the city. No access
to El Alto airport.


7. (S/NF) Contingency 3: Auto-coup. Morales claims he is
"forced" by MAS-aligned social groups to take over all
powers. He will likely use rhetoric against USG to justify
the action. Attacks on USG property likely. Unclear whether
Morales would cooperate to allow permissive ordered
departure.

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Initial Options Discussed
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8. (S/NF) EACWG discussed possible alternate sanctuaries such
as the German club, the French school, and friendly
embassies. Hunkering down in homes may be one of the best
options, but many groups know where our homes are (street
guards, taxi companies, domestic employees). EACWG agreed to
wait for SSAT participation before getting into details.


9. (S/NF) Requests for SSAT Planning Team's Contingency
Plan. Country team decided to request that the SSAT team,
working with all mission elements, draft a contingency plan
to address all three scenarios. Contingency plan should
include:

--securing the Embassy and USG facilities,
--protecting USG personnel and families,
--alerting non-official Amcit community,
--hunkering down
--implementing ordered departure, if decided upon,
--executing a NEO.


10. (S/NF) EACWG will meet at 1400 on 9/19, with SSAT
members, to continue planning.
URS