ENERGY: BOLIVIA AND THE REGION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 001905 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ENRG EPET EINV BL SUBJECT: ENERGY: BOLIVIA AND THE REGION REF: A. LA PAZ 1828 ¶B. LA PAZ 1588 ¶C. LA PAZ 1024 Classified By: Acting EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b, d) . - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) On the margins of the annual Bolivian Chamber of Hydrocarbons (CBH) event, Embassy La Paz hosted a meeting for regional energy officers August 19-21 in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Over the past two years, the focus of energy security in the region has changed. No longer is Bolivia seen as a possible hub for regional energy integration over the next decade. Rather, countries are now generally focused on three strategies: Developing Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) capacity, increasing domestic production, and diversifying away from natural gas. Meanwhile, actors in the Bolivian gas sector continue to operate under the threat of additional state intervention and are forced to try to coordinate and work with an often hostile and incompetent national hydrocarbon company (YPFB) and a confrontational Ministry of Hydrocarbons. While the government is demanding additional investments if firms are to avoid nationalization, companies face the barriers of forced, subsidized sales to an ill-defined domestic market, a transportation system operating at capacity, and no credit worthy buyer for any additional production. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - Bolivia and the Region - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) The CBH event hammered home the fact that Bolivia has lost its chance to become a regional energy hub. According to Sylvie D'Apote, Associate Director of Latin America for the Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), regional supply and demand imbalances are set to deepen. Argentina will struggle to bring its pricing structure more into line with regional markets, political instability will continue to be the reality in Bolivia, and additional Brazilian supplies are still many years away. As a result, plans of regional integration are on hold as countries pursue a mixture of the following three strategies: Developing Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) capacity, increasing domestic production, and diversifying away from natural gas. ¶3. (SBU) Development of LNG capacity is perhaps the most prominent result of the collapse of regional integration plans centered around Bolivia. Currently five new regasification terminals are either on-line or under construction in the region. In Brazil, the northern terminal at Pecem is complete and another is planned near Rio de Janeiro. The new terminal in Bahia Blanca, Argentina is also completed and two additional terminals are being constructed in Chile, at Mejillones in the north and at Quintero Bay near Santiago. The only LNG export terminal is the region is being built in Pampa Melchorita in Peru. (Note: While LNG from Peru was originally planned for the North American market, it may now also be sold to neighboring Chile. End note.) ¶4. (SBU) Worldwide, Latin America will continue to be a small player in LNG markets. Christian Iturri from British Gas LNG sees flat demand in Latin America through 2010, despite the new LNG regasification terminals. He thinks that the region will not be willing to compete on price with the larger, more established markets (Chile may be the exception). Iturri projected that Asia would consume some 40 LA PAZ 00001905 002 OF 004 million tons (mt),while demand in Latin America would be around 4.5 mt (the U.S. consumed around 16 mt in 2007). Too many nations are building regasification plants while LNG supply and transport capacity will be stretched to catch up. Felipe Dias from the Brazilian Institute of Petroleum (IBP) claimed that 459 new LNG regasification terminals were being built worldwide, while only 191 new LNG export facilities were being constructed. Moreover, with only 278 LNG ships available (at a cost of $170 million each),worldwide growth of a smoothly operating LNG spot market will take time to develop. What this means for Chile, Argentina, and Brazil is that while LNG will provide opportunities for stop-gap measures, cost and available supply will be considerable challenges. ¶5. (SBU) As for Bolivia, LNG appears to be a clear threat to its regional relevance. Will the Argentinean government really be willing to invest an estimated $5 billion dollars to build the proposed Northeast Argentine Gas Pipeline (GNEA) from Bolivia when LNG may be an alternative? (Note: BG Bolivia President and head of the CBH, Jose Magela pointed out that no cross border pipeline had ever been built in Latin America between two state companies. End note.) In the long term however, LNG development in the Southern Cone may not doom Bolivia to energy irrelevance. CERA's D'Apote pointed out that the flexibility LNG may provide to gas supplies may make regional integration more palatable. Instead of a pipeline creating an uncomfortable dependence for the receiving nation, it could simply be seen as a way to bring in less expensive gas with LNG as a back-up. Moreover, LNG may provide the region with a solid international price reference and help negotiations move forward. ¶6. (C) LNG is not the only threat to Bolivian gas-hub dreams -- countries with more favorable investment climates are doggedly looking for their own gas. Alvaro Rios, the former Bolivian Minister of Hydrocarbons told EconOff that by next year Bolivia would fall to fourth place in South America for proven reserves behind Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, and Peru. Moreover, IBP's Dias estimated that Brazilian gas production would more than double from 28 million cubic meters of gas per day (Mm3/d) in 2007, to 64 Mm3/d by 2009. While Petrobras is committed to investing in Bolivian gas (Ref. A),gas self-sufficiency is clearly the goal for Brazil by the time the current contract with Bolivia ends in 2019. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bolivia Now: Additional State Action Feared - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) In meetings with visiting energy officers, BG's Jose Magela said that the biggest risk now in Bolivia is not investing. While there have been no "real" investments in Bolivia since 2001, he expressed the view that the "wait and see" strategy will no longer be politically sustainable. He said that if BG does not step up and make investments for additional gas production (investments over the last 5-6 years have been generally aimed at maintaining production levels),nationalization is a likelihood. Carlos Delius, Director of Kaiser and Vice President of the CBH, said that Chaco, which is still in negotiations over operational control following its May 1 "re-nationalization" (Ref. B), would be fully nationalized shortly. Magela spoke for the entire industry in being thankful that Petrobras was moving forward with investment plans because of "other considerations." Those investment commitments, which Petrobras Bolivia's Managing Director Hugo Paredo said were needed to keep the 30Mm3/d flowing to Brazil, helped keep some of the pressure off of the other major producers. Nevertheless, over the past year, executives have never appeared more nervous about pending state actions than now. LA PAZ 00001905 003 OF 004 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Four Barriers to Investment - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Ironically, the Bolivian state continues to be the biggest barrier to additional investments in Bolivia. While contracts can be signed for exploration, the state insists that the terms for exploitation can only be determined following a new discovery: There is no guarantee that the state will not insist on a 99 percent take after a promising new field is uncovered. Meanwhile, YPFB continues to suffer from a lack of qualified personnel and an overly ambitions agenda. According to Magela, the private companies are now doing all of the administrative work for YPFB which, unfortunately, frees them up for "more mischief." That said, Magela concedes that YPFB is at least workable; on the other hand, he stated that the industry does not have a love/hate relationship with the Ministry of Hydrocarbons, but rather a hate/hate relationship. There is no consensus about steps to move forward and all licenses must come from the Ministry. ¶9. (C) A second concern are forced sales to the domestic market. Currently producers on large fields must supply the domestic market in accordance with their percent of overall production (Ref. C). With exports fetching between $6-9 per million BTU, domestic market sales are a drag on the bottom line. While increasing domestic demand is a manageable and accepted headache to the industry, a creeping expansion to what constitutes the domestic market is not. President Morales recently announced plans to build gas-powered electrical generation plants in order to become an exporter of electricity. Will the private gas companies be on the hook for exporting subsidized gas prices via electricity? The definition of domestic demand matters, and currently the government will not discuss it. ¶10. (C) A third concern is that the domestic pipeline network is filled to capacity. Where would any additional gas go? Can the newly state-owned Transredes (now renamed YPFB - Transport Company) be trusted to both manage and expand the existing network? Currently, their headline project of connecting the pipeline at Carrasco with the line at Cochabamba is stalled as the $100 million loan from the Andean Development Bank (CAF) for Transredes needs to be renegotiated with the new client, the Bolivian state. CAF Director Jose Carrera told EconOff that the process would likely take "a long time". ¶11. (C) The final major concern expressed by the industry representatives was that there is no credit worthy buyer for any additional gas supplies. The government trumpets the contract with Argentina, but the Argentine National Hydrocarbon Company (ENARSA) is not credit worthy. Following an embarrassingly shallow presentation by the company at the CBH conference, Jorge Martignoni, General Manager at Vintage Petroleum (and from Argentina) scoffed at the company as "a national embarrassment." In any case, as technically the only buyer of Bolivian gas, a credit worthy buyer should be the concern of YPFB. However, true to form, it falls on the companies to make the Morales administration understand the business. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶12. (C) Adding to the uncertain environment in the Bolivian hydrocarbon industry is the increasingly volatile political situation. Major highways throughout the principal gas production areas are blocked and in the statement issued by the opposition grouping of CONALDE on September 2, they excused themselves from responsibility for any disruptions to gas flows to neighboring countries. Moreover, beyond any LA PAZ 00001905 004 OF 004 physical disruptions that may occur during these turbulent political times, at some point the companies may need to deal with taxation demands directly from local "autonomous" governments. While gas exports remain vital to the Bolivian economy, the nation will clearly not be reliable solution to regional energy needs for the foreseeable future. GOLDBERG