EVO TAKES A PAGE FROM CHAVEZ, RULES BY DECREE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001839

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ASEC BL
SUBJECT: EVO TAKES A PAGE FROM CHAVEZ, RULES BY DECREE AND

REFERENDA

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d


1. (C) Summary: On the eve of his trip to Libya and Iran,
President Evo Morales issued a supreme decree setting
December 7 as the date for a nationwide referendum on the
governing-MAS party's draft constitution, which would allow
for Evo's re-election for two additional five-year terms. At
the same time, Evo announced that December 7 will be the date
for elections to replace the prefects of La Paz and
Cochabamba (who lost in the August 10 recall referenda) and
to elect, for the first time, subprefects and departmental
advisors throughout the country. There is no provision for
elections of subprefects or departmental advisors under
Bolivian law, and Evo made no effort to provide a legal
justification for this part of the decree. Allowing for the
direct election of subprefects and advisors is another blow
to the prefects: for example, MAS-aligned groups in
Chuquisaca are promoting the election of subprefects who
oppose Prefect Savina Cuellar (who broke with the MAS.)


2. (C) Prefects and civic leaders of the five opposition
departments (Santa Cruz, Beni, Tarija, Pando, and Chuquisaca)
rejected the decree calling for the referendum; they will
hold an emergency meeting August 29 in Santa Cruz to analyze
the decree. The opposition is determined to block the
referendum, but they have not yet announced their methods for
doing so. By calling for the referendum via decree, Evo is
trampling democratic requirements, bypassing congress where
the opposition-controlled Senate was one of the few remaining
checks on his power. Evo's intention to use decrees to
circumvent the legal process has been clear since August
2007, when he stated in an event with Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez: "being subject to the law is damaging us; though
they may say our decrees are unconstitutional, that does not
matter. Ministers, I tell you we should not wait for the
laws; we have to continue to work with political decisions
and if they file lawsuits arguing our decrees are
unconstitutional, it will be the people who will judge."
Since the Constitutional Tribunal has only one remaining
judge, Evo has effectively guaranteed that there is no option
to "file lawsuits," and in the end, only Evo will judge. End
summary.

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Majority Rule with No Protection for Minorities
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3. (C) Ignoring legal requirements, Evo announced on August
28: "Today the vote of the people does not only serve to
elect authorities, today it serves to decide politics. Today
we have the challenge of refounding Bolivia with the vote of
the Bolivian people. We are talking about profound
transformations in democracy." Following his 67 percent win
in the recall referendum, Evo is confident of his ability to
win other issues via referenda, with no consideration of
protection for minorities. Evo's decision to jettison
dialogue and abandon democratic behavior while running
roughshod over minorities will increase divisions between
east and west: although nationwide the opposition is a
minority, in certain departments the opposition holds a
majority. Furthermore, because the MAS constitution grants
extra rights to indigenous Bolivians, the new MAS
constitution is bound to exacerbate existing racial tensions.

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Arguing Legal Points When the Laws Don't Count
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4. (C) The opposition's objections to Evo's latest action
center around the fact that the referendum is being called by
decree rather than by law and the fact that Bolivian law
states that only one national referendum can be held per
year. When the national opposition in the Senate passed the
law that called for the August 10 recall referenda, one of
their stated reasons was to make it impossible for Evo to
call for another referendum (on the draft constitution) until
the next legislative year. This gambit failed, as Evo has
ignored the law limiting the number of referenda. (Comment:
At the time it was also clear that the national PODEMOS party
wanted to take back its leading opposition role from the
prefects and badly miscalculated in doing so, paving the way
for Evo's big victory at the polls. End comment.)


5. (C) Evo and the central government are emphasizing the
"democraticness" of the call for the referendum because they
cannot legally justify their actions. The official Bolivian
news service tried to apply a legal whitewash to the
announcement, noting that "the draft of the new political
constitution was approved by two-thirds vote of those present
in a session of the Constituent Assembly" while failing to
mention that "those present" excluded the opposition, who had
been physically prevented from entering. Defense Minister
Walker San Miguel also announced that "this is founded on a
sufficient judicial-constitutional base." Generally a
judgment on constitutionality would not be the province of
the Defense Minister, but since Evo and the MAS have gutted
the Constitutional Tribunal, there is no legally-recognized
body to rule on constitutionality.


6. (C) In the constant stream of illegalities undertaken by
the MAS and Evo during this process, it is easy to forget
that this new action is merely another illegal addition to
the list. The MAS constitution in question was illegally
drafted by MAS advisors (by law it was supposed to be drafted
by the Constituent Assembly.) It was then voted on in a
meeting of the Constituent Assembly in which opposition
members were blocked by force and intimidation. The
Constituent Assembly members voted on the illegal draft
without reading it, another illegal act. Then after the
vote, the MAS continued to make changes to the text,
correcting "errors" that did not go back to the Constituent
Assembly for approval. Quibbling over the legality of how to
call a referendum on this mess of illegality seems futile,
but the opposition has few options other than raising legal
issues and using protest methods.

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Vote for Something You've Never Read, That's Still Changing
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7. (C) Since the MAS constitution was forcibly approved in
Oruro, several texts have surfaced and no one seems to know
which is the final version that voters are supposed to
consider on December 7. All that seems to matter is that a
vote for the constitution will be a vote for "change" and a
vote for Evo. Evo's campaign machine has been saturating the
airwaves with propagandistic "public service announcements"
about the myriad benefits of the new constitution. The ads
also link a yes vote on the constitution to the "Evo Si"
campaign.


8. (C) While the constituent assembly members are technically
required to go back to their bases and educate the people on
the contents of the MAS constitution, our contacts in the
countryside tell us that the education often boils down to a
simple order: "vote for the constitution." In discussions
with community leaders, we have often heard the complaint
that the text of the constitution is legalistic and that no
one is available to explain the details. However, another
recurring refrain is that people have heard that they are
"included". A prominent women's leader in El Alto told
Emboff that, "I haven't read it, but I know women are in it."
Mining leaders have likewise told us that they support the
new constitution because "it recognizes us." In fact, the
more than 400 articles of the constitution are a marvel of
unenforceable inclusion: practically every subgroup
imaginable is mentioned, and all (except white males) are
defined as especially equal.

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Evo's Autonomy: Stealing the Opposition's Thunder
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9. (C) Evo also announced the creation of a Ministry of
Autonomies which will reportedly be in charge of
"harmonizing" the opposition departments' autonomy statutes
with the MAS constitution once the constitution is passed.
The MAS constitution's vision of autonomy is regional and
indigenous, a blow to the power of the departments. Evo
announced, "We need autonomy for the peoples, not autonomy
for groups," adding that "once autonomy is constitutionalized
we will create a law of autonomies that will incorporate the
distinct regions' autonomy statutes." Although Evo and his
MAS followers are hailing this step as an acceptance of
autonomy, in reality it represents a rejection of any chance
of compromise with the opposition departments: the
departments' autonomy statutes will be "harmonized" with the
new constitution as the MAS desires.


10. (C) The creation of the Autonomy Ministry and the MAS's
calculated inclusion of different autonomies in the MAS
constitution also serves to blur the distinctions between the
opposition's and central government's platforms. One of the
MAS pro-constitution ads that has been running on state
television since the beginning of the year shows a woman
worrying that she can't support the new constitution because
she believes in autonomy. "Don't worry, Senora" the helpful
shopkeeper says, "The new constitution includes autonomy."
She asks, "Really?" "Si," he replies, and Evo's picture is
displayed. Thus the MAS have staked out a position where
voting for the MAS constitution is a vote for change, a vote
for Evo, and even a vote for autonomy.

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Opposition's Options Limited
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11. (C) One day before the decree, noted constitutional
expert Dr. Jaime Asbum told emboff that the opposition has
three options. One, the opposition could refuse to
participate in the constitutional referenda, which they could
reject as illegal if called by decree. Two, the opposition
could participate in the referenda and lose (given the
widespread allegations of voter list fraud and the central
government's unlimited resources for campaigning). Or three,
the opposition could participate in the referenda and win in
the opposition-controlled areas, possibly using the resulting
dichotomy in the country to force the central government into
a pact. Asbum was pessimistic, however, and feared that
regardless of the scenario, Bolivia is headed toward violent
confrontation. "The two visions of the country are complete
opposites; we are on a collision course that is being
accelerated by Morales' actions." In fact, even the
just-appointed MAS interim Cochabamba Prefect Rafael Puente
recognized on August 29 that the actions of the government
could unleash civil disobedience with "grave consequences".


12. (C) Jose Antonio Ayala, spokesperson for the Departmental
Electoral Court of Santa Cruz, announced that it would be
impossible to go forward with another electoral process until
the voter rolls had been purged of duplicate names and
ineligible voters, a situation which was publicized before
the August 10 recall referenda and confirmed by the OAS.
Ayala suggested that the process of cleaning the voter rolls
would take at least four months and should be observed by the
OAS. (Comment: Since the OAS eventually gave its blessing to
the August 10 vote, despite having voiced concerns about the
constitutionality of the recall, voter irregularities and
fraud, further OAS participation might only serve to support
Evo's quest for legitimacy for the December 7 vote. End
comment.)

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No Good Scenarios
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13. (C) EVO RULES: Evo and the MAS are likely to increase
their use of decrees, as predicted by Evo's own words in
August of 2007. With no checks and balances or input from
the opposition, Evo could be re-elected as allowed for by the
MAS constitution and then strengthen his hold over the next
five years. Evo's progress toward this kind of authoritarian
plebiscite democracy will be supported by Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez, who has led the way.


14. (C) CIVIL STRIFE, BUT EVO FORGES AHEAD: The
autonomy-seeking departments have called for civil
disobedience to protest what they view as an illegal and
irresponsible government. However, violent clashes are
unlikely to deter Evo from going forward with the vote. Even
if the constitution fails to pass in the opposition
departments, Evo will still likely win the overall vote and
will push for implementation of his constitution.


15. (C) CIVIL UNREST BLOCKS EVO, INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT
NEEDED: Opposition contacts have told us that they intend to
block the referenda in their departments. At this point, it
is not clear how the central government could force the issue
if the departmental electoral courts refuse to hold the
December 7 election. If the two sides end up in a deadlock,
it may still be possible for international groups to try to
step in to encourage real dialogue. Foreign Minister
Choquehuanca had previously briefed the diplomatic corps that
the government would not call for a referendum on the
constitution by decree, which suggests that either the
government was intentionally deceiving the international
community or that Evo and his hardliners simply decided to
forge ahead. In a separate meeting, the Brazilian Embassy
told the Ambassador that whereas they are watching for Evo to
cross their redlines, the illegal use of decree to call for a
constitutional referendum would probably not constitute such
a step for Brasilia. The sense we get here from other
missions is that international community is not likely to
protest Evo's latest transgressions or to get involved unless
forced to step in by an otherwise-irredeemable impasse.


16. (C) UNREST ESCALATES INTO CIVIL CONFLICT: Now that the
opposition has confirmation that their input will not be
considered and Evo will rule--by decree if necessary--as he
sees fit, the opposition may feel that its back is against
the wall, and small acts of violence may spin into a larger
west-east, highland-lowland conflict. If the central
government sends in the military to the opposition
departments--either in response to threats to gas
installations and government offices or to arrest key
opposition leaders whom the government already accuses of
sedition--opposition contacts have warned us that some of
their followers are preparing for violence.

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Comment
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17. (C) Emboldened by his 67 percent win in the August 10
recall referendum, Evo did not wait long to discard any
prospects for dialogue, moving ahead in an attempt to further
consolidate his power by calling for a referendum on his
constitution which will allow for his reelection. Short of
actually impeding the referendum from physically taking
place, the opposition has few options left now to oppose Evo.
Neither the central government nor the opposition are
working entirely within the law, and in a lawless frontier

society, might makes right. Although we expect both sides to
make token appeals to the law and to international
involvement, the chances of a peaceful resolution to the
situation are slim. End comment.
GOLDBERG