GOVERNMENT INSIDER OUTLINES POST-RECALL STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001774 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM BL SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT INSIDER OUTLINES POST-RECALL STRATEGY REF: LA PAZ 1716 Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Vice-Minister of Water Gustavo Adolfo Morales told POLOFF August 13 that under no circumstances would Bolivian President Evo Morales resort to a "hard line" strategy to ensure passage of a draft constitution. He further outlined a post-August 10 recall referendum strategy, allegedly explained to him by Evo himself, consisting of a December 2008 constitutional "consultation," a March constitutional referendum, and December 2009 general elections, culminating in a "revolutionary government." Morales added bilateral U.S. relations would not improve significantly until after 2009, partially due to the continued utility of the USG as a campaign foil and partially because of President Morales' "lack of trust" in the USG. Morales and his supporters have hinted at a range of options to approve the draft constitution, but Morales said no decisions will be made until a meeting of MAS party leaders August 23-24. Evo publicly committed himself August 17 to undefined "mechanisms" to incorporate the autonomy statutes of four opposition-led departments (states) into the national constitution. End Summary. Constitutional "Victory" Assured; Plan A: Use "Mechanisms" -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Bolivian President Evo Morales provided the first hints on August 17 of his post-recall referendum strategy to approve the ruling Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party's draft constitution. Morales equated the "two-thirds" vote in favor of continuing his mandate August 10 to ipso-facto support for the constitution. "I would say my compatriots, that with this (August 10 recall) referendum we have secured more than two-thirds of the votes. Automatically then, I can imagine that the new political constitution is already approved." Morales, however, assured he would "first" resort to complying with the necessary "mechanisms" to reconcile the "correctly- or incorrectly-called autonomous referenda with the Constitution, so that the people through their vote, approve the new constitution. It is a responsibility not only for me, but for all." ¶3. (U) It was unclear exactly what mechanisms or processes Morales was referring to, but Vice Minister for Government Coordination Rebeca Delgado told daily La Prensa August 15 that the palace is considering plans to draft a presidential decree calling for four electoral processes to be merged in a sort of super-referendum. A referendum convoked by such a "combo-decree" would ask voters to decide new prefects (governors) in departments (states) where the existing prefects lost during the August 10 recall referendum, new departmental "counselors," decide land ownership limits, and, most controversially, ratify the MAS' draft constitution. Meanwhile, social groups met over the weekend, endorsing a decree to convoke an immediate constitutional referendum with no changes to the MAS-drafted text. Morales said MAS leadership will met over the August 23-24 weekend to consider its options. "No Need" to Resort to Hard Line on Constitution -------------- --- ¶4. (C) Vice-Minister of Basic Services (Ministry of Water) Gustavo Adolfo Morales told POLOFF August 13 that President Evo Morales had not and would not consider a "hard line" strategy to pass the draft constitution proposed by the MAS. Vice Minister Morales said although Evo was elated with the August 10 recall referendum results (reftel) and would use the "endorsement of the people" as a springboard to advocate the MAS agenda, he would not use the results as a mandate to circumvent legal processes to pass a constitutional referendum with executive decree. "We do not need to do anything outside the law; the people are with us ... time is on our side." Although he conceded that Evo's respect for "opposition-controlled" institutions of government, such as the courts and Senate, is low, he claimed Evo "does not want to move forward (on the constitution) without knowing the will of the people is behind him." Opposition Recall Strategy Only Made Evo "Stronger" -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) VM Morales said the government would respect a legal restriction that limits Bolivia to one national referendum per calendar year, but added that the opposition strategy to convoke a recall in order to avoid a constitutional referendum in 2008 was "stupid," considering it made Evo "stronger" and by association bolsters support for the constitutional referendum, which he admitted was not polling "as well as we wanted." He added by legally postponing a constitutional referendum, the opposition also helped prevent an internal fight in the MAS between people who wanted to push an immediate constitutional referendum and others who wanted to "take our time and make sure we got it right." Post-Recall Plan: Revolutionary Government by '09 or Bust -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) VM Morales laid out the following post-recall MAS timeline, which he claims Evo was touting as early as mid-July as his strategy if he won more than 54 percent. He said Evo discussed the three-part plan with him when they were flying to dedicate some water projects in conjunction with Evo's recall referendum campaign: --There will be a national "consultation" the first Sunday of December (December 6) to ask voters what they think about three constitutional issues: limit on presidential terms (yes or no),capping land holdings at 5,000 hectares (yes or no), and a choice between autonomies for departments/municipalities (opposition) or for departments/municipalities/regions/indigenous (MAS). The consultation will take place simultaneously with elections for new prefects. According to VM Morales, this is perfectly legal to conduct in 2008 because it is not a "referendum." (Note: Post's domestic Legal Advisor contends this legally/ constitutionally murky reasoning. End Note.) --Relevant sections of the draft constitution would be changed or stay the same depending on the outcome of the consultation and be presented for a referendum in March, ¶2009. Because this would ostensibly resolve the most contentious constitutional issues, "the opposition will not be able to complain about the new constitution because it would be the people who would be in charge." --Assuming the subsequent "people's" constitution is approved, there would be new elections across the board (President, Congress, Prefects) in December 2009, piggybacking on the already-planned municipal elections. VM Morales said this would likely result in a fresh term for Evo and prefects (at least two of which would change hands to MAS control),MAS control of the Senate, and significant municipal gains for the MAS. Armed with a new constitution and stronger leadership, "then the revolution can begin in earnest." Violence/Scattered Talks Forecast Until December Vote -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) VM Morales said violence was likely before the consultation phase of the MAS strategy in December. He predicted the opposition would rightfully perceive this as the point of no return for changing the constitution and "keeping their land." After the constitutional consultation, VM Morales argued the opposition would have a much harder time arguing "against the people's will." VM Morales said the government will "try" for a negotiated solution to prefectural (state) constitutional and revenue-sharing complaints, but little hope of coming to agreement with unreasonable prefects. Ultimately, he said both sides will make token efforts "for appearances." Low Expectations for Improving Relations with the U.S. -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite assurances from other government and MAS contacts that relations would improve following the Yankee-bashing rhetoric of Evo's recall campaign, VM Morales dourly said relations were unlikely to improve in 2008 because: --This is only a pause in the MAS campaign, which won't really end until after the December 2009 elections. VM Morales claimed the United States will remain useful as a "campaign issue" for the MAS. --Evo's perception (also widespread in the palace) that the USG is partial to the opposition and that we control the Bolivian media, planting anti-Evo articles. President Morales supported this analysis August 15 by segueing into criticisms about USG "interference" in foreign countries after blasting the media for "lying" about the recall results, whether the source of lies was domestic or "external." --Evo's cocalero past in the Chapare and disposition to "suspect the worst in you." He said most ministers don't share the extent of President Morales' paranoia, but that Evo attacks anyone who tries to convince him to leave his USG baggage in the past. He explained Evo's inability to "move beyond the past" is the psychological flip side of his "incredible memory, like an elephant." Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Although VM Morales has a history of being frank with us, his outline of the MAS' strategy is surprisingly revealing if true. We find it plausible, but with the caveat that Evo allegedly explained the strategy back in July and that he was supported on August 10 by a larger margin (perhaps 67 percent) than he anticipated. This may embolden Evo to take a more direct, extra-legal path to approve the constitution via executive mandate than the more complicated strategy to stay ostensibly within the existing legal referendum process described by the Vice Minister. Even if Evo is inclined to stay, albeit superficially, along a "legal"/electoral path to a new constitution, developments since August 10 may tempt him to abandon such a strategy. Evo is facing increasing pressure from his hard-core social group supporters clamoring for "hard line" and from opposition prefects threatening to advance their autonomy movements and opposition to the central government (septel). Now that the August 10 international observers and media have left, and with Evo flush from the vindication of "more than two-thirds" of Bolivians, there is little expectation that Evo will strike a more conciliatory tone or moderate his course. ¶10. (C) Evo's latest comments seem to endorse a grudging commitment to complete some kind of "mechanism" to resolve lingering questions about the constitution or at least to follow through on a formal constitutional referendum. Such a posture allows Evo to show his democratic bona fides to the world, blast the USG for continued inference, and cast opposition prefects as violent and unreasonable separatists. End Comment. GOLDBERG