Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LAPAZ174
2008-01-24 21:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

VENEZUELAN CHECKS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON BL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000174 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN CHECKS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000174 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN CHECKS: THEORY AND PRACTICE Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Bolivian government announced $48 million in Venezuelan aid for 2008, a drop from the $54 million claimed for 2007. The funds will go to the "Bolivia Changes, (President) Evo (Morales) Delivers" campaign to provide checks to municipal governments. Although the Association of Municipalities claims the campaign has brought 163 of 327 municipalities under ruling MAS party influence, a MAS deputy told us the loyalty purchased with the Venezuelan funds is very fickle. Officials in the heavily pro-Morales Department (state) of La Paz provided a range of feedback about the checks from gratitude, to criticism of the project selection process, to outright resentment for being left off of the gravy train. As the opposition gains some traction in its criticisms of Venezuelan "imperialism," the government may tone down touting the source of these funds. According to a December poll, Bolivians regard the government's partnership with Venezuela as Morales' single biggest mistake. End Summary. Venezuelan Aid = Overt Political Tool -------------- ¶2. (U) The Ministry of the Presidency announced $48 million in Venezuelan aid for 2008. The Ministry estimated $54 in Venezuelan aid in 2007 of the $100 million or so promised. Government officials openly assert their aim is to continue giving Venezuelan checks directly to mayors in 2008 as a way to turn them into pro-government political operatives. According to the Association of Municipalities, of a total 327 municipalities, the ruling MAS party has increased its influence over municipalities from 114 in 2005 to 163 now (including allies and sympathizers). Leading daily La Prensa asserts the increase correlates with the Venezuelan payments to 311 municipalities. ¶3. (C) MAS Congresswoman Ana Lucia Reis (Pando),however, told PolOff that although the MAS has engendered some good will from spreading Venezuelan money throughout the country, the party is fooling itself if it thinks it has bought loyalty. She doubted any of the prefectures that the MAS claim to have won over since 2006 in her area of Pando/Beni are doing anything more than accepting money. "Of course they will take the money, but the money is not even from Bolivia, they don't owe anyone anything." Three Case Studies: Venezuelan Checks in Pra
ctice -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) El Alto City Councilwoman Bertha Acarapi told PolOff citizens of the city of El Alto are grateful for any assistance, particularly as they are frustrated with the lack of development through regular Bolivian government channels. Acarapi echoed the familiar refrain from Alteno leaders that government projects go to Santa Cruz Department (state) and other opposition strongholds while El Alto has to rely on "very little money from our own government." According to Acarapi, Morales promised two hospitals and 1,000 classrooms, but has only budgeted for about 600 additional classrooms and that only because Altenos marched on the Ministry of Education in October. (Comment: Proving Altenos will march on anyone's government. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) Acarapi asserted Venezuelan checks have helped build a sports arena and two swimming pools, but these "are easy projects" that require little planning or expertise. Acarapi said commissioners feel in a tight spot because they know what the community wants but most of the Venezuelan funds are spent based on recommendations of government-aligned congressmen. A smaller portion goes directly to the city, but is not given as a check to local leaders "with no strings attached, as many people think." Instead the projects must be approved by the central government and the Venezuelans with little input from city. "Then we have to take it or leave it," said Acarapi. She complained the Law of Popular Participation gives city councils "all of the responsibility" for basic services, but "none of the funds" to carry out their own projects. Acarapi asserted the system forces city leaders to take whatever ill-conceived project the government or Venezuelans offers. Meanwhile her constituents complain that the government is building a sports arena, when they really need a hospital. ¶6. (C) In contrast to Acarapi, the gratitude for Venezuelan funds seemed genuine and uncoerced from Eusebio Lecona Choque, President of City Council of Pucarani, a small town outside of El Alto. Lecona noted proudly that construction of a milk processing plant in Pucarani "represented that President Evo Morales keeps his word," but later conceded it was built with Venezuelan funds. He said the city spent about 20 million Bolivianos ($2.6 million) in 2007, but was only budgeted 13 million Bolivianos ($1.7 million). Although he would not specify how much of the difference included Venezuelan funds, the only other source are local taxes and fees. He also claimed the city's official budget would grow to 15 million Bolivianos ($2 million) in 2008. ¶7. (C) Further down the road in Hautajata, however, city leaders told us they receive none of the Venezuelan funds. They charged corrupt and insensitive leaders in the neighboring town of Achacachi have kept all Venezuelan money for themselves. The town is currently lobbying Congress to create its own municipality, largely because they feel Achacachi's government is not dividing funds properly (including government funds) to the subordinate towns within the musicality. In the case of Venezuelan money, which is wholly outside any official oversight, they accuse multiple leaders of "keeping all of it for themselves." Brand Venezuela Loses Luster -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Bolivians identified Venezuelan interference as the leading mistake of President Evo Morales when asked in a December Captura Consulting poll conducted in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. In a November Ipsos poll, Bolivians disapproved of Venezuelan President Chavez's conduct at the 2007 Ibero-American 68 percent to 23 percent. Chavez's popularity has taken a hit since he started talking about turning Bolivia in a second Vietnam in October, 2007, should the opposition attempt to remove Morales. Chavez most recently raised eyebrows January 21, when he told the Venezuelan national assembly he consumed "coca paste" delivered from Morales, illegal in both countries if true. (Note: Chavez may have meant to say coca leaves, but instead said paste, a precursor to cocaine. End Note.) Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The "Bolivia Changes, Evo Delivers" campaign is funded by Venezuelan checks and more accurately could be called "Bolivia Changes, Chavez Delivers." However, in Pucarani, the city council members we spoke to gave credit for the funds to Evo, not Venezuela. In the past half year, the opposition has complained vehemently about undue Venezuelan interference in Bolivian affairs with some success, according to polls. Now that Venezuela has became the new "imperial power," it will be interesting to see if the government will de-emphasize the funds source and tone down the Venezuelan presence in check handout events. We note all our case study examples are from the Morales stronghold of La Paz Department. Some city leaders in opposition-controlled departments have flat refused to accept the Venezuelan funds on principle. ¶10. (C) Comment Continued. Pucarani does indeed appear to be doing very well compared to other cities we visited in La Paz Department, with a new central square, growing milk industry, and comparatively plush city offices. However, the highly-partisan distribution of Venezuelan funds has also provoked envy and dissent in communities that do not receive funds, receive less, or feel marginalized by the project selection process. Despite government attacks on U.S. assistance, some MAS contacts have (privately) told us they prefer USAID to Venezuelan aid because they bring expertise, accountability, and "have a plan." In any event, as Reis points out, whether the MAS has gained lasting inroads into local governments by virtue of Venezuelan cash remains dubious. With less money to hand out to municipalities this year, gratitude for Venezuelan checks may not be lasting. End Comment. GOLDBERG

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