BOLIVIA: A/S SHANNON MEETING WITH FRIENDS GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001646 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: A/S SHANNON MEETING WITH FRIENDS GROUP Classified By: DCM Kris Urs for reasons 1.4 b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: A/S Shannon, PDAS McGlynn, Deputy Director for Andean Affairs Andrew Bowen, and the Ambassador met with representatives of the Friends Group--Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina--on July 22 to share opinions of the state of Bolivian politics. Friends Group members expressed their frustration with the Bolivian government's and the opposition's unwillingness to compromise or even negotiate in good faith. After recommending that the USG not respond to rhetoric, all participants agreed that actions--the June 9 attack on the chancery, the expulsion of USAID from the Chapare, recent allegations that Peace Corps volunteers are spies--go beyond rhetoric. Brazilian Charge Alfredo Camargo suggested that the USG could hope for a normalization of relations with Bolivia only if we are willing to "redefine normal" to include constant insults. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Friends Group and OAS Relations with Bolivian Government - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Colombian DCM Adriana Arbelaez gave an overview of the Friends Group's interactions with the government. Stating that the government had basically ordered them to confront the opposition as criminals and oligarchs, she said that in fact the Friends Group had found the opposition prefects "reasonable" to work with and that, in her opinion, 90 percent of the fault for failed dialogue rested with the central government. Because the Friends Group refused to accept a government-mandated view of the opposition, it therefore has maintained credibility with the opposition. (Note: In comparison, she said the OAS lost credibility when OAS Secretary General Insulza declared his support for the central government without considering irregularities in the constitutional process or meeting with the opposition. Subsequent meetings with the opposition prefects have allowed OAS representatives to slowly recoup lost ground on objectivity, and the OAS is now more able to work with the opposition. Reportedly the OAS view of the central government is also evolving, with repeated frustrations souring the relationship. End note.) - - - - - - - - - - Constitution is Key - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) According to the Friends Group participants, opposition leader Tuto Quiroga told them that the opposition-led Senate passed the recall referendum legislation because Bolivian law mandates only one national referendum per year. Thus the opposition felt it was buying time on the question of the constitution, which will have to wait until next year for a national referendum. Brazilian Charge Alfredo Camargo pointed out, however, that the central government has proven willing to circumvent the law as necessary. Camargo suggested that if President Morales wins the recall referendum, Morales will find a way to push the constitution through. Camargo and Arbelaez agreed that the central government never intended to negotiate with the opposition on the constitution, instead using negotiation as a ploy to distract the opposition and the international community. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Certification and Brazil's Potential CN Role - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) A/S Shannon mentioned the September anti-narcotics certification process and the December ATPDEA expiration as pending decision points that will affect the bilateral relationship. In response, Brazilian Charge Camargo elaborated on his government's growing concern regarding Bolivian cocaine. Saying that this concern has not been a public priority in an otherwise "dense" bilateral agenda, Camargo explained that nonetheless the Brazilian government realizes that most Bolivian cocaine goes to or through Brazil. The Brazilian government recognizes the associated increase in crime and instability and expects the situation to worsen if the USG cannot continue with counter-narcotics efforts in Bolivia. Camargo said that the Brazilian government wants to be more involved in counter-narcotics in Bolivia. While the subject is sensitive politically due to the close ideological ties between Morales and Brazilian President Lula, Camargo says Brazil wants to help, possibly at a technical level. - - - - - - - - - - - - U.S./Bolivian Relations - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) All of the Friends Group participants agreed that U.S.-Bolivian relations are strained. Brazilian Charge Camargo said that for the USG and the Bolivian government to resume normal relations, the USG will have to "redefine normal" to include an acceptance of insults, since these will continue regardless of USG efforts. He suggested, however, that the Bolivian government will lose credibility with its own people as ongoing accusations of USG "conspiracy" are shown to have no basis in fact. Camargo advised that "the best reaction is not to react", although he qualified that recommendation by stating that actions against USAID and Peace Corps are not mere rhetoric. A/S Shannon confirmed that any act of violence against Peace Corps volunteers or mission personnel could have devastating effects on bilateral relations; however, Morales continues to use anti-American rhetoric to motivate his supporters. Colombian DCM Arbelaez agreed, opining that this strategy seems to be working since so far the Bolivian government's anti-American actions have had no repercussions. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bolivia's Foreign Relations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) As the representative of the country with the closest ties to Bolivia and Venezuela, Argentine Charge Jorge Gomez expressed less open frustration during the meeting. He did, however, mention concerns over Bolivia's interest in relations with Iran and North Korea. On the other side of the spectrum, Brazilian Charge Camargo said that Brazilian-Bolivian relations have been tense, but that Brazil is compelled to participate in the Friends Group for reasons of history and geography. A/S Shannon offered his support to the Friends Group, emphasizing the importance of their participation both for Bolivia and the region. Noting that Bolivia's neighboring countries have even more at stake than the United States, A/S Shannon encouraged the Friends Group to continue to meet with the Ambassador. ¶7. (U) A/S Shannon cleared this cable. GOLDBERG