BOLIVIA: POOR PROGNOSIS FOR NATIONAL DIALOGUE

S E C R E T LA PAZ 000150 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: POOR PROGNOSIS FOR NATIONAL DIALOGUE Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) President Evo Morales and opposition prefects publicly maintain a relatively optimistic outlook on talks to reach a national accord; but, both sides appear privately to be advancing more cynical agendas. A national accord would require Morales and the opposition to agree to a funding mechanism for a new pension plan that does not notably impact departmental budgets, and would also include agreements to change the MAS draft constitution and the opposition departments' autonomy proposals. The prospects for a comprehensive agreement are slim, but the talks may not be an all or nothing deal. The opposition prefects could very well reach agreement to maintain their departmental budgets while pushing negotiations on the MAS constitution to a later day. Most observers see a referendum on the MAS constitution as at least half a year away. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - No Accord without Restoration of IDH - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (U) The Morales' administration's decision to impose a 30 percent cut in the distribution of hydrocarbons revenues (IDH) to the nine prefectures to fund its new pension system remains a critical obstacle to any agreement between opposition prefects and President Morales. The opposition prefects of Beni, Cochabamba, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija proposed aGh:QQQil January 23. Meanwhile, rather than delay for a few days the implementation of its pension plan/IDH cut while talks continued, the government announced it would go forward with implementation on January ¶16. Opposition prefects, not surprisingly, viewed the January 16 move as detrimental to the negotiations. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - MAS Constitution and Autonomy Statutes: Like Oil and Water - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (U) The other issue that can )- and will likely )- derail the talks is the so called "harmonization" of the MAS constitution with the opposition department's autonomy statutes. Assuming the two sides can reach an agreement on the IDH issue, each department is supposed to send two delegates to begin working in earnest on the constitution and autonomy statutes negotiations January 26. ¶4. (U) Despite suggesting that the other's documents were trash before the talks even started, both Morales and the prefects have recently tried to sound a more conciliatory tone. After meetings on January 16, president Morales stated, "I have a lot of hope in these talks" and "It is important to make compatible, to unite, the autonomy statutes with the new constitution." One of Evo's most vocal critics, Cochabamba prefect Manfred Reyes Villa also sounded positive and committed to the talks stating, "We have an obligation to reach an agreement . . . not to fail." ¶5. (C) While the principals in the negotiations have generally taken the conciliatory approach, both parties rely on surrogates to promote their side's respective hard-line strategy. Constituent Assembly members from Morales' MAS party have stated they will not change the MAS draft constitution. Roman Loayza, the MAS party's leader in the Assembly and long time Morales associate stated, "The President cannot tell us what to do, because as assembly members we are superior to him." (Comment: Loayza's comment seems at least a bit disingenuous and it would be seismic shift from the past if MAS assembly members no longer took instructions from Evo Morales. End Comment). Meanwhile, senior judiciary officials and the Bolivian bar association )- groups favorably disposed to the opposition -- issued a non-legally binding declaration calling the MAS draft constitution illegitimate and illegal. - - - - - - - - - - - Bad Faith Negotiating - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (S) Both sides appear to have little faith in the negotiations, and both seem to be cynically approaching the talks. The government apparently views the talks as a "show" for the public and has no interest in a real negotiated solution (per sensitive reporting). Roly Aguilera, Secretary General of the Santa Cruz Prefecture, told Emboff that the prefecture has no expectation that the "dialogue" will have any real result. According to Aguilera, Morales has been "negotiating" in bad faith since the start. But the prefects have their own motives for attending the talks. Aguilera and his colleague Mario Bruno, Secretary General of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee, have mentioned that the opposition views the talks as a useful delaying tactic. The negotiations give the opposition departments time to organize their autonomy statutes referenda. The opposition is pushing for three sets of referenda: first a (presidential and prefect) recall referendum; then referenda on the departments' autonomy statutes; followed by the referendum on the MAS draft constitution. The media luna (opposition) prefects will consider it a big victory if the referendum on the MAS' constitution is pushed back until late 2008, early ¶2009. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶7. (C) Both sides need to be seen talking, although Evo seems to get the most out of such overtures. Morales' poll numbers tend to move upwards when he is seen negotiating. It seems that his more tepid followers -- those who shy away from him during troubled times -- return to the MAS fold when he acts conciliatory. Nevertheless, with the cynicism surrounding the talks, we do not anticipate the president and prefects reaching the fabled national accord. Despite the pessimism there is a possibility for the parties to reach some form of lesser agreement. The prefects may very well be content to depart the talks with the (at least partial) restoration of their IDH revenues, while leaving the fight over the MAS constitution for a later day. The government might be willing to cede some ground on the IDH issue to give itself some breathing space )- a period of time without significant conflict. Morales might even be willing to make cosmetic adjustments to the MAS constitution -- to fix glaring contradictions )- as yet another act in the "show." ¶8. (C) Whether or not the IDH issue is resolved, both sides will eventually begin campaigning in earnest for their respective charters )- the MAS constitution and the opposition autonomy statutes. The opposition will attempt to stall (and if possible prevent) any referendum on the MAS constitution. Stalling will likely include trying to force votes on their autonomy statutes prior to a vote on the MAS constitution. On the other hand, the MAS will likely try to push the constitutional vote as soon as possible while laying down obstacles for the autonomy referenda. If the media luna fails to prevent a referendum on the MAS constitution, the opposition will eventually focus its efforts behind the "NO" vote, rather than boycott the referendum. ¶9. (C) With a referendum on the MAS constitution at least six months away, it is likely Bolivia will go on without serious violence for most of that period. If either the "YES" or "NO" vote looks solid, the possibility for violence will increase as supporters for the likely losing side will want to ratchet up pressure to try to bring about an as yet undefined alternative outcome, rather than face defeat at the polls. End Comment. GOLDBERG