CHARGE REITERATES SECURITY CONCERNS TO VICE FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001406 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ODIP KLIG KTIA BO SUBJECT: CHARGE REITERATES SECURITY CONCERNS TO VICE FM REF: A. LA PAZ 1391 ¶B. LA PAZ 1359 ¶C. LA PAZ 1302 ¶D. LA PAZ 1301 Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i. Kris Urs for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Charge and EcoPol Counselor reiterated Post's security concerns in the aftermath of a violent June 9 protest at the Embassy to Vice Foreign Minister Hugo Fernandez. The Charge delivered a diplomatic note asking that appropriate action be taken regarding a march organizer who continues to make public threats to "burn down" the Embassy in future protests. EmbOffs urged that the government live up to its 1961 Vienna Convention obligations to protect the Mission and stop inciting and supporting violent protests against us. We noted that Bolivian government officials' statements meant to reassure us that they will protect our Mission lacked credibility when followed by accusations that we are conspiring. We also registered our concern that firing the police commander for allegedly protecting the Embassy too vigorously sends the wrong signal to both police and protesters. Fernandez initially minimized our concerns and tried to justify the march and continued threats from march organizers as a reaction to USG policy. But, when pressed, Fernandez said he understood "how serious and important security is to the United States," promising to raise it with his superiors. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Charge and EcoPol Counselor explained Mission security concerns to Vice Foreign Minister Hugo Fernandez June 19. The Charge emphasized that the seriousness of Embassy security concerns following a violent June 9 Embassy demonstration prompted Washington to ask our Ambassador to return to Washington for consultations. The Charge noted that the government's public statements to date that appear intended to reassure us of Bolivia's commitment to provide adequate security of our Mission, in accordance with its obligations under the 1961 Vienna Convention, lack credibility given that they were coupled with accusations of conspiracy. Disturbing Signs: Punish Police; Ignore Embassy Threats - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) The Charge highlighted that on the day of the demonstration, the Ambassador's calls to the government were not returned, and that no Bolivian government official had expressed any concern to us about the violent incident. Then, the Charge explained that Minister of Government Alfredo Rada's removal of the La Paz Police Commander following supposedly heavy-handed defense of the Embassy June 9, sent a signal to the police that they should not confront "people who want to sack the Embassy." Likewise, such punishment for protecting the Embassy emboldens protesters, such as El Alto City Council Vice President Roberto de la Cruz, who has threatened to "burn down" the Embassy before, during, and after the demonstration. De la Cruz clarified June 10 that sacking the Embassy was not a threat, rather "a promise" on par with the promise Altenos made in 2003 to bring down the government of then-President Gonzalo (Goni) Sanchez de Lozada. The Charge then delivered diplomatic note 195/08 (text para 14 below),which asks the Bolivian government to take appropriate action against de la Cruz's threats. Charge explained that we were concerned that there has been no government action yet against de la Cruz, despite the clear obligation to do so in accordance with both international obligations (Vienna Convention) and, according to Embassy legal advisors, domestic laws regarding threats to property and person. The Charge made the point that we expected a reply to our diplomatic notes, remarking that we had yet to receive any response to our April 17 diplomatic note protesting aggressive surveillance of our Mission. Putting Embassy Arson "In Context" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Fernandez said he did not wish to "diminish the importance" of our concerns, particularly as they relate to the Vienna Convention. However, he seemed to do exactly that when he continued to "put our concerns in context:" --De la Cruz is not a member of the government, and, therefore the government cannot control his behavior. De la Cruz has his own "project" and he and other Alteno leaders are in campaign mode for the August 10 presidential/prefectural recall referendum. Anti-imperialist allusions are part of their stump speeches to energize the public and "not to be taken terribly seriously." --The Embassy is a "fortress" and was not damaged during the June 9 protest, nor "is there any danger" that it will be significantly damaged or overrun in the future. To illustrate the point, he added that the demonstration was only minor annoyance to his family, who lives nearby. --The police acted within their mandate to beat off the protesters at the Embassy's front gate, but went too far by gassing the demonstrators, the cause for the police chief's dismissal. Fernandez argued the gassing had nothing to the protection of the Embassy and, therefore, we should not be concerned about the government's commitment to protect the Embassy in the future. Blaming the Victim - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Fernandez then changed course and rebutted that De la Cruz's criticisms of the former Defense Minister Carlos Sanchez Berzain's asylum case are not the ravings of "some crazy man in the desert." According to Fernandez, the perceived U.S. protection of Sanchez Berzain is a legitimate issue for the people of El Alto, and, "in this sense, the march was a result of what you did in this case." Fernandez also used the opportunity to argue that although the government "understands" the legal/jurisdictional reasons we cannot comment on the case, "in this special case" the government should have been informed of his asylum status. Justifying the Soft Hand: What is Terrorism, Anyway? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Fernandez segued into a philosophical discourse on the definition of terrorism, saying he did not "want to use the term lightly, lest it lose all meaning." (Comment: implying that we had. End Comment.) He argued that if we are concerned about de la Cruz's "terrorism," it stood to reason that we should be concerned about opposition-aligned group "attacks" on the Constitutional Assembly, on assembly members, and on officials from the Ministry of Justice, referring to an assortment of recent events. He also mentioned opposition groups' denying access to parts of the country for government officials, including President Evo Morales. "The Ambassador needs to denounce these things too; these things are also terrorism." In an apparent and strange attempt to justify the government's less-than-ideal handling of our security concerns and at the same time compel us to reign in opposition radicals, Fernandez argued that a consistent approach to security issues would require an equally tough approach to opposition-led Santa Cruz Department (state) radicals as with pro-government radicals such as de la Cruz. "Unfortunately, this is the country we have; you have to take it in context." Back to Reality - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) The Charge retorted that Fernandez's analogy is inappropriate and illogical: the United States Government has no mandate or authority over Bolivian citizens, as opposed to the Vienna Convention obligation that countries protect foreign missions on their soil. Moreover, the Charge argued that the United States does not have relations with the groups in question nor does it control opposition groups in general, despite government accusations to the contrary. The Charge also pointed out the inconsistency of implying we should involve ourselves in domestic political issues while the government vehemently criticizes the Unites States for imagined breaches of Bolivian sovereignty. The Charge then steered the conversation back to Embassy security and asked if the government planned to initiate any legal actions against de la Cruz. Government Inciting the Next Attack - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) The Charge also asked for a clear public statement in support of the security of the Embassy. He said remarks by Bolivian officials, including Fernandez himself, assuring Bolivian support for foreign mission security were always coupled with critical remarks about U.S. policy or Ambassador Goldberg, giving a mixed message to would-be protesters. The Charge also noted the comments of senior officials, including President Morales, condoning the June 9 march, congratulating its participants, and endorsing violent protests as a legitimate form of dissent with U.S. policy. The Charge argued that instead of trying to quell angry mobs, rhetoric from senior officials is contributing to a hostile environment for the U.S. Mission, contradicting Vienna Convention obligations to protect the Mission. The Charge also questioned if government support for the march was financial as well as rhetorical, as many marchers were publicly paid for participation. Fernandez: We'll Talk to de la Cruz - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) After rehashing how overly "sensitive" our concerns were, Fernandez said de la Cruz would be talked to so that he "understands the gravity of threatening the Embassy." Fernandez said any public denouncement or detention of de la Cruz would be "ill advised and counterproductive." He added that if we had any proof linking government ministers to the march, we should provide it. Fernandez: "We Will Never Break Relations" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Fernandez said he believed we were acting in good faith with the government, including the Sanchez Berzain case, and suggested we continue to be "neutral" and keep a low profile on domestic issues. He said he gave the same advice to Venezuelan officials. He called opposition leaders daring the government to break ties with the United States "imbeciles." "We will never break relations with the United States." Fernandez ended the meeting by emphasizing the government's support for mission security and suggesting subsequent meeting with Minister Rada and Defense Minister Walker San Miguel "so you can ask them your questions and we can come to a better understanding." Latest Rabid Rada Ramblings -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) Although Fernandez's attempts to minimize and take a light-hearted approach to our concerns seemed awkward and misapplied to our serious security concerns, he seemed at least willing to work towards a resolution of the issue. Other senior government officials, including President Morales (reftels),have instead mocked our legitimate concerns and used them as a base to launch spurious attacks. This latest volley from Interior Minister Rada June 19: "What's the Department of State's concern? The security of its Embassy. And to this concern the Bolivian government says they have the same guarantees of security that other embassies have, so therefore this is a fictitious concern. But okay, since they have that concern, we have the concern of guarding our sovereignty in the face of the political interference that Philip Goldberg has been up to in recent months. We are concerned about the impunity that Sanchez Berzain and Sanchez de Lozada have in U.S. territory. We give the Embassy full guarantees, but we ask for respect. Therefore, if there is going to be any dialogue, or whatever it is called, then there has to be (respect). Both sides have concerns." Police Close Book on Police Chief's Undefined "Errors" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (U) Bolivian National Police Commander General Miguel Gemio said June 19 that the police committed errors in the confrontation with the Embassy protesters. "We have evaluated it and it's now a closed book. We identified that the police effectively committed certain errors that we will correct." La Paz daily La Razon interviewed an anonymous "other high-level police chief" who said that "everything that was done at the Embassy was under police norms. Any officer who sees, hears or reads what occurred that day will discover that what they did was correct. I'm surprised that they haven't listed what those 'errors' were, if they were worth knowing." Comment - - - - ¶13. (C) Like most of our conversations with senior government officials we consistently get inconsistent answers: Fernandez accepted the government has international obligations to take security seriously, but he did not commit to take a serious approach to our general concerns or the specific case of de la Cruz. Only after being pressed, Fernandez did accept that the government had to do something to temper de la Cruz's behavior, hence the offer to talk to him. And, while offering to help, Fernandez remarked he is "only a cog in the machine, and not an important one." Diplomatic Note 195/08 -------------- ¶14. (C) Begin Text. June 19, 2008 No. 195/08 The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Republic of Bolivia. In accordance with the rights and privileges accorded to all diplomatic missions in the Republic of Bolivia, Embassy La Paz registers its profound concern regarding the security of the U.S. Mission in Bolivia following a large, violent demonstration at the Embassy June 9. As we informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Ambassador Goldberg was asked to return to Washington to review the Embassy's security situation. The Mission understands the role of public marches and demonstrations in the expression of public opinion in democratic societies. We further understand the intent of many of the June 9 marchers was to peacefully register their disagreement with perceived U.S. policies, irrespective of actual U.S. policy or their understanding of the same. However, both the intent and the actions of a sizable minority of the marchers were clearly violent, as evidenced by unambiguously hostile public statements aimed at violently targeting the Embassy. Peaceful protesters do no throw dynamite or other explosives at the police protecting the Embassy or over the Embassy walls. These actions resulted in injuries to police and civilians. Roberto de la Cruz, Vice President of the Municipal Council of El Alto, is responsible for the most egregious and overt calls to violently attack the Embassy. De la Cruz repeatedly and consistently stated before, during, and after the June 9 incident his intent to "burn down the Embassy." He publicly reiterated this intent as "to take down the Embassy of the United States" as recently as June 16 (see attached DVD). De la Cruz also has clarified his intent to "return to the Embassy to take it" in the future. We take these terrorist threats seriously and in accordance with the Bolivian government's public assurances that it will abide by its international obligations to protect foreign missions under the 1961 Vienna Convention, we expect the government to take appropriate action against Mr. de la Cruz. Our highest priority is the safety of our U.S. and Bolivian employees. We trust that the Bolivian government shares our security concerns and will ensure the protection of the Mission should there be violent demonstrations in the future. The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Republic of Bolivia the assurances of its highest consideration. To the Honorable Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship Of the Republic of Bolivia, La Paz. End text. URS