RECALL REFERENDUM BACKFIRING ON OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001129 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL BL SUBJECT: RECALL REFERENDUM BACKFIRING ON OPPOSITION REF: LA PAZ 1082 Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) With nearly a week's worth of hindsight the opposition is starting to recognize that their move to approve President Evo Morales' recall referendum legislation was likely an ill-conceived strategy. The chances of unseating Evo, while not impossible, are remote. Meanwhile, the other arguments put forward by the opposition (mainly PODEMOS) for approving the recall do not seem to hold water. Members of PODEMOS, citing Bolivian law, argue there can only be one national referendum per year so the recall referendum should de facto block a national vote on the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS)' draft constitution until 2009. Others in the opposition have called PODEMOS' position "absurd" given that that Morales' MAS rarely allows the law to stand in its way. The MAS is understandably arguing that one referendum with several questions makes both logistical and financial sense and is now suggesting a vote on its draft constitution should be included as part of the August 10 referendum. ¶2. (C) PODEMOS' argument that the recall referendum would serve as a mechanism to restore the party on the national political stage while pulling the increasingly powerful prefects (governors) closer to them has largely backfired. PODEMOS congress members are now openly distancing themselves from the decision. Meanwhile, the prefects are angry with the party for failing to warn them about the recall decision. Moreover, the prefects' key issue of departmental autonomy, which was front and center on the national agenda until May 8, has now been eclipsed by the recall referendum. The pressure on Evo that the May 4 autonomy vote in Santa Cruz generated has been deflected. Evo and his closest confidantes must be delighted by the opposition's state of disarray. Nonetheless, they too seem to be having second thoughts. While Evo is bound to win the recall, he is unlikely to obtain the oft touted 54 percent "mandate for change" he achieved in December 2005. Thus he would emerge from the referendum weakened. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Evo Signs Recall Referendum Legislation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (U) President Evo Morales signed legislation May 12 approving a recall vote for himself, Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera, and all nine of Bolivia's prefects (governors). The opposition-led Senate passed the legislation, originally conceived by President Morales and his ruling MAS party, in a surprise move on May 8. Prior to May 8, the Senate had rejected the legislation as being too favorable to the Morales, and indeed as passed there is only a slim chance for Evo to lose. Under the law, the President/Prefects will lose their mandate should the "NO" vote exceed both in percentage AND the number of votes cast the results in favor of the President/Prefects in the December 2005 election. For more details on the specifics of the recall law see reftel. - - - - - - - - Party Politics - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Several Embassy contacts within the main opposition party PODEMOS have told us the idea to pass the MAS' recall legislation was hatched on May 5 at Ex-President Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga's birthday party. Per our sources, one of the PODEMOS party attendees mentioned a new poll that showed President Morales' approval rating at 33 percent. Giddy from the poll numbers the PODEMOS party-ers decided at the spur of the moment that the time was right to challenge Evo to a recall. - - - - - - - - - The Numbers Game - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) While Morales' popularity is sagging, polling we have still shows him with over 50 percent approval which is a far cry from the 33 percent cited by the opposition. Several opposition contacts claim that conditions in Bolivia are ripe for Evo's recall now that the cities of Sucre and Cochabamba are firmly in the opposition camp. While Evo' support has dropped in both cities, together they only comprise approximately 10 percent of the total electorate. Although the anti-Evo sentiment is strong in the departments of Beni, Pando and Tarija, they too only add up to 10 percent. The opposition likely stands to rack up 12 to 13 percent of the required 54 percent from Sucre, Cochabamba, Beni, Pando and Tarija. That total added to anti-Evo votes from Santa Cruz's May 4 autonomy statutes referenda puts the opposition close to 44 percent, but still 10 points shy of the 54 percent needed. It also fails to consider the possibility of high abstention rates which would work in Evo's favor (reftel). For the opposition to succeed it will have to make serious inroads in the MAS-majority departments of La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi. To date it only appears the La Paz city middle class has the inclination to vote against Evo in large numbers. Furthermore, the government will launch an intense media campaign, surely financed by Venezuela. And, Evo's enduring strength as the symbol for change and promoter of indigenous rights should not be underestimated. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Recall Designed to Delay MAS Constitution . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Recognizing that Evo is relatively safe from recall, many in the opposition argue that the real reason behind the decision to approve the recall legislation was to delay a national referendum on the MAS' draft constitution. The opposition feared their Santa Cruz victory would prompt the government to approve its new constitution in order to regain the upper hand. Citing Bolivia's law 2769 which establishes the rules on how referenda can be implemented, PODEMOS members argue that there can only be one national referendum per year. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . But the MAS Has Other Ideas . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) The MAS, however, has turned PODEMOS' single referendum strategy on its head. The MAS is now arguing for a single referendum with essentially two main themes, one on the recall vote and one on approving/rejecting its draft constitution. (Note: Both the constitutional inquiry and the recall vote would actually consist of two questions each. End Note). The MAS can make the logical argument that one vote is more efficient and more cost effective than two separate nationwide plebiscites. Furthermore, law 2769 is ambiguous. It does indeed appear to limit the number of national referendum, but does not specify how many questions a single referendum can contain. ¶8. (C) The MAS appears to have two routes in which to include the constitutional question on the August 10 ballot: the feared Congressional encirclement tactic (which it used on February 28); or via a Presidential Supreme Decree. Influential MAS lower house deputy Gustavo Torrico began floating the Supreme Decree idea on May 12. The concept is actually not new. Congress is traditionally the only legal authority permitted to write and pass the enabling legislation for constitutional referenda. But, the MAS, during its hastily convened final session of the Constituent Assembly in December, passed a resolution allowing the President to authorize the referendum should Congress not complete its duties within 30 days. The December resolution clearly violates the assembly's enabling legislation as agreed upon by the MAS and opposition. However, without a quorum in the Constitutional Tribunal )- the body designed as a check on legislative and executive overreach -- there is no court to rule on the legality of such a decree. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Recall Law Provokes Dissension in Opposition - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) PODEMOS insiders cite yet another incentive for passing the recall referendum law. Some viewed the action as a means to restore relevance to the party on the national political stage. Yet PODEMOS Congress members are now openly distancing themselves from the decision. Senator Roberto Ruiz (PODEMOS, Tarija) has publicly called the decision "a terrible calculation, irresponsible, one that can cost PODEMOS its life." Lower House Deputy Edwin Flores (PODEMOS, Tarija) has called on his colleagues to pass a new law to overturn the recall legislation. ¶10. (C) But it is not only PODEMOS Congressional representatives that have expressed their concerns with the decision. Senator Fernando Romero (MNR, Beni) told PolOffs May 14 the MNR party was decidedly opposed to the recall referendum and will issue a statement blasting PODEMOS' recall strategy by May 15. Romero claims he walked out of the Senate on May 8 because he felt very uncomfortable with the reasoning provided to him for the recall by Senator Roger Pinto (PODEMOS, Pando). Romero criticized the logic, timing, and execution of the recall decision. After initially backing the move, National Unity (UN) party leader Samuel Doria Medina has called PODEMOS' action "absurd." Doria Medina has questioned PODEMOS' proposal that there can only be one referendum, arguing that even if it were true that the recall law could be trumped by law 2769, "the MAS has demonstrated that it does not comply with judicial order." - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Senate Surprise Understandably Angers Prefects - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) PODEMOS insiders have suggested that the move was also aimed at seizing the initiative from the prefects who had taken control with their autonomy push. On this count, the decision clearly backfired. Senator Luis Vasquez (PODEMOS, La Paz) in explaining the strategy behind the Senate's action stated, "in some cases we informed them (the prefects) . . . and in others we did not, but as a chamber we have to make decisions, and by our own criteria, the element of surprise was essential to our strategy. The prefects are angry because the Senate blindsided them; PODEMOS failed to consult with (or at least warn) them before the May 8 decision. (Comment: PODEMOS Congressional members openly acknowledge that even before the May 8 decision that the leaders of the media luna often ignored Quiroga, now the situation is almost certainly worse. End Comment). ¶12. When questioned by poloff about the lack of coordination with the Prefects and the fracturing of the opposition, Senator Jose Villavicencio (UN, Pando) stumbled through some explanations. He admitted the prefects were not consulted but claimed that there would not be a break between them and the national opposition parties. In the end, the opposition from all of Bolivia's departments would all unite against the MAS, Villavicencio added. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Autonomy Moves to Backburner - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) What further angers the opposition prefects is that the recall has distracted the nation's attention away from the autonomy movements of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija. Following Santa Cruz's autonomy referendum on May 4 in which the pro-autonomy (anti-government) vote won by a landslide (85 to 15 percent),many analysts felt the pendulum of political momentum had shifted to the departments and away from Evo Morales. Now analysts note the recall referendum has allowed Evo to retake the initiative and put his MAS constitution back at the forefront. The prefects of Beni, Pando and Tarija rather than focusing their attention on the upcoming autonomy referenda in their departments, now must work on their own campaign plans. ¶14. (C) Another argument in favor of the recall referendum, put forward by some in the opposition, was to roll back the MAS' plans to impede (perhaps with violence) the June 1 autonomy referenda in Beni, Pando and June 22 in Tarija. (Comment: We feel that campaigning both against the recall and the autonomy referenda are not mutually exclusive for the MAS. The MAS can and likely will do both. In fact, a poor showing (i.e. not overwhelming victory) by the opposition-led pro-autonomy movement in the Beni, Pando and Tarija referenda would give Morales momentum going into the August 10 recall. End Comment). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Forget the Recall, Let's Go to Elections - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶15. (C) The opposition prefects have all publicly agreed to "submit" to the recall referendum. However, that has not stopped them from calling the referendum a waste of time and money that will fail to solve the nation's problems. Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben Costas on May 13 suggested that a "larger solution" is necessary and then suggested convoking general elections rather than the recall. Cochabamba Prefect Manfred Reyes Villa echoed his Santa Cruz colleague's proposal, arguing that one solution would be for all (the President, Vice President, and Prefects) to resign and submit to a new round of general elections. (Comment: Resignations leading to new elections is constitutionally problematic as there is a line-of-succession for both the President and prefects. Also, under the current constitution, those in power today could not run for the same office in the next election. However, if there is a "grand" political agreement to hold general elections, all parties will try to find the way to have their candidates run for re-election. End Comment). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Electoral Court Can Stop the Recall - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶16. (C) Following Evo's May 12 signing of the recall law, the National Electoral Court (CNE) almost immediately approved a resolution (057/2008) identifying the calendar of tasks required to meet the scheduled August 10 referendum date. Without a functioning CNE, the recall referendum (in theory) cannot move forward. The court today is split. The opposition-friendly justice Jeronimo Pinhiero has dissented from his two colleagues, Morales appointee and CNE President Jose Luis Exeni and Justice Amalia Oporto, on several recent decisions and has argued publicly the two are overly (MAS) partisan. With just three of five justices on the court, should Pinheiro resign the CNE will no longer have the requisite quorum to function. Pinheiro, who is close to Pando Prefect Leopoldo Fernandez, is rumored to be thinking about resigning which would leave the CNE without the needed quorum. ¶17. (C) Both MAS and PODEMOS Congressional leaders have stated that filling the CNE's two vacancies is an immediate priority. However, both sides might prefer to keep the court's razor-thin quorum as a means to complicate or even stop the recall (and potentially constitutional) referendum should they find themselves in a bad electoral situation. The opposition could pressure Pinheiro to resign, while the MAS could attempt to press one of their judges to resign. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶18. (C) PODEMOS' decision to support the recall referendum was badly coordinated and poorly thought through. Rather than make PODEMOS and the national opposition in general more politically relevant, the reactions to the May 8 Senate decision highlight the opposition's lack of a strategy and cohesiveness. At a time when logic suggests that the opposition should be united behind autonomy, the one movement that can stymie Evo's plans, the opposition within and outside of PODEMOS is busying sniping at each other. Furthermore, as Doria Medina pointed out, it is "absurd" that PODEMOS would cite Bolivian law and then expect the MAS to abide it. After all, PODEMOS has frequently criticized the MAS for acting illegally. ¶19. (C) While Evo and his entourage must take some pleasure from the opposition's disarray, they too are unenthusiastic about the recall referendum. The MAS likes to cite Evo's 54 percent December 2005 victory as a mandate for his "change" agenda. In all likelihood, Evo will poll worse than in 2005. Government spokesperson Ivan Canelas has already hinted that government would be open to canceling the recall, should it and the opposition reach a national pact. End Comment. GOLDBERG