BOLIVIAN FOOD SAFETY TAKES BACK SEAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 000111 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017 TAGS: ECON PGOV AGR FAO FAS IFAD IICA EINV BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN FOOD SAFETY TAKES BACK SEAT REF: LA PAZ 3236 Classified By: Acting EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Bolivian Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (SENASAG) is facing a funding crisis heading into the new year. The termination of an Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loan and an unwillingness to accept administrative controls mandated by the P.L. 480 program leave SENASAG facing a budget shortfall of over $5 million or 57% of their 2008 budget. Currently, only 40% of SENASAG employees are working as the Ministry of Agriculture continues to muddle through with a SENASAG reorganization. The process demonstrates a disregard of SENASAG's institutional integrity, the GOB's prioritization of political objectives over technical goals, regional rivalries, institutional incompetence, and hostility towards U.S. development assistance. Meanwhile, programs designed to control biological threats to the food supply (including hoof and mouth disease) are at risk in 2008. End Summary. -------------- An Incompetent Ministry Focused on Politics -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ministry of Agriculture (MDRAyMA) under the Morales Administration often appears more focused on political ends than on providing competent service to its constituents. A clear example is the Ministry's dealings with SENASAG, the Bolivian equivalent of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Over the past year, it was clear that the agency would have financial difficulties as IDB funding came to a close. Contingency plans were continually postponed as the Ministry voiced its desire to "reorganize" SENASAG. To date, no formal reorganization has been realized and according to Luis Carrasco, Administrative Specialist for APHIS, who works within SENASAG in a separate administrative unit (UNADE),the agency faces a budget shortfall of over $5 million or 57% of their 2008 budget. Currently, only 40% of SENASAG employees are working. ¶3. (C) The USG is involved with SENASAG through APHIS employees who work directly in the agency and through financing from remaining Title I USDA funds (Ref. A). Aware of the looming crisis, Regional Agricultural Counselor (Eugene Philhower, based in Lima) proposed using $800,000 from the remaining Title I funds to fortify SENASAG, as long as the UNADE unit remained in place to effectively administer all program funding. He thinks that UNADE control over finances is vital to curb the Ministry's penchant for placing MAS party members in an agency with easy access to small farmers throughout the country. Despite letters explaining the offer, no proposals were put forward by the Ministry until December 24th when P.L. 480 Secretariat Director, Juan Carlos Rodriguez was contacted by the Ministry. Rather than calling for a P.L. 480 board meeting, the Ministry wanted to set up an emergency teleconference with Embassy officials in Lima and La Paz on December 28 to consider funding for SENASAG. After that initial outreach, no additional, more formal proposals have been put forward. ¶4. (C) In a January 7 meeting, SENASAG Director, Rolando Cazzol offered no insights as to when SENASAG reorganization would be complete. Moreover, there was no plan in place to replace missing funding for 2008. It also appears that rather than allow UNADE to continue operating with a transparently hired, technically competent staff, the Ministry would prefer a crippled SENASAG to partially operate LA PAZ 00000111 002 OF 004 through 2008. (NOTE: Moreover, of the $1 million that the P.L. 480 board approved over a year ago for SENASAG to execute a Newcastle disease control program, only $46,000 has been spent. When asked why these funds have yet to be utilized, especially considering the funding shortages, Oscar Sandy, Chief Administrator of SENASAG, replied that the strange controls imposed by UNADE prevented him from spending the funds. Luis Carrasco denounced this as ridiculous to EconOff. Both he and Cesar Orozco, the Veterinary Officer provided by APHIS, think that withholding the funds is strictly political. Moreover, they say that Sandy has been blocking most funding for technical programs over the past year. Both APHIS employees believe that Sandy will now blame UNADE controls for SENASAG inefficiencies and will seek to justify its elimination, or at least the replacement of its personnel. End Note.) ¶5. (C) The situation is made even more unpredictable, as the Minister of Agriculture, Susana Rivero, appears to be on the verge of being replaced. President Morales recently denounced her as part of the "oligarchy" and wondered publicly why she was part of his government. In practical terms, a new Minister would probably signify both new leadership at SENASAG (Cazzol is rumored to be a high school sweetheart of Rivero) and starting any reorganization plans again from scratch. -------------- IDB Observations Match Our Own -------------- ¶6. (C) According to the Senior Multi-Sectorial Specialist at the IDB, Masami Yamamori, IDB administrators were concerned about institutional sustainablity in SENASAG due to constant personnel changes. SENASAG hired around 300 "consultants" for temporary work in 2007 and Yamamori also thought the Ministry was using SENASAG for MAS political activities. Despite this, Yamamori said that the IDB would be considering funding additional SENASAG programs for 2009 if they receive a promised formal proposal from the government. (NOTE: Oscar Sandy said that IDB funding for 2009 was 80% secure. Curiously, Yamamori also said that a SENASAG proposal would have a leg up on other proposals in Bolivia because it has a proven track record. The IDB has a $75 million quota for Bolivia in 2009. End Note). -------------- The Departments Want Control -------------- ¶7. (C) An additional reason for SENASAG's budget shortfall is that the opposition departments of the 'Media Luna' (Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando) have all withdrawn financial support for the agency. All are demanding a greater say over SENASAG activities within their departments. Tarija has moved the furthest in establishing independent plant and animal health operations. The prefect currently funds and staffs its own foot and mouth disease control program and just established an independent organization for control over fruit flies. According to the Prefect's Secretary of Economic Development, Ernesto Farfan, the MAS SIPDIS had been using SENASAG workers for political means. He even blamed the agency for organizing several blockades in Tarija. He claims that the national organization could recognize the work of third parties in carrying out food safety programs, and thus give department exports national certification, but it is something that SENASAG leaders would be unlikely to concede. Tarija will share their experiences in a January 17 meeting in Santa Cruz where "relations with SENASAG" will be discussed among 'Media Luna' agricultural leaders. ¶8. (C) Claims of abuse are not one-sided. Oscar Sandy accuses the Tarija Prefecture of spreading anti-MAS propaganda while carrying out cattle inoculations. APHIS LA PAZ 00000111 003 OF 004 employees think that both claims are probably true and that both they and their technical work are caught uncomfortably in the middle. -------------- Dangerous Ramifications -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite the negative portrait of the situation, SENASAG has achieved many successes. Carlos Covarrubias, APHIS Program Coordinator in Santiago, Chile described how since UNADE controls were placed in SENASAG seven years ago, Bolivia has been able to control its foot and mouth disease problems and effectively initiate other technical programs. Unfortunately, these advances are currently threatened. Under the Morales administration, technical work has been increasingly difficult to carry out (particularly since Minister Rivero was appointed one year ago). The ramification is that Bolivia is again vulnerable to disease outbreaks. The most high profile is foot and mouth disease, which can not only threaten beef and other agricultural exports from Bolivia, but can also quickly spread throughout the region. ¶11. (C) It is not just beef exporters however, who will suffer with a dysfunctional SENASAG. For example, a program for the control of fruit flies was just initiated in Bolivia. According to the local APHIS representative, 40%-60% of Bolivian fruit is lost because of fruit flies. Ironically, it is not the large producers who are most affected (they have the money to spray),but rather all rural Bolivians with a fruit tree or two. Similarly, the avian Newcastle disease, which can wipe out all the chickens in an infected area, likely won't affect large exporters who can afford to inoculate their birds, but rather those rural families that critically depend on eggs and chicken for protein in their diet. These concerns for the poorest Bolivians however, have taken a back seat to regional conflicts and political agendas. ¶12. (C) The personnel upheaval in Senasag also has implications for the continued sound operation of the Phyto-sanitary Inspection Center based in the Chapare region of Bolivia. This region has received heavy U.S. assistance to reduce coca production and spur sustained economic development based on high value export crops, e.g., bananas, pineapples, and palm hearts. The inspection center was jointly funded by USAID and the British Government and is now owned and managed by SENASAG. Currently, the center is being operated with minimal personnel resulting in weakened inspection, quality control, and speed of certification. Even if the center is once again fully staffed with new personnel, the learning curve means that export processes will be slowed down. Furthermore, if SENASAG is not able to carry out its responsibilities in controlling problems such as foot and mouth disease in the Chapare, this could seriously hurt the ability of farmers to continue to export from this region. To date, USAID-funded programs have taken on this responsibility, but ideally and over the long term, SENASAG needs to provide this service. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) After dialogue with SENASAG officials, it is the conclusion of USDA, APHIS, and Embassy officials that we must take a "wait and see" approach toward SENASAG funding through the P.L. 480 program. While probable backsliding on plant and animal health control programs is regrettable, providing the MAS controlled agency with a blank check for reorganization plans is unpalatable. Ideally the government will realize that the technical work is important and that the model suggested by the P.L. 480 board is both logical and LA PAZ 00000111 004 OF 004 has achieved laudable advances in the area, but currently this positive outcome seems unlikely. Ultimately, if the Morales administration truly thought that the work being done by SENASAG was important, it could use some of its budget surplus to fully fund the agency in the form of its liking, but that too appears unlikely. GOLDBERG