BOLIVIA: RECALL SURPRISE -- A HIGH RISK GAMBIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001082

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: RECALL SURPRISE -- A HIGH RISK GAMBIT

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) In a surprise move on May 8, Bolivia's
opposition-controlled Senate passed a law proposed originally
by President Evo Morales that provides for a recall
referendum on the President and Bolivia's nine prefects
(governors). Evo signed off on the law a few hours later.
The Senate has opted for a high risk strategy which could
result in the opposition losing at least two prefectures, La
Paz and Cochabamba. Evo with his current popularity,
favorable rules, and Venezuelan financing seems unlikely to
lose the recall, but could come out weakened. Members of the
opposition PODEMOS party who support the move say it was
designed to prevent the government from taking radical
actions against opposition autonomy-seeking departments
(states). They also stress the measure postpones a vote on
the Movement Toward Socialism's (MAS) draft constitution.
Others in PODEMOS call the move "myopic" and designed purely
to allow the weakened national opposition a chance to
"reclaim the agenda" from the ascendant prefects. If it goes
forward, the National Electoral Court (CNE) should hold
referendum in the next 90 days. But, the CNE is fractured
and one resignation from the court could stop the process.
One thing is sure, the already confusing Bolivian political
scene has just gotten more complicated. End Summary.


2. (U) On May 8, Bolivia's opposition-controlled Senate, in
an unexpected move, passed a law proposed originally by
President Evo Morales that provides for a recall referendum
on the President and Bolivia's nine prefects (governors).
President Morales approved the law hours later after a brief
cabinet meeting. The law calls for the referendum to be held
within 90 days. In theory should the referendum go forward,
the National Electoral Court (CNE) must organize the
referendum on or before August 5.


3. (U) The Senate had until May 8 rejected the recall
referendum law that was passed by Morales' Movement Toward
Socialism (MAS) party in the lower house in January 2008.
The lower house law was widely viewed as overly favorable to
the President. Under the law, the President/Prefects will
have their mandates terminated should the "NO" vote exceed
both in percentage AND the number of votes cast the results
in favor of the President/Prefects in the December 2005
election. The original Senate bill demanded a simple
majority (50 percent plus one) "NO" vote in order to recall
the President/Prefects. Some 1,544,374 eligible voters chose
Morales in December 2005 which equaled 53.74 percent of vote
cast.


4. (U) For Evo to be recalled under the May 8 law, 53.75
percent of voters would have to vote against Morales and the
total number of "NO" votes cast would have to equal or exceed
1,544,375. If more than 1,544,375 voted against Morales but
the percentage did not exceed 53.74 percent, Morales would
stay in power. In order for the prefects to remain in power
the "NO" vote must NOT exceed the following 2005 results:

Beni 44.63 percent, 46,482 votes
Cochabamba 47.61 percent, 246,417 votes
Chuquisaca 42.30 percent, 66,999 votes
La Paz 37.98 percent, 361,055 votes
Oruro 40.95 percent, 63,630 votes
Pando 48.03 percent, 9,958 votes
Potosi 40.69 percent, 79,710 votes
Santa Cruz 47.87 percent, 299,730 votes
Tarija 45.65 percent, 64,098 votes

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Who Is At Risk?
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5. (SBU) Given recent polling data shows that the President
as still having over a 50 percent approval rating, Evo does
not seem to be at risk of losing the recall referendum. On
the contrary certain opposition prefects are at risk, namely
Jose Luis Paredes of La Paz and Manfred Reyes Villa of
Cochabamba. Despite the odds against them, both the prefects
of La Paz and Cochabamba have indicated they approve of the
referendum.


6. (SBU) Paredes is most at risk because in December 2005,
he ran against several candidates thus splitting the vote
leaving him with just under 38 percent. The recall
referendum is simply a yes/no vote on Paredes meaning even if
he garnered 55 to 60 percent support, he could still be
recalled, a scenario which is likely given he serves in
heavily MAS department. Paredes claims his campaign will
focus on the "advances" he has provided La Paz department.


7. (SBU) Manfred Reyes Villa who received close to 48
percent of the vote in 2005, presides over an evenly divided
department between pro- and anti-MAS constituents. Rural
Cochabamba, dominated by the coca-growing Chapare region, is
the heart of President Morales' base. There has been a
recall (signature) campaign against Reyes Villa as far back
as December 2006. Reyes Villa may have accepted the recall
referendum since he would have to face the issue sometime
anyway.


8. (SBU) On the MAS-side, the prefects of Oruro and Potosi
are at somewhat of a risk as they both barely achieved 40
percent in December 2005. Popular Potosi Mayor Rene Joaquino
who is trying to mount his own national political party
Alianza Social (AS) could view the recall referendum as a
chance to unseat the MAS on his home turf and the adjacent
department of Oruro.

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Recall Math 101
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9. (SBU) Because the recall referendum requires that the
"NO" vote exceed both the percentage and the number of votes
cast in December 2005, a high abstention rate in the
referendum could mean that both the President and Prefects
remain in power. Only 15.5 percent of eligible voters
abstained in December 2005, however in the May 4 Santa Cruz
autonomy statutes referendum the abstention rate was much
higher, over 30 percent. Despite increased voter
registrations, less Santa Cruz residents voted on May 4, 2008
than in December 2005. Of course, if the MAS and opposition
are energized to try to topple their respective political
enemies, abstention rates may be close to the December 2008
number.

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Why the High Risk Strategy?
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10. (C) With President Morales almost certain to pass the
recall, given his current approval ratings and the Venezuelan
cash that will help finance his campaign, why would the
opposition in the Senate agree to the recall referendum?
According to Senator Robert Yanez (PODEMOS, Beni) the
opposition made the decision that it was "less damaging" to
the country to call a recall referendum, even one that was
not on the most optimal terms, than to "proceed on the
current trajectory." According to Yanez, many in the
opposition feared that Evo with his back up against the wall
and facing three more sure autonomy referendum victories
would try something radical/violent. Yanez acknowledged that
the recall referendum is also a ploy to push back a vote on
the MAS constitution to 2009, when the opposition will be
able to negotiate from a position of greater strength.
Ultimately, according to Yanez PODEMOS politicians think time
is on their side: Evo will be weaker and they will be
stronger. He acknowledged there are risks with the strategy
and they are playing with fire because Evo could come out
boosted from referendum and they could lose in La Paz and
Cochabamba, but Yanez didn't think the outcome would change
much because low voter turnout is likely to nullify the
results.


11. (C) According to other sources, former President Jorge
"Tuto" Quiroga and his PODEMOS party cooked up the idea to
support the recall referendum at Tuto's birthday party on May

5. PODEMOS Alternate Senator Rafael Loayza told poloff, the
goal was to try to "retake the national agenda" from the
opposition prefects of the "media luna" departments of Santa
Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija. These four prefects,
especially Santa Cruz' Ruben Costas, have increasingly taken
on the mantle of leading the opposition, a role that Quiroga
and others in the national opposition view as a challenge.
For example, Evo Morales no longer calls on national
opposition figures to attend national talks, he simple calls
on the prefects. However, members of the Congressional
opposition often see the Prefects as having too much of a
regional (departmental) view and not a national view. Other
PODEMOS insiders have confirmed Loayza's account.


12. (C) Loayza, however, called the move a huge mistake and
"myopic". He acknowledged that Senators had in essence
"sacrificed" La Paz Prefect Jose Luis Paredes and set up
Manfred Reyes Villa for a "monumental" battle in Cochabamba.
He recognized that the opposition could pick up Potosi.
Loayza echoed what many critics have stated that by calling
on a national recall vote, the Senate has shifted the agenda
away from the autonomy movements (referenda) of Beni, Pando
and Tarija and hands Evo the chance to put himself back in
the middle of the political scene. While, it may take
attention from the autonomy votes Loayza explained that the
media luna prefects would still end up leading the anti-Evo
vote thus thwarting the national opposition's plan to return
to relevance. Loayza noted that even if Morales were to lose
(which Loayza acknowledged is unlikely) Evo would simply
return to the Chapare and stir up trouble for his successor
(or successors),and by implication continue to make Bolivia
ungovernable.


13. (C) Manuel Suarez, former advisor to President Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada, told poloff that the Santa Cruz Civic
Committee had heard the MAS was planning another takeover of
the Congress in a week and that they would push through
legislation to convoke a vote on the MAS constitution.
(Note: In a February 28 takeover, MAS supporters blocked
opposition members from attending Congress and passed
convoking legislation which was later overturned by a CNE
resolution arguing the law did not provide enough time to
organize a referendum. End Note). Suarez argued the Senate
passed the recall referendum to throw the MAS off. However,
he acknowledged the MAS could still go ahead and push through
the constitutional referendum as well. Suarez mentioned that
the Senate's actions caught the Committee totally by
surprise, but that the Committee is tentatively supporting
the move. Suarez echoed the popular wisdom that Manfred
Reyes Villa and Jose Luis Paredes are very vulnerable.

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Comment
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14. (C) The Senate's move is risky and throws the Bolivian
political scene into further confusion, or even chaos. The
risks are definitely higher for the opposition than for
Morales, although the recall seems to shelve the new MAS
constitution for now. The recall also provides the
opposition leverage to try to prevent the government from
acting against its autonomy referenda in Beni, Pando and
Tarija. The reality is that the recall may never happen.
There are numerous potential obstacles for the recall
referendum which could prevent it from ever advancing. The
National Electoral Court (CNE) which must organize and
supervise the referendum is split and has the bare minimum
three person quorum. If any justice on the CNE resigned, the
court could not (in theory) carry out the election.
Furthermore, if Congress ever decides to appoint magistrates
to the Constitutional Tribunal, the Tribunal could rule the
recall law unconstitutional thus stopping the process
altogether.


15. (C) According to Bolivia's constitution, the loser(s) of
the recall referendum, (the President or the Prefects),would
not be permitted to run again for the same office in the
subsequent election. The constitution does not permit
consecutive mandates. However, with Bolivia's fluid
political system anything is possible. Without a
Constitutional Tribunal to rule against a law passed
specifically to allow Morales to run again, Evo's loss would
not necessarily spell out the end of this presidency. End
Comment.
GOLDBERG