WORKING RELATIONS: DEATH BY A THOUSAND PAPER CUTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001023 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS MARR EAID ECON OPDC OPRC ADPM BL SUBJECT: WORKING RELATIONS: DEATH BY A THOUSAND PAPER CUTS REF: A. LA PAZ 899 ¶B. LA PAZ 711 ¶C. LA PAZ 695 ¶D. 07 LA PAZ 2960 ¶E. 07 LA PAZ 2634 Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Despite a constant barrage of anti-U.S. vitriol and baseless accusations of U.S. conspiracies against the Morales government, there are also many examples of continuing good relations among working-level and even senior-level contacts. However, there is clearly a campaign underway since mid-2007 to "distance" the Bolivian Government from the United States backed by a number of concrete actions, including new restrictions, demands, and calls to renegotiate, reject, or freeze long-standing agreements. Many government officials have cut off contact with the mission, either at their own behest or through the orders of superiors. Due to an influx of new political appointees government-wide, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether actions are intended to be slights or simply incompetence. We have also observed a new fear of association with the Embassy among some working-level contacts. Constant high-level government accusations of U.S. conspiracies inherently make it more difficult to engage at the working level. We will continue to reach out to the Bolivian government at all levels (ref a),but we do not expect to escape scapegoat status any time soon. Many high-ranking government officials are simply not ready to accept any reality that does not fit into their paranoid view of the United States. End Summary. Fear of the Empire: Paranoid Political Backdrop -------------- -- ¶2. (C) Although the government has spewed anti-U.S. rhetoric since Morales took power in January 2006, consistent with Morales' positions before he became president, we had not seen concrete steps taken to follow through on the rhetoric until October, 2007 with the release of the presidential foreign assistance decree (ref d). Before then, veteran officers dismissed the rhetoric as bluster, consistent with the assurances of working-level contacts and political contacts that such outbursts were simply part of the government's ongoing campaign to rally its base around symbolic, but ultimately hallow, anti-imperialist vitriol. ¶3. (C) However, since the decree was issued, we have witnessed a steady ratcheting up of concrete measures detrimental to our working-level cooperation. Vice Foreign Minister Hugo Fernandez confirmed this intentional "distancing" in our bilateral relationship back in September. Much of this "distancing" is reflected in actions that are not entirely attributed to us, but that nevertheless are clearly aimed in our direction, for example opening diplomatic relations with Iran, suggesting the UN be moved from New York, and blaming the "empire" (read U.S.) for global climate change. ¶4. (C) These actions to distance us are compounded by and consistent with an increase in the quantity and scope of government attacks against the U.S. in general, and the Embassy and the Ambassador in particular. Government and ruling MAS Party contacts confirm that these attacks are not just political gamesmanship, but sincere fears we are trying to undermine their rule and orchestrate their ouster. Whatever the case, these accusations are scaring some of our contacts away from us. New Assistance Rules: Bark, Bite, or Both? -------------- ¶5. (C) Ever since the government passed a decree requiring closer international assistance coordination with public institutions in October, 2007, we have waited to see how the government would apply the vaguely-worded, potentially far-reaching decree (ref d). Although we are still waiting for implementing regulations, it is clear the government wishes to exert more control over our assistance budget ($124 million in FY07). --Following months of allegations that USAID programs were undermining the government, the government finally requested a comprehensive review of USAID programs (ref c). While the government has labeled this a technical exercise, the signals are clear that there is a strong political element to the review, including efforts to control U.S. funds and secure patronage for the MAS party faithful. While we are concerned that the government may be using the review to stop at least parts of USAID's programs (democracy in particular),we also note that the government is disorganized and plagued by infighting. --This review has been much more in)depth and lengthy than past reviews. Normally a host country government review would take a few days, not the 30 days the government requested. The review has already passed its 30 day deadline and there is much more work to be done. At the current pace, the entire review could last as long as six months. While the process may be necessary to show we are transparent and focused on development, it is a drain on staff time and resources. --One point of contention are the numerous and evolving information requests made by the government to USAID. We suspect they are after information to build a case against us. As much of what they seek is protected by U.S. law or part of diplomatic archives, we have pushed back on these requests. --So far, a welcome irony of the review has been the very positive reception USAID and government staff has received from community members when we have traveled to the field to visit projects. The government reviewers see how valuable this work is and what little capacity they have to carry out these programs without USAID and its project partners. Furthermore, farmers and mayors have given the government reviewers an earful on the need to thaw certain projects frozen by the government. USAID: Continued Scrutiny -------------- ¶6. (C) The government has not put its criticisms of USAID on hold pending the results of the review (ref b). In the weeks prior to the May 4 Autonomy Referendum in the Department (state) of Santa Cruz, President Morales has been falsely accusing USAID of going door-to-door offering people money to oppose the government. On April 19, the President reportedly levied this attack on USAID. "Our patience can end. If they want to work, they can work; if they want to help, they can help, and if they do not want to do it, get out of Bolivia." --This latest round is fueled for the first time by so-called "evidence" of USAID conspiracy: a letter from an Assistant-Mayor to Morales asking him to suspend USAID activities in Potosi Department (state) because USAID is "offering money to leaders that are provoking conflicts and divisions in our communities." (Note: We have not seen the letter. End Note.) --In a highly-publicized rejection of U.S. support, Agriculture Minister Susana Rivero refused to accept 19,000 tons of wheat flour because she considered the donation an affront to national dignity. The Ambassador noted that it is Bolivia's sovereign right to refuse assistance. The refusal has been a public relations disaster for the government amid soaring inflation and rising bread prices." --By and large, the criticisms come from the President and the Minister of the Presidency, and don't seem to be shared widely within the cabinet. However, the President's public criticisms prompt some ministers and vice ministers to avoid dealing with USAID, at least for the time being. Cutting Off Uncle Sam: The "Distancing" Begins -------------- - ¶7. (C) Some government officials have threatened to or actually stopped meeting with us, have refused to continue cooperation or with our programs, or have failed to renew agreements for no other reason than we are the U.S. Embassy. --The government has suspended a routine annual exchange of diplomatic notes granting our military in Bolivia on temporary assignment rights and protections consistent with a Status of Forces Agreement. The government has made clear the freeze is based on political reasons and will not be lifted until the "atmosphere" improves. The Vice Foreign Minister readily suggested that the USG repackage the SOFA exchange of notes as a "new" agreement to get past resistance to renewal. Suspension of the exchange has already cost Bolivia more than a million dollars in medical assistance benefits for 2008 and threatens 2009 humanitarian assistance projects. --The government suspended military participation in the Western Hemisphere Institution for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC),alleging the training facility is teaching Bolivian students to oppress their own people. Although Government Minister Alfredo Rada said the police would likewise be banned from attending the facility, no official order has followed and police continue to attend. The Bolivian Navy has interpreted the WHINSEC ban to include any training that discusses strategy, which sometimes requires them to stretch the definition of "technical" training. --The Vice Ministry of Culture refused to work with our book donation program in 2008, ostensibly because they were too busy. We are now simply working directly with libraries and local authorities. The snub has had no impact on the program, as Ministry participation was confined to taking credit for the donations at public events. --The government's export promotion office (Ceprobol) has been instructed to stop supporting programs if USAID or the U.S. Embassy is involved. This automatically bans USAID or Embassy from funding commercial diplomacy projects. The ban includes staff members attending Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade (IBCE) seminars funded by USAID. --The Morales Administration cut funding for all U.S.-funded Bolivian personnel in the administrative unit of the Bolivian Food and Animal Health Safety Agency (SENASAG) in 2008. Without this administrative control, some $4 million in USDA funds targeting problems such as hoof and mouth disease and fruit fly control, have been frozen. --Vice Minister of Coca Geronimo Meneses told our Narcotics Affairs Sections (NAS) he had been specifically instructed by the Agriculture Minister Susana Rivero not to meet with U.S. officials. He followed these orders from December to February, when Minister Rivero announced her resignation (which later was rejected by President Morales). Fear Factor: Guilt by "Imperial" Association -------------- ¶8. (C) In additional to officials that have stopped associating with us altogether, many of our contacts have confided they are under pressure not to work or meet with us. Other government contacts have reduced their contact with us and will only meet in neutral locations out of sight or under the most official of circumstances. Clearly, it is not career enhancing to appear too close to the Embassy if you are a government official. Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana has likewise attempted to frighten our own Bolivian employees by publicly questioning their patriotism. --One of our MFA contacts asked PolOff to arrange meetings via his anonymous private e-mail account, to not talk publicly about friendly MFA officials, and to not call him on his business phone or e-mail. He also says the fear factor has infected every career diplomat at the MFA, to the point that everyone uses cell phones at work and assumes their phones are tapped and e-mails monitored. --Our Regional Security Office (RSO) police contacts' are being pressured to minimize association with the Embassy and fear meeting anywhere outside of police headquarters. On rare occasion, some will still meet informally in discrete restaurants, but only on condition that they arrive and leave separately. Embassy Force Protection Detachment reports contacts in Trinidad and Tarija Departments (states) are being told to sever all contact except when absolutely necessary. --Army Commander Gen. Freddy Mackay commented to us that ever since we identified him as a graduate of WHINSEC courses, he has had "to watch his back." This despite the fact that Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana is also a graduate and has never reconciled his fiery attacks on the institution with his presence there. --Contacts may have good reason to fear government retaliation. Returning diplomats from overseas postings are routinely placed on leave without pay if they are not deemed sufficiently pro-government. A MAS political appointee, who had worked well with the Embassy in issuing courtesy visas to U.S. Fulbright scholars, was sacked earlier in April. While the courtesy visa procedure was never "legal" under Bolivian law, it had been in use for many years (see below). The Director of the Bolivian Agency for Development of Information Society (ADSIB; a quasi-government organization supported by the Vice President's Office) was fired in March following his public involvement in a computer donation sponsored by Intel. Apparently, association with a U.S. multi-national company is sufficient grounds for removal in the Morales administration. --In an attack on our Bolivian national employees in August, 2007, Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana said Bolivian "traitors" working with the United States would be "judged" by history. Passive Aggressive Procedures: Show us Your Papers -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Post notes working level contacts are increasingly requiring us to present information we have not had to present in the past and routing us through new or newly enforced procedures. Government requests for itemized project and expenditure lists has become the norm throughout the Embassy and a result of the government's efforts to ensure "transparency." --Fulbright scholars and exchange fellows initially enter Bolivia on tourist visas, which are later expanded by the MFA as courtesy visas for the duration of their programs. The MFA broke with this long-standing policy in March and refused to grant our scholars courtesy visas. Because the Bolivian Mission in the United States has limited capacity to produce any visa type other than the 90-day tourist visa, we are stuck in a Catch-22. Of the three Amcits the change immediately impacts, one will exit Bolivia and re-enter with a new 90-day tourist visa, one will convert to a missionary visa in accordance with her work with a Catholic university, and the third still has more than 60 days before her visa expires. The MFA has indicated a willingness to negotiate a new bilateral cultural agreement with the USG. Our correspondence with the MFA cites a 1960s agreement on cultural exchanges; however, neither the Bolivians nor we can find a copy of the agreement. Absent the agreement, the MFA has "determined" that it cannot legally issue courtesy visas. --The Ministry of Housing submitted a list of training competencies to our Public Affairs Section that it suggested we target through our Fulbright and exchange programs. We have received similar letters in the past, for which we send a letter back explaining how the programs work and that many of the programs will overlap with the Ministry's very extensive and broad list of suggested training. This year, however, the Housing Ministry responded to our reply by requesting a comprehensive list of all Bolivian exchange program participants and their biographical information through the inception of the program in Bolivia. --The government agency responsible for regulating radio frequencies turned the normally routine process of renewing Embassy satellite telecommunications back-up links into a long and arduous process. We were required to provide over 100 legal/technical documents, half of which had to be certified by a notary public. Government Double Whammy: Hostility and Incompetence -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) At times it is difficult to distinguish whether the government's actions are intended to spite us, are simply the product of ineptitude, or some combination of both. --The government announced a new, politically motivated "visa fee" for U.S. citizen tourists visiting Bolivia (ref e). In the process, the U.S. was moved from the highest to the lowest tier of countries under Bolivian immigration law -- we are now lumped in with Angola, Somalia and Yemen. Insult was added to injury when the MFA put new and incompetent political appointees in charge of the change. Our officers had to explain basic consular terms and principles, and even had to correct their math at the many painful meetings leading up to the much-delayed, often-revised, and never fully-explained policy. Following the clumsy implementation, the Consular Section has heard reports of American Citizens who have been unable to obtain a visa at Bolivian consulates abroad, as the consulates simply ran out of the visa stickers or were unclear about the requirements. Overall, however, the new visa system has not/not proven overly onerous for U.S. citizens. --Although there are theoretically seven requirements in order to obtain a tourist visa at a Bolivian port of entry, Bolivian immigration officers have told ConOffs that in practice, due to time and personnel constraints, they only enforce three (the passport, application, and fee). This inconsistency has led airlines to refuse boarding passengers in Miami because they lacked one of the seven requirements (such as the yellow fever certificate),when this is not an actual requirement at the port of entry. --The MFA also failed to notify us of the formal sentencing of an American Citizen on terrorism charges in a very high-profile case. When an Embassy official tried to call the judge to inquire about the status of the case, he pretended that he was someone else when the judge realized he was talking to an Embassy staffer. "The judge is out," he said, before abruptly hanging up the phone. --Cooperation from the MFA and Bolivian courts as we attempt to ramp-up adoption services for U.S. citizens following U.S. ratification of the Hague Convention has been similarly lacking. Interlocutors have privately observed that given the political climate, it is unlikely that this process will move forward. "Misunderstandings," Reversals, and Half-Baked Apologies -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Government officials have reversed some actions we found to be part of U.S. "distancing." We may never know whether these examples were honest mistakes by overly cautious and possibly new officials or politically motivated slights overruled by internal Bolivian government pushback. --Although the Bolivian military has been slow to fill (non-WHINSEC) U.S.-sponsored training slots in 2008 and initially refused our requests for vehicle access passes (until recently routine),these issues have since been improved upon significantly or resolved, respectively. These delays could have been intended as an intentional effort to slight us, or could be explained by the yearly change in the high command, or could be a little of both. --The Foreign Ministry denied one of our MILGP candidates a dipnote necessary to receive a U.S. visa. He was told all such dipnotes were on hold for U.S. training. The matter was resolved and has not been repeated, but we do not know if a policy change occurred and was reversed or if a Bolivian consular officer simply did not understand procedure. --Technology and Information Advisor for the Ministry of the Presidency Jeol Flores de Carpio told the Bolivian Telecom Chamber (CTIC) that his office would support any program as long the U.S. Embassy and USAID are not involved. Once EcoPol officer reminded him that USAID and Commerce established the chamber and also support the ExpoTeleInfo annual fair, Flores revised his earlier ban on our help to accepting assistance that is conducted "in a transparent manner." --Production Minister Javier Hurtado told EconOff that the unilateral Bolivian naming of a new PL-480 Board President in violation of bilateral agreements was a mistake, not hostility. He urged patience for the learning curve of many new government employees. On the other hand, Hurtado asserted that the U.S. owed Bolivia something for its "blatantly political" freezing of the MCC compact process. He went on to claim that attacks against the Embassy and the Ambassador by President Morales were merely responses to U.S. aggression and hostile actions, such as holding up the MCC process. --U.S. military delegations visiting Bolivian bases used to be required only to obtain the approval of a service commander or the Armed Forces Commander. Now, the Ministry of Defense must approve a formal request. However, this is not being universally enforced, leading us to suspect the new requirement may have more to do with new military officials misunderstanding requirements than intentionally complicating the process. --A few high-ranking military officers have backed out of U.S.-sponsored military conferences with dubious excuses. Not All Bad News -------------- ¶12. (SBU) We note that these examples are not reflective of the whole of our working-level relationships, which remain cordial and, in some cases, better than we expected. Some examples: --Although we did have problems with an airport manager, including denial of tarmac access for Embassy staff assisting in diplomatic pouch runs and denial of VIP lounge access to the Ambassador's bodyguards, his behavior was rectified after we complained to his superior. Otherwise, GSO and Human Resources offices report no politically-motivated changes at the working level. --At a recent inauguration of USAID-funded social infrastructure projects and with press present, community members, the mayor and municipal council members, and the representative of the government's Vice Ministry of Coca and Integrated Development, roundly praised the USG for its support. --Access to senior military and Ministry of Defense officials remains better than most posts and cooperation with both our military and anti-narcotics interlocutors is enthusiastic. Comment: -------------- ¶13. (C) We have been going the extra mile to explain our assistance programs, basic concepts of international agreements and diplomatic protocol, and our interest in working with the Morales administration from the outset, but have little to show for it. Despite two years of patiently dealing with government paranoia and suspicion, the U.S. government and, in particular, the U.S. Embassy continues to be assaulted with an almost constant barrage of accusations that we are conspiring against the Morales administration. We understand the political value of scapegoating the United States in Bolivia, but this has gone on for so long and such a high pitch that it has begun to affect our ability to carry out our work. There is no amount of rational explanation that is likely to change this dynamic as it is becoming increasingly evident that there are some leaders in the government's inner circle (Quintana and Rada particularly) that do not want these "misunderstandings" to be resolved. ¶14. (C) Optimistically, as critical elements of the government work to uncover evidence of our supposed nefarious activities, they are bound to learn their suspicions are baseless, how important our assistance is to the people of Bolivia, and pave the way for contacts to reengage. This should be our goal. End Comment. GOLDBERG