PUNJAB GOVERNOR TASEER TELLS AMBASSADOR THAT SHARIFS ARE TOO

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAHORE 000276 E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/6/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER EFIN PK SUBJECT: PUNJAB GOVERNOR TASEER TELLS AMBASSADOR THAT SHARIFS ARE TOO CLOSE TO EXTREMISTS Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D ¶1. (C) Summary: Punjab Governor Salman Taseer told Ambassador Patterson September 30 that Punjab Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif and his brother Nawaz have ignored the growing extremist threat in the Punjab. Taseer, a member of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP),criticized the Sharifs' focus on political horse-trading designed to break the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and allow the PML-N to "escape" from its provincial coalition with the PPP. Taseer believed, based on his discussions with the PML, that Shahbaz Sharif would not/not be able to muster the necessary votes if Taseer demanded that he show support of the majority of the assembly -- a move that the Govenor can constitutionally make at any time. While Taseer repeatedly stated that he did not wish to use this power, he also indicated that if Shahbaz continued to try and break the PML and marginalize the PPP, he would have no alternative. Taseer equally underscored that President Zardari would be the final arbiter of the timing of this move. Taseer also indicated that if Shahbaz managed to avoid a confidence vote, the PPP might also consider imposing Governor's Rule in the Punajb on the grounds that Shahbaz's government was not doing enough to maintain law and order. End Summary. Future of the Shahbaz Sharif Provincial Government ¶2. (C) The Ambassador asked Punjab Governor Taseer about recent efforts by the PPP to forge a provincial alliance with the PML in an effort to force PML-N Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif from government. Taseer responded that he had no interest in destabilizing the current provincial government. However, Shahbaz had precipitated the crisis with his repeated attempts to create a sizeable forward block within the PML. If Shahbaz succeeded in convincing the majority of the PML to join the new forward block, its members would then be free from prohibitions on party crossing and able to vote with the PML-N to give Shahbaz an outright majority in the Provincial Assembly (the PML-N currently has 171 provincial assembly members, 15 short of the 186 necessary for a majority). The PML-N could then jettison its PPP partner and use its provincial power to challenge the PPP-led central government. "They (the Sharifs) want to use the Punjab as in the past - to launch a ground assault to destabilize the federal government," he said. "They are trying to replicate 1988, and they haven't learned anything." ¶3. (C) Taseer claimed, therefore, that the PPP had to act preemptively in its own defense. Taseer stated that if he believes the PPP no longer supports Shahbaz's provincial government, he would be constitutionally required to ask the Chief Minister to prove that he continues to enjoy a majority in the Assembly. Taseer doubted that Shahbaz could win such a vote without PPP support. The PML, unlike the "disciplined" MQM, is composed of "a scattering of individuals" and the PML-N cannot rely on it as a bloc of support. "Even Shahbaz's own 171 members will not all go with him in a vote," Taseer noted. Moreover, the Governor asserted that even if 15 PML members decide to support the PML-N, the law against floor-crossing would invalidate their votes and disqualify them from the Provincial Assembly. ¶4. (C) Taseer also noted that the PPP had considered moving a vote of no-confidence against Shahbaz on the grounds that he had not done enough to protect law and order and/or implementing Governor's rule in the Punjab on the same pretext. Neither of these possibilities, however, seemed to enthuse Governor Taseer. Taseer concluded by noting that the PPP had recently issued an ultimatum to Shahbaz that he respect its "rights" in the provincial government and stop trying to create a PML forward block, or it would move against his government. Taseer believed the likelihood of Shahbaz living up to this agreement was slim, but stressed that timing of any action against Shahbaz and the nature of the action was up to President Zardari. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador voiced concern that taking the provincial government from the PML-N would remove that party's stake in constructive governance and could lead it to destabilize the PPP government through street protests that could take on a very anti-American tone. She reflected that the anti-American comments voiced by the PML-N in response to President Zardari's visit to the U.S. could herald a wider campaign. Taseer disagreed, arguing that the Sharifs were more dangerous in the provincial government than out of it, as they were using the organs of state power to strengthen their grip on the Punjab at the expense of the federal government. He feared that left to their own devices, the PML-N would use the provincial government to destabilize the country. The Governor bemoaned the PML-N's willingness to sacrifice long-term policy for short-term political gains. "I wish they would take the five-year view because we cannot have elections every month," he opined. "We need to be clear that on the economy and security, the parties need to work together." Instead, he continued, the PML-N "is using populist methods by taking an anti-American stance." Taseer Links Sharifs to Terrorists ¶6. (C) Taseer claimed that Shahbaz Sharif's government lacked any real plan or commitment for dealing with extremists/terrorists in the Punjab. In response to the Ambassador's inquiries the Governor lamented that the Punjab government has done nothing to arrest Qari Saif Ullah Akhtar of Harkat Jihad al Islami; Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaiseh-e-Muhammad; Maulana Ludianvi of Sipah-e-Sahaba, or Hafiz Muhammad Saeed Azhar of Lashkar-e-Taiba -- despite outstanding warrants for their detention. He claimed that the Sharif brothers "keep going to madrassas that are extremely reactionary, and canoodling with maulvis." He contrasted the PML-N negligence with the PPP's attention to the issue: "President Zardari, [Interior Minister] Rehman Malik, yours truly -- we are clear [the mullahs] are the number one enemies." Taseer related that he organized a terrorism briefing for local officials and media, which detailed the linkages between the terrorists in northern Pakistan and extremist groups in Punjab, which have spawned Taliban commanders. Extremists run "rampant" in Punjab, Taseer maintained. He worried that the army's recent success in Bajaur will compel the militant groups to "seek sanctuary" in Punjab. Financial Crisis Will Hurt Pakistani Brokers and Clients ¶7. (C) Taseer, who in addition to his official role owns one of Pakistan's largest brokerage firms, lamented that the American financial crisis will impact margin-buying in Pakistan and cause many Pakistani brokerages to go out of business when they cannot cover the margin cost. Taseer related that the crisis has hurt his own firm, but a large amounts of cash on hand from the recent sale of the majority holding in his telecommunications company has helped him weather the storm. He noted that the Pakistan stock market attracts nearly one million investors, with the middle-class owning a substantial share of the funds. Taseer doubted that foreign portfolio investors, who in recent years have held large shareholdings in the local exchange, would continue to come to Pakistan during the international and domestic financial "debacle." He predicted that the impact on second-level brokerage houses will be "disastrous." Compounding the problem, many investors put their futures in oil, which has also taken a speculative hit and, he surmised, could decrease to USD 70 per barrel. On the other hand, low fuel prices are good for Pakistan's budget crisis and lack of reserves, he noted. Taseer advised that China has the cash to deposit in the State Bank of Pakistan. China could then fund its many projects in Pakistan by using the cash it would have invested in the Bank. Any infusion would help pop the speculative bubble that has pushed the dollar exchange rate to 78 rupees, about ten rupees above the actual price, he estimated. Comment ¶8. (C) Taseer's personal and political animosity with Shahbaz Sharif may be clouding his political judgement. While the PPP may gain short-term in the Punjab by ending its alliance with the PML-N, forcing Shahbaz from power will only serve to anger the PML-N's sizeable provincial base and lead to demonstrations against the sitting government. Further, with the PML-N in government, it must at least assist in helping to deal with the twin national crises of economic collapse and terrorism in order to maintain credibility with voters. If the party is locked out of the system, it will, no doubt, turn its venom on the PPP and take an increasingly unhelpful and stridently anti-American tone on both issues. The PML-N has a demonstrated ability to shape public opinion in the Punjab. At present, the Governor's over-the-top allegations notwithstanding, both Shahbaz and Nawaz have been constructive both in condemning extremism and in working cooperatively through provincial authorities to dismember terrorist cells in the Punjab. Their historically close relationship with the security establishment, which the PPP lacks, has been critical in this regard. In addition, while Shahbaz has not been helpful to his PPP allies, he has not/not yet demonstrated any intention to utilize the Punjab government as a tool to destabilize the center as in 1988. Even if he wanted to do so, such a move would likely be untenable as unlike in 1988, the Sharifs do not control the presidency or have a close relationship with the military establishment. End Comment. HUNT