Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LAHORE234
2008-07-17 12:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Lahore
Cable title:  

NAWAZ REMAINS FIXATED ON MUSHARRAF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ECON PK 
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OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHLH #0234/01 1991257
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 171257Z JUL 08
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3734
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4465
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0260
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0078
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0635
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1872
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1555
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 4866
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAHORE 000234 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON PK
SUBJECT: NAWAZ REMAINS FIXATED ON MUSHARRAF

CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan Hunt, Principal Officer, US Consulate
Lahore, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAHORE 000234 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON PK SUBJECT: NAWAZ REMAINS FIXATED ON MUSHARRAF CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan Hunt, Principal Officer, US Consulate Lahore, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Boucher met with Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Chief Nawaz Sharif in Lahore on July 1. Nawaz said the judges' restoration issue was a matter of principle not subject to political compromise. Nawaz expressed lukewarm support for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas Khyber Agency military operation but was displeased that the government did not consult him or other senior party leaders about it beforehand. He equally criticized what he perceived as the lack of a government strategy to develop public support for the operation. Boucher pressed the point that polarizing political issues such as the judges' restoration and threats to impeach Musharraf are distracting the Government of Pakistan from effectively tackling more serious threats to Pakistan's stability, i.e. the economy and the law and order situation. He expressed U.S. willingness to support the Government in addressing these issues. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher met with Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Leader Nawaz Sharif in Lahore on July 1. The Assistant Secretary was accompanied by National Security Council Senior Director for South and Central Asian Affairs Mark Webber, Deputy Chief of Mission Peter Bodde, Principal Officer Bryan Hunt, Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden and Political Officer Antone Greubel (notetaker). Joining Nawaz were his brother Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Pakistan Muslim League Parliamentary Leader Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, former Petroleum Minister Khwaja Asif and Ambassador Tariq Fatemi. ¶3. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher began the meeting by asking about the status of Nawaz's eligibility to run for parliament and how long it would take to resolve. Nawaz explained that papers were shuttling back and forth, having not been accepted in a "political move." He filed candidacy papers at the urging of his party, he explained, despite that fact that he "didn't want to," and preferred to "run at a later, appropriate time." But, he said, "they want me among them." Nawaz claimed no desire to be Speaker of the Assembly, or Opposition Leader; rather, he will support the Government and seek to address the "serious constitutional issues" Pakistan faces, including restoring the constit
ution to its 1999 form ("when I was Prime Minister") and reinstating the judiciary. He noted that there were no major disagreements with the Pakistan Peoples Party on the current proposed package of constitutional amendments. ¶4. (C) There remain disagreements on reinstating the judiciary, however. Assistant Secretary Boucher said that the judges' issue was one for Pakistanis but pressed Nawaz to consider compromise so that it might be swiftly resolved. Nawaz said that he could not compromise on the judges' restoration since it was "morally wrong," and a matter of principle. There must not be any Provisional Constitutional Order judges on the courts since they abandoned their principles by taking an oath against the constitution under the Order. He acknowledged judicial reforms were in order but the time to tackle them was only after the judges were restored. Nawaz criticized Asif Ali Zardari for going back on his commitments in the Murree Declaration to restore the judges within 30 days through a parliamentary resolution. Boucher stated that many felt Nawaz had also pulled out of an earlier commitment to support restoration minus former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry -- the so-called "minus one" formula. Nawaz responded emphatically that he had never committed to the "minus one" formula and even if he was amenable to it "the people would never accept it." ¶5. (C) After listening to Nawaz's explanations of judicial and constitutional issues, Boucher said that we agreed these were important issues and the United States wants to see them resolved quickly so the Government can get down to the business of dealing with the most pressing issues facing the Pakistani people. He expressed serious U.S. concern over the state of the economy, the rise of militancy and the increase in cross-border attacks in the Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province. Nawaz agreed that it was time to get to business, but said that the country could only do that once the judiciary was restored and Musharraf was out of power. When asked about the prospect for returning his ministers to Cabinet, Nawaz said that the party will also not reinstate its ministers until the judges are restored. He conceded, however, that the Pakistan Muslim League was getting a free ride in the current scenario because it can claim to be a ruling coalition partner but does not have ministers to face the media to announce unpopular policy decisions. LAHORE 00000234 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Asked if he supported the Prime Minister's multi-pronged strategy to combat terrorism, Nawaz said that he supports the policy and that it was important that Pakistan coordinate with the United States in the War on Terror. He expressed concern that terrorists and militants are threatening the social fabric of Pakistan, as well. Nawaz's principal complaint about the statement on fighting terrorism and the undertaking of the Khyber Agency military operation was that the government and military did not consult him or his other senior party leaders in advance. The Pakistan Muslim League is a major coalition partner, after all, and the policy on fighting terrorism should be developed through public debate (in the National Assembly and in the press),not by one party. Nawaz admitted that neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan have effective writs of control in the tribal areas straddling their borders. The Assistant Secretary agreed on the need for everyone to come together on a comprehensive terrorism strategy, including public outreach, but pressed for quick, demonstrable progress in curtailing the operations of militant groups in the meantime. ¶7. (C) Nisar expressed skepticism on how deeply committed the current government is to combating terrorism. He accused the government of launching the Khyber operation immediately before Boucher's arrival simply as a facade to demonstrate to the United States that Pakistan is still a reliable ally. He asserted that limited combat encounters to date buttress this accusation. Nisar repeatedly claimed that President Musharraf was never as committed to effectively combating terrorism as the U.S. believed. The Assistant Secretary noted that Musharraf had made genuine and important contributions to the War on Terror and reiterated that the current governing coalition needed to demonstrate its own credibility on this issue rather than rehashing the past. ¶8. (C) After railing against Musharraf as the cause of all of the problems in Pakistan, Nawaz and Nisar emphasized to Boucher that during Nawaz's two terms as Prime Minister in the 1990s he was a reliable ally of the United States. They cited their support for Operation Desert Storm in 1990, reigning in militant groups and embarking on policies to improve relations with India. Aside from the judges' restoration issue and the future of Musharraf, they claimed the Pakistan Muslim League platform and United States foreign policy goals in Pakistan are on the same page. Boucher agreed that there was certainly a commonality of interests between the two. ¶9. (C) Nawaz asserted that he also had commonality of cause with Zardari when it came to President Musharraf, reporting that Zardari told him he was prepared to move forward with impeaching President Musharraf. Boucher stressed that this would be another counterproductive diversion and a negative backward movement to begin impeachment proceedings against Musharraf. Nawaz countered that the "people have expressed that they want to get rid of Musharraf." Boucher quickly responded: "They also asked you to govern." Ignoring this comment, Nawaz continued, saying "Musharraf is conspiring against us every day...Not me. If I am conspiring, I'm conspiring to get the judiciary reinstated." ¶10. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this cable. HUNT

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