Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KYIV97
2008-01-16 13:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: SENATOR LUGAR MEETS NEW GOVERNMENT;

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM UP 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKV #0097/01 0161306
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161306Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4719
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000097 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: SENATOR LUGAR MEETS NEW GOVERNMENT;
PUBLICIZES UKRAINIAN REQUEST FOR A NATO MAP


Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000097

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: SENATOR LUGAR MEETS NEW GOVERNMENT;
PUBLICIZES UKRAINIAN REQUEST FOR A NATO MAP


Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Ukraine's plan to request a MAP at the April
NATO Bucharest Summit dominated discussion during visiting
Senator Richard Lugar's January 15 meetings with President
Yushchenko, PM Tymoshenko and opposition representatives.
Yushchenko expressed the strong hope that Ukraine's request
for a MAP would be well-received, both by the U.S. and NATO
Allies at Bucharest, and Tymoshenko stressed that the
decision to request a map was jointly made with the President
and Rada Speaker Yatsenyuk - all three signatures were on the
letter of request. Shadow foreign minister Gryshchenko
representing Regions told Senator Lugar that the party would
not support the request for MAP, but stressed that Regions
was not anti-NATO and was interested in continued cooperation
with the Alliance. Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko told
Senator Lugar that they hoped President Bush and Secretary
Rice would be able to visit Ukraine -- either in April or
later this year. Senator Lugar's discussions regarding
energy and our biological threat reduction programs will be
reported via septels.


2. (C) Comment: An unexpected by-product of Senator Lugar's
visit was the fact that the letter containing Ukraine's
request for a MAP was made public after the Senator's meeting
with the opposition. The orange team's worries about how and
when to release the letter were overtaken by events, and the
text of the letter addressed to NATO SYG De Hoop Scheffer was
posted on the presidential website the evening of January 15
(and the MFA tells us that the letter will be delivered to
the NATO SYG in Brussels on January 18.) Thus far, the
Ukrainian Government's public reaction to the release of the
letter has been calm, with PM Tymoshenko agreeing with
Senator Lugar that the issue should now be discussed by
average Ukrainians. Ukraine's request for MAP will be both a
key topic for PM Tymoshenko's proposed January 28-29 visit to
Brussels and will undoubtedly kick-off a renewed domestic
debate about the pros and cons of joining NATO - a topic for
the Government's re-invigorated public information campaign
about NATO. Both the Ukrainian Government and the Allies can
help by continuing to explain that MAP is not the same as
membership. Given our long-standing position that NATO's
door is open to Ukraine, we recommend that the USG be
supportive of Ukraine's request and work to encourage our
Allies to take a positive approach. End Summary and Comment.

Ukraine Hopes for a MAP at Bucharest
--------------



3. (C) President Yushchenko began his meeting by announcing
that he, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Rada had
just signed a joint letter requesting a MAP. Ukraine was
vitally interested in approval of a MAP at the Bucharest
Summit, but U.S. backing was needed to help get Allied
support for the request. He said that the orange team was
united in its request and expected that at least some in the
Party of Regions would also be supportive. Later in the
conversation, Yushchenko acknowledged that about 33% of
Ukrainians supported NATO membership; another 33% were
opposed and 33% were undecided. In Yushchenko's view, this
was an "ideological struggle," not only domestically, but
against Russian influence. Yushchenko said he was speaking
frankly, but stated simply NATO membership equaled Ukrainian
independence. Otherwise Ukraine would remain in a
semi-colonial state because of its energy dependence on
Russia and due to shadow "political projects" emanating from
Russia. In Yushchenko's opinion, there was only one way to
assure Ukraine's sovereignty and that was through NATO
membership -- he reiterated several times during the
conversation that "there was no other policy." With most of
Ukraine's borders still undemarcated, only NATO membership
could guarantee Ukraine's borders and territorial integrity.


4. (C) According to Yushchenko, there will be a referendum
on membership, but "at the right time, not today." What was
needed now was more intensive coordination with NATO. In
response to Senator Lugar,s question about the reaction to
MAP of "undecided" Ukrainians in the weeks leading up to
Bucharest, Yushchenko acknowledged that there would be
debates. In his view, the majority of Ukrainian youth would
accept it, and the generation that lived through the Soviet
Union would not. However, Yushchenko stressed that the
decision now was not whether or not to join; the decision now
is to start a dialogue with the nation. This will entail
cooperation with NATO. Yushchenko said that the letter
requesting MAP noted that consultations with the public would
take place at the right time. He noted that several
countries had held referenda on NATO membership; years of
dialogue with society were ahead, but Ukraine could not
afford to waste time. A request for MAP was "important and

urgent" and was supported by all branches of power.
Yushchenko recalled that Ukraine's EU and NATO aspirations
were enshrined in law since 1993. In the past, these
aspirations had not been supported by BYuT, the Socialists or
the Communists. However, now BYuT supports, and Regions had
supported this policy before as had Lytvyn. Today, according
to Yushchenko, only the Socialists and Communists opposed MAP
for Ukraine.


5. (C) Lugar noted that he had supported NATO expansion
since 1992 and recalled that during the Clinton
Administration, a compromise had been found in the creation
of the Partnership for Peace. In 1996, NATO's first round
of expansion had been difficult; in the second tranche,
Congress had been more receptive. Lugar said he would relate
Ukraine's story to the Senate, and although there were
differences of opinion in the U.S., he was sympathetic to
Yushchenko's message. In response to the Ambassador's
question about when the letter requesting MAP would be sent,
Yushchenko responded that this was a "technical" question
once agreement and understanding had been reached with the
Allies. The Ukrainian Government was talking to European
partners and the U.S. in order to "avoid complications." In
Yushchenko's words, "if the letter goes out and Ukraine does
not get MAP at Bucharest, then it would be very bad for us."
FM Ohryzko said "we can't fail -- if we do so, it would be a
huge step backward." (Embassy note: The FM was presumably
referring both to the prospects for NATO membership and for
the success of the new government which would be publicly
criticized by their opposition. End note.)

Tymoshenko Highlights Unified MAP Request
--------------


6. (C) At her meeting with Senator Lugar, PM Tymoshenko led
off with a reference to the request for MAP, highlighting
what she termed "the historic fact" that the President,
Government and Parliament were completely unified in signing
this request for a MAP for NATO. She and the President had
even sipped celebratory glasses of champagne after the
signing. In response to Senator Lugar's question about
moving forward on MAP, Tymoshenko said that a unified
government would allow Ukraine to rapidly achieve all of the
important priority goals that have been pending for the past
17 years. When Senator Lugar asked about the unity of the
orange team, Tymoshenko said that there was still work to be
done, but that the members of the orange team had good
relations with each other and that all were committed to
cooperating in order to succeed. She said that cooperation
with the President was much better than it had been in 2005,
but there were challenges still ahead.


7. (C) In response to the Senator's comment that the letter
requesting MAP was now public, Tymoshenko was relaxed, noting
that it was the right time for the Ukrainian people to
discuss the request, and noted that she was pleased that the
opposition would be taking part in the debate. The PM said
that the large number of Ukrainians opposed to or undecided
about NATO was the result of a propaganda machine that had
worked overtime up until now. The Government's challenge
would be to give out real facts and rebuild the people's
"mentality" through information. Tymoshenko said that her
government was committed to providing funds in the budget for
a NATO information campaign.

Regions to Oppose, but is not Anti-NATO
--------------


8. (C) Referencing his earlier meeting with President
Yushchenko, Senator Lugar raised with shadow foreign minister
Gryshchenko the MAP request letter signed by the President,
PM Tymoshenko and Rada Speaker Yatsenyuk and suggested that
this request would trigger a discussion within the USG about
how to assist in pushing forward on MAP, while realizing that
MAP was a process of intensified interaction and dialogue,
and not membership. Lugar asked about the reaction within
the Party of Regions to the request, and Gryshchenko replied
that for many Ukrainians, and especially Regions supporters,
the "benefits of NATO were still not clear." Gryshchenko
also noted he was still not completely clear on role of
"shadow FM," but believed that overall purpose of the shadow
cabinet was to provide input and contrasting views to
government and be prepared to step in if government failed.


9. (C) Gryshchenko indicated that although foreign policy
experts (like himself and Regions MP Leonid Kozhara who also
attended the meeting) were supportive of the request for MAP,
their personal opinions were irrelevant. Gryshchenko
predicted that Regions would not be able to support a request
for MAP at this juncture, but that the U.S. needed to

understand that this did not mean that the party was
anti-NATO. The party had taken its position in the 2006
elections (calling for a referendum on neutrality) to
undercut the position of radical anti-NATO forces. He
lamented that foreign policy had "been taken hostage" by
politics in recent years, noting that under the Yanukovych
government large budgets had been allocated for a NATO public
information campaign. (Embassy Note: The Yanukovych
government's info campaign was widely seen as under-budgeted,
and not very effective. End Note.) The current government
had control over the political levers and could decide their
NATO policy without obstruction. Regions would reserve its
official position for now and react following an internal
meeting of the Party's Politrada (political council).

Yushchenko Also Looking for Closer EU Ties
--------------


10. (C) Also on the European front, President Yushchenko
told Senator Lugar that after a successful February 5 WTO
General Council meeting, he anticipated fast movement toward
a Free Trade Agreement with the EU. Ukraine had a plan
including the issues to be resolved -- approximately 6-7
pages worth -- and Yushchenko was confident that an FTA with
the EU could be achieved this year. He noted that an
Enhanced Agreement with the EU was even more important;
Ukraine wanted a "Neighborhood Policy Plus." Yushchenko said
that he had talked to French President Sarkozy regarding some
kind of associate membership with the EU and noted his belief
that key partners like the UK and Germany would also be
supportive.


11. (U) Senator Lugar did not have an opportunity to clear
this message before his departure from Kyiv.


12. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor

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