UKRAINE: YUSHCHENKO/TYMOSHENKO RIVALRY HITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000874 SIPDIS TREASURY FOR LEE AND TORGERSON DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR CKLEIN/PBURKHEAD USDOC FOR 4201/DOC/ITA/MAC/BISNIS USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/OEENIS/NISD/CLUCYK E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2018 TAGS: ECON EINV PGOV ETRD EIND UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: YUSHCHENKO/TYMOSHENKO RIVALRY HITS PRIVATIZATION, STATE PROPERTY FUND REF: A. KYIV 803 ¶B. KYIV 771 ¶C. KYIV 447 Classified By: Economic Counselor Douglas R. Kramer, Reasons: 1.4(b) an d (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The GOU's ambitious privatization plans have fallen victim to the political rivalry between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko (Refs A and B). Following the latest iteration of their drawn out privatization battle characterized by dueling decrees, court rulings and mutual recriminations, Tymoshenko created her own, duplicate State Property Fund (SPF),operating out of the Cabinet of Ministers offices and headed by a loyalist. This second SPF is moving forward with the sale of the Odesa Portside Plant, considered the most attractive of all objects identified for privatization, in open defiance of Yushchenko's decrees and the original SPF, which continues to criticize Tymoshenko's plans. The legal uncertainties surrounding this privatization, scheduled for May 20, make it unlikely that any serious investor will bid on the plant and almost certainly will depress the level of bidding. With neither Tymoshenko nor Yushchenko signaling a will to compromise, the GOU will likely miss its goal of raising $1.7 billion through privatization this year, a sum that most observers considered optimistic in the best of circumstances. End summary. Yushchenko Criticizes Tymoshenko's Plans From the Start -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ukraine's last successful privatization large took place in October 2005, when the Kryvy Rih Steel plant was sold for $4.8 billion. The privatization was organized during Yuliya Tymoshenko's previous term as Prime Minister, although the auction actually took place under her successor Yuriy Yekhanurov. After assuming power in December, Tymoshenko's government announced plans to raise UAH 8.6 billion (about USD 1.7 billion) in 2008 by privatizing 26 large companies. Of these, the chemical factory Odesa Portside Plant (OPP),the land-line operator Ukrtelekom and six regional power distribution companies were slated to bring in the bulk of the revenues. (Note: About 4 percent of Ukrainian companies, representing 31 percent of the total value of all fixed assets, remain in state ownership. End note). Tymoshenko has said she plans to use the privatization revenues to reimburse those account holders at Oschadbank whose savings were decimated by the hyperinflation of the early 1990s. ¶3. (SBU) Almost from the start, President Viktor Yushchenko and several top advisors unleashed a barrage of criticism against Tymoshenko's plans. Yushchenko first argued that all further privatizations should be regulated by a special law making the process transparent and immunizing it from abuse and corruption. The Rada last approved such a privatization law for the years 2000-2002, and all attempts to pass a new law have failed. Yushchenko also criticized Tymoshenko's intention to use privatization revenues to reimburse Oschadbank account holders. Yushchenko has repeatedly argued that the money should be used to finance infrastructure projects rather than current consumption. Oleksandr Shlapak, Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat, has argued that revenues from privatization of energy companies should be used specifically to recapitalize the gas transit network and nuclear power plants. Rivalry Reaches Grotesque Proportions With Schism Over SPF -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Yushchenko and Tymoshenko's rivalry has now reached grotesque proportions over their battle to control the State Property Fund (SPF). In February Tymoshenko's Cabinet of Ministers fired SPF Head Valentyna Semenyuk, a member of the Socialist Party and left-over from the previous government, and installed BYuT MP Andriy Portnov as acting head pending the required Rada confirmation. Semenyuk had publicly opposed the privatizations envisaged by Tymoshenko. The following day, Yushchenko issued a decree reinstating Semenyuk and challenged the dismissal in Ukraine's Constitutional Court. Yushchenko says he continues to favor large-scale privatization, even if he is actively backing the Socialist Semenyuk, who remains an outspoken opponent of KYIV 00000874 002 OF 003 privatization. Yushchenko argues that only the Rada, and not the CabMin, can replace the head of the SPF. (Note: The Rada coalition has been unable to muster the needed majority to make any senior personnel changes, including removing Semenyuk. End note.) ¶5. (SBU) Without waiting for the Constitutional Court to rule on the case, Tymoshenko got a favorable ruling from a lower administrative court confirming Semenyuk's dismissal and immediately appointed Portnov as new head of the SPF a second time, personally introducing him to the SPF staff on April ¶25. Yushchenko retaliated by quickly ordering a change of security at SPF headquarters to prevent Portnov or anyone loyal to him from gaining access. In response, Tymoshenko set up offices for Portnov in the CabMin building and ordered the State Treasury to block the SPF's accounts. Both Yushchenko and Semenyuk are now loudly criticizing Tymoshenko's renegade SPF, claiming it is illegal and that any actions it conducts will lack a legal basis. Tymoshenko Pushes Forward Odesa Portside Privatization -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Unperturbed, Tymoshenko and Portnov announced on April 28 that "their" SPF will move forward with the privatization the Odesa Portside Plant (OPP),a large chemical plant that also harbors an ammonia loading terminal for an ammonia pipeline. The pipeline runs between Togliatti in Russia and the Odesa terminal and is considered highly strategic, since it gives the terminal control over all ammonia shipments leaving Ukraine and the chemical factories around Togliatti. ¶7. (SBU) Tymoshenko's move openly flaunts another Yushchenko decree, dated April 15, that specifically suspended the privatization of the OPP. (Note: The GOU began preparations for the OPP sale earlier this year, with 14 companies from Ukraine, Russia, Norway and India expressing interest. One Russian company even made the initial down payment foreseen in the tender regulations, a sum that Semenyuk has now promised to reimburse. End note.) In opposing Tymoshenko's plans, Yushchenko has argued that the ammonia terminal and pipeline are strategic assets that should remain in state control. Earlier, the GOU modified the privatization conditions to require the new owner to coordinate pricing of the terminal services with appropriate regulators. However, Yushchenko subsequently argued that the conditions contained loopholes that would allow a private owner to misuse his monopoly position. Most recently, Yushchenko said he would allow the sale of the OPP plant if it did not include the ammonia pipeline and terminal. Still, Tymoshenko has called Yushchenko's decree "empty and unlawful." Each side's deputies entered into the fray, with First Deputy PM Turchynov calling the President's efforts to block the privatization an "aggressive provocation," and Presidential Secretariat Head Viktor Baloha suggesting that Tymoshenko wants to sell OPP on the cheap to interests friendly to her. ¶8. (SBU) The fact that Yushchenko also blocked the previous Yanukovych government's attempts to privatize OPP could support the claim that he is operating from a position of principle. At the time, Yushchenko cited environmental concerns and the potential monopoly that could be created, presumably from control of the pipeline. However, Semenyuk was as SPF chairperson and supported the sale. It was widely speculated that, in reality, Yushchenko feared that the Party of Regions intended to privatize OPP to one of its supporters, mostly likely a Russian company. On May 6 Portnov, who runs Tymoshenko's SPF, claimed that Baloha worked against the interests of Yushchenko and had sent a letter to then PM Yanukovych ordering him to quickly privatize OPP. Western observers also have noted that the relatively short time frames for the OPP and other privatizations may discourage Western companies from bidding because there may be insufficient time to perform due diligence. Rivalry Will Affect Other Privatizations As Well -------------- --- ¶9. (SBU) It is unlikely that the OPP privatization will actually move forward at such short notice against the backdrop of the Tymoshenko/Yushchenko battle over the SPF. By all accounts, Tymoshenko's SPF lacks the manpower and KYIV 00000874 003 OF 003 resources to conduct the tender, and its legal basis is widely regarded as questionable. The political rivalry and uncertain legality of the SPF's actions will likely endanger the other large-scale privatizations foreseen by Tymoshenko. In a separate decree dated April 11, Yushchenko suspended the planned transfer of ownership of several power generation companies from the Ministry of Fuels and Energy to the SPF, a prerequisite for their privatization. The same decree also suspended privatization of the turbine plant Turboatom on the grounds that its sale would contradict the GOU's energy sector strategy. Yushchenko has taken no specific action against the planned sale of Ukrtelekom (Ref C). However, the Ukrtelekom privatization was already viewed as ambitious in the best of circumstances, and will only become less appealing to investors if the political infighting continues. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko try to underscore their respective positions with economic and legal arguments. In reality, however, the drama surrounding the GOU's privatization plan and the comedy over the SPF are mostly about political power. Yushchenko is opposing Tymoshenko's privatization plans primarily because they are Tymoshenko's, a fact made clear by his otherwise illogical backing of Semenyuk, an outspoken opponent of large-scale privatization and a representative of a political party despised in Yushchenko's circles. By successfully thwarting Tymoshenko's plan, Yushchenko hopes to make it more difficult and costly for her to fulfill her campaign promise to reimburse the account holders of Oschadbank and claim a major political victory. Tymoshenko likely hopes that her steadfast opposition to the unpopular president will help her cast herself as a victim, increase her popularity ratings and enable her to fulfill her privatization and spending promises. In any case the big loser is Ukraine's investment climate. The GOU's privatization plan was optimistic in the best of circumstances. The fact that the plan has become the object of a very visible, high-level squabble would be sufficient to doom it. Now that the very legality of any privatization can be called into question, it is highly unlikely that any serious investor will be interested in OPP or the other objects up for sale. End comment. Taylor