UKRAINE: PRESIDENT CALLS FOR COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000474 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PRESIDENT CALLS FOR COALITION COOPERATION, BUT REFORMATTING TALKS CONTINUE REF: KYIV 00453 Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(b,d). Summary and Comment ¶1. (C) Summary. Meetings with Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat Roman Bezsmertniy, Deputy Prime Minister Hryhoriy Nemyria, Regions MP Andriy Klyuyev, and Regions financier Rinat Akhmetov in the past week revealed that efforts are being made to reformat the coalition, but opinions varied on the pace and potential outcome of such talks. Bezsmertniy was circumspect in his conversation, although he clearly preferred Tymoshenko be removed. However, he said the President had ordered the Secretariat to improve relations with the Cabinet and ensure the coalition got to work. Nemyria told the Ambassador that President Yushchenko was now directly engaged in talks with Regions leader Yanukovych, and that Secretariat head Baloha was working on a group of 22 MPs from OU-PSD to vote no confidence in the Tymoshenko government a in a move that would end with Baloha as interim PM. Klyuyev confirmed that Regions was actively working towards the goal of a 234-member majority with Yanukovych returning to the PM's seat. Akhmetov was much more cautious, saying that a broad coalition was desirable, but if events moved too fast and Tymoshenko was removed before she had a chance to discredit herself, she would become a martyr and the next president. Therefore, he was urging Regions to proceed slowly. Meanwhile, the Rada was unable to reach a political agreement on March 4 and Regions continued to block the Speaker's dais. With the constitution giving the President the right to dissolve parliament if it does not meet within 30 days of its last sitting -- meaning it must meet by March 13 -- many are now talking about early elections. ¶2. (C) Comment. Bezsmertniy's comments indicate that the President may have decided to put any plans for a new coalition on hold for now. No one doubts that Baloha is scheming and negotiating, but it could simply be an effort to get Regions back in to the Rada chamber and to increase pressure on the Prime Minister with the threat that she could be removed if she does not cooperate. The President's team must be carefully calculating about optics in Kyiv leading up the April 2-4 NATO summit in Bucharest, as well as the impact on presidential elections of removing Tymoshenko versus 
leaving her in office. With so much at stake, no one is likely to make a move until they are sure of the outcome. The talk of early elections is most likely a game of political chicken, but meanwhile the legislature remains paralyzed. End summary and comment. Bezsmertniy: President Says Make Coalition Work -------------- - ¶3. (C) The Ambassador's March 3 meeting with the usually cynical Bezsmertniy took a much more serious tone, in large part because of a frustrating meeting he had just had with Yushchenko. (Note. On the way into the meeting, Bezsmertniy's aide Svitlana Gumenyuk told the Ambassador that Bezsmertniy had come out of the Yushchenko meeting looking ashen. End note.) Although Bezsmertniy did not talk about the meeting with the President until the very end of his time with the Ambassador, it appeared that Yushchenko had ordered his Secretariat to improve cooperation with the Cabinet, a policy Bezsmertniy clearly disapproved of. Bezsmertniy said he was not authorized to share details, but the President had just gathered the Secretariat leadership to give them the task of unblocking the Rada, stopping infighting with the Cabinet, stopping personal disagreements with the PM, and strengthening the coalition. Bezsmertniy said he believed this policy would hurt Yushchenko personally and he had argued vehemently against it at the meeting, but the President had insisted, so the Secretariat would work seriously at the task. He said in the very nearest future, we would see the realization of this task. ¶4. (C) Bezsmertniy said the situation in the Rada will not be improved quickly. There are objective reasons, what he termed the "illness of development," that the President, PM, and government cannot work together as they would in a fully developed democratic country. Everyone knew what Tymoshenko and Yushchenko's relations were like before the government was formed -- why is it a surprise what is happening now? Yushchenko has a choice - Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. Neither signals that Yushchenko is choosing anything other than a European course. Bezsmertniy argued that the President was the only sign of stability in the country. Yushchenko's public criticisms of Tymoshenko should not be interpreted as him trying to undermine the Cabinet. They were like a KYIV 00000474 002 OF 003 father's criticism. Moreover, the President should criticize the PM or people won't know who is in charge. Frankly speaking, Bezsmertniy added, he did not think Yushchenko was strong enough in his criticisms, and the President would not let the Secretariat criticize her either. (Note. Apparently that prohibition does not include Baloha. End note.) If the Cabinet presents provocative economic policies, Yushchenko must raise this issue. Moreover, Tymoshenko was trying to cut deals with Putin behind Yushchenko's back. The President, Bezsmertniy stated, has endless patience. He ended the meeting on a somewhat cryptic note, saying that the key thing to remember was this is not Yushchenko's Cabinet. Nemyria: They're Plotting to Remove Tymoshenko -------------- - ¶5. (C) A frazzled and worn-down DPM Nemyria stopped by the Ambassador's late on February 28 to pass on BYuT's concerns that negotiations between the Presidential Secretariat and Regions had taken a more serious turn. He said that he had information that Yushchenko and Yanukovych had met to discuss a "reformatted" coalition, and that Baloha and Regions MP Kolesnikov were meeting as well. He also believed that Regions MPs Andriy Klyuyev and Anton Pryhodskiy, the latter a close friend of Yanukovych's, were also involved to a lesser degree. Nemyria said the plan he had heard about would involve several stages. First, 22 MPs from OU-PSD would be convinced to vote, along with Regions, Lytvyn Bloc, and at least some Communists, no confidence in the Tymoshenko government. Then this new majority would appoint an interim or acting PM, presumed to be Baloha, and elect Yanukovych Speaker. Nemyria opined that Yatsenyuk would then either go back to the National Bank or the Foreign Ministry. Once this had been accomplished, they would be able to convince 15 more members of OU-PSD to defect, formally dissolving the current coalition and forming a new one. (Note. 37 members of OU-PSD, one more than half the faction size, are required to sign a new coalition agreement. End note.) ¶6. (C) Nemyria also commented on Tymoshenko's health, which has been reported on widely in the press here as the PM canceled meetings to go the hospital on February 29. He said that she had complications from the flu that had led to a high fever and eventually an operation. (Note. Nemyria did not know the English for what the operation was, but said the doctors had removed something that sounded like "gnoids". End note.) Klyuyev Cuts to the Chase -- 234 Votes Expected -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Klyuyev described to the Ambassador on March 3 Regions's vision of a short-term situational majority that would become a new coalition, a plan that sounded a lot like what Nemyria had described. Klyuyev said that he believed Baloha controls 12 MPs in OU-PSD (not 22 votes that Nemyria attributed to him). If those 12 MPs were added to the 175 Regions, 27 Communists, and 20 Lytvyn Bloc members, this would create a 234-vote majority. This majority could pass needed laws that the current 226-member coalition is incapable of passing, such as the CabMin law. Klyuyev said that 234 votes would also allow for a no confidence vote in the Tymoshenko government, a vote Klyuyev described as going "like clockwork." Then Rada rules of procedure could be changed to allow "individual membership in a coalition." (Note. Klyuyev's explanation does not address all the constitutional nuances, such as that a no confidence vote in the Cabinet does not inherently bring down the coalition -- that would still require 37 members of OU-PSD to cooperate -- but it does acknowledge the constitutional provision that says the Rada cannot be without a coalition for more than 30 days. End note.) ¶8. (C) Klyuyev said that they believed Yanukovych could again become PM. He said Regions had not considered him for Speaker, as he had "lots of job experience" as PM. Klyuyev said Yushchenko had recently told him that it was easier working with Regions than now with Tymoshenko. Klyuyev also indicated that Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were not talking anymore - they "won't even shake hands." Akhmetov: New Coalition Someday -------------- ¶9. (C) In a meeting later on March 3, Akhmetov was more circumspect than his Klyuyev in addressing potential shifts in the coalition. He began by claiming that Regions was not interested in a Rada blockade and suggested that maybe it was the Cabinet that benefited because they did not have to worry about cooperating with the parliament. (Note. We have heard KYIV 00000474 003 OF 003 this specious argument from many Regions MPs, but it does not address the fact that it is their faction who has been physically blocking the rostrum and Speaker's chair. End note.) When the Ambassador asked about rumors of attempts to form a new broad coalition, Akhmetov said sometimes rumors were just wishes. He did not care what color the coalition was, just what it did. The problem today was that although the coalition existed de jure, but in reality it could do nothing. Akhmetov said it was clear that the President and PM held different positions on many topics. Everyone understood that it was worse now than in 2005, that the conflicts were more visible. Akhmetov said his Fund and his McKenzie Group advisers -- which had put forward recommendations for 22 reform steps -- were wary of working with the current Cabinet. The President might be interfering in the Cabinet's area of responsibility, Akhmetov argued, but things would be much worse if he did not. He believed that the President was criticizing Tymoshenko publicly only because she ignored his private comments. ¶10. (C) The main task for Regions, he argued, was to proceed with caution. Some were negotiating with Tymoshenko, some with Yushchenko -- no decision should be made in a hurry. His main concern was that if Tymoshenko were removed now, she could play the martyr and claim she had not been allowed to work -- if she was not allowed to continue with the Sberbank repayments, she will become a hero. The public would never have the opportunity to learn how dangerous her policies really were in the long run. In principle, there was nothing inherently wrong with changing the coalition and Regions should push for a Tymoshenko dismissal. However, with the presidential election only two years away, firing Tymoshenko hastily based on emotional reasons would be the best way to ensure that she wins that election. Moreover, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were fighting for the same electorate -- time was needed to show the difference between them and their policies, to show the President and Regions had been right to criticize her. ¶11. (C) Regarding a broad coalition, Akhmetov said that when the time comes for a new coalition, he will be pleased. Akhmetov said that he had always wanted Regions, Lytvyn Bloc, and OU together. After the September 2007 elections, he had advised Yanukovych that it would be better to be in the opposition than in a coalition with just OU-PSD, because the coalition would be weak. Even now, if Regions did join a coalition, Akhmetov would prefer that Regions not take the PM or Speaker post. Better to let OU-PSD pick the PM and let Lytvyn be Speaker. Yanukovych could be head of the coalition. (Note. Presumably to distance Yanukovych and Regions from the possible short term negative effects of economic reforms that a new Cabinet might pursue in the run-up to the presidential election. End note.) Rada Remains Blocked -------------- ¶12. (C) With the coalition rumors swirling in the background, the five Rada factions remain unable to reach consensus on a political agreement that would see the parliament reopened. Despite the draft agreement announced on February 26 (reftel),when the Rada leadership reconvened on March 3, Regions, Lytvyn Bloc, and the Communists refused to sign it. Yatsenyuk announced further talks for the morning of March 4, but they produced no results. At 4 pm Kyiv time on March 4, 30 Regions MPs encircled the rostrum and two sat in the Speaker's chair. Coalition deputies were present in the chamber, but made no move to unblock the rostrum. Yatsenyuk entered, had a brief chat with Yanukovych, then announced that Regions had refused to reach a compromise. If a resolution was not reached by 10 am on March 5, the Speaker said, then he, Yatsenyuk, would stop trying to unblock the Rada and would allow the 30-day clock to tick down to zero, saying "if we fail to resume plenary work tomorrow, that will be an end to this Rada." Afterwards, OU-PSD faction leader Kyrylenko told the press that his faction was ready to start consultations with the President about dismissing the parliament, following up on comments by NSDC Secretary Bohatyreva about new elections. (Note. We believe that no party really wants new elections, because the financing and energy required are so significant. Nevertheless, this threat is increasingly being bandied about in an effort to make one side or the other cave in negotiations. End note.) ¶13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Taylor