UKRAINE: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH CRIMEA'S POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 002172

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL EINV RS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH CRIMEA'S POLITICAL
LEADERS

REF: A. KYIV 1947

B. 2007 KYIV 3101

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Taylor
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador, along with a small American
business delegation, traveled to Crimea October 19-20 for an
annual investment forum. The Ambassador also met with
Crimea's political leadership while there. Local leaders
characterized the September 19 vote by the Crimean Rada
(parliament) urging Kyiv to recognize the independence of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a moderate step that carried no
real consequences. Crimean officials complained of a lack of
GOU interest in Crimea's problems and a lack of communication
with Kyiv on issues like NATO membership and issues of
concern to the Crimean Tatar community. President
Yushchenko's representative to Crimea made a strong argument
for a more tolerant GOU position toward the use of the
Russian language in Crimea and for a TV station that could
provide objective news in Russian. Crimean Tatar leaders
lamented that there had been no real progress on issues of
importance to their community and asked the Ambassador to
help engage GOU officials. The Ambassador's visit helped
enlarge USG visibility in Crimea and expanded our dialogue
with Crimean leaders. End Summary.


2. (U) The Ambassador traveled to Yalta, Crimea October 19-20
to participate in an annual investment promotion forum held
by the Crimean authorities. Emboffs, President of the
American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine Jorge Zukoski, and
representatives from American firms Microsoft, 3M, and IMTC
accompanied. The Ambassador also conducted interviews with
popular Crimean TV station Chernamorka and with a Tatar
community station Radio Maidan.


3. (U) While in Yalta, the Ambassador met privately with
Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Speaker of the Crimean Rada, Viktor
Plakida, Crimean Prime Minister, and Leonid Zhunko,
Representative of the Ukrainian President to Crimea. The
Ambassador also met in Simferopol with Tatar Mejlis Chairman
Mustafa Jemilev and Deputy Chairman Refat Chubarov, the
Crimean Tatar community's key political leaders. The
following were the main topics of discussion raised during
the Ambassador's meetings.

Crimean Rada Vote on South Ossetia/Abkhazia
--------------


4. (C) Regarding the September 19 vote by the Crimean Rada
urging Kyiv to recognize the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia (ref A),Hrytsenko argued that the Rada took a
moderate step by not actually recognizing the breakaway
regions' independence, but only requesting that the Verkhovna
Rada (Ukrainian parliament) closely examine the issue.
Zhunko agreed that the resolution had been successfully toned
down and stressed that it had no substantive implications.


5. (C) The Ambassador asked if the September 19 vote had been
pushed by any external forces. Hrytsenko responded that it
had been a purely domestic Crimean initiative, noting that an
overwhelming majority of the Crimean people strongly
supported the vote. The Ambassador asked if this public
support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia meant that Crimeans,
too, wanted independence. Hrytsenko ducked the question,
instead saying that public opinion was driven by fears that
Kyiv wanted to revoke Crimea's autonomy. Zhunko argued that
the situation in Crimea was completely different than in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and said he was confident that, if
a referendum were held today, a majority of Crimeans would
vote to stay as part of Ukraine, not to join Russia.

Lack of Attention from Kyiv
--------------


6. (C) Hrytsenko complained throughout the meeting that the
GOU did not pay appropriate attention to Crimea's legitimate
needs and did not engage in serious dialogue with Crimean
leadership on issues of mutual importance. He repeatedly
criticized President Yushchenko and the GOU for not rebuking
calls from some politicians in Kyiv to revoke Crimea's
autonomous status. Hrytsenko said that GOU leadership should
have come out forcefully to defend Crimea's special status
and commented that Yushchenko's silence on the issue was
perceived as support for calls to revoke autonomy.


7. (C) Hrytsenko pointed to the Ukrainian Cabinet of
Ministers' efforts to appoint Crimea's police chief, "in
clear violation of the Constitution," as an example of Kyiv
creating ill will in Crimea. Hrytsenko also accused Kyiv of

failing to properly fund the Crimean Economic Plan, which
sets funding targets for economic development programs until
2017, saying that the GOU had provided UAH 700 million
(approximately USD 120 million) less than promised this year,
and five times less than that provided by the previous
Yanukovych government.


8. (C) Jemilev and Chubarov similarly complained of a lack of
dialogue with Kyiv, in their case on issues of importance to
the Crimean Tatar community. They said that under former
President Kuchma there was at least a formalized dialogue,
and Kuchma himself came to Crimea several times a year to
participate. They said they expected President Yushchenko to
expand this dialogue with Tatar leadership when he took
office, but in reality the opposite occurred. Jemilev
specifically asked the Ambassador to stress the importance of
dialogue with the Tatar community to GOU leadership. The
Ambassador said he would take this message back to Kyiv and
during his interview with Radio Maidan called on the GOU, the
Crimean government, and Tatar leadership to engage in a
serious dialogue on Tatar-related issues.

NATO
--------------


9. (C) Hrytsenko complained that when the Presidential
Secretariat organized a NATO outreach event in Simferopol in
August, the Secretariat failed to coordinate with Crimean
officials. Motorcades of Kyiv-based GOU participants
unnecessarily disrupted traffic, he said, and there were
clashes between upset Crimean residents and special police
brought from Kyiv. Then, when the Crimean Rada later held
open, public hearings on NATO accession, the GOU failed to
send anyone.


10. (C) Zhunko called local opposition to NATO membership
"artificial," although he clarified that he did not see any
political interference by outside forces, including Russian
government or Black Sea Fleet officials. The problem was a
lack of information, said Zhunko, and radical elements were
successfully appealing to fears that Ukrainian soldiers could
get sucked into fighting foreign wars if Ukraine joined the
Alliance.

Ties to Russia
--------------


11. (C) Hrytsenko described the reasons for Crimea's strong
ties to Russia, noting that 58% of Crimeans identified
themselves as ethnically Russian, 100% were Russian-speaking,
and the roughly 600,000 retirees living in Crimea felt
particularly close to Russia. He said that 92 of the 100
member Crimean Rada, while coming from a variety of parties,
were united on a few core issues, namely, support for
official status of the Russian language, support for closer
ties with Russia, and opposition to NATO membership.
Hrytsenko was quick to emphasize that he and Crimean PM
Plakida were "pro-Ukrainian" and did not support any
"anti-state actions," but noted that maintaining this line
could be difficult in Crimea's political climate.

Russian Passports
--------------


12. (C) Hrytsenko said that reports of the Russians handing
out passports to Crimean residents were untrue. He suggested
that such rumors originated with the Kyiv political elite and
cited this as another example of how provocative statements
from Kyiv could have negative consequences in Crimea.

Russian Language
--------------


13. (C) Zhunko made a convincing argument for the need for
greater "tolerance" by the GOU toward Crimea on the language
issue. Trying to force Ukrainian on the Crimean population
would have a negative result, said Zhunko, and indeed such
policies already made language the go-to issue for radical,
pro-Russian political parties. He noted that Ukrainian is
still not widely used or socially acceptable in Crimea, and
there is a lack of qualified teachers, meaning changes cannot
come overnight. A transition period for schools should
involve parallel classes in Russian and Ukrainian to allow
choice, said Zhunko, who noted that he had tried to convince
Kyiv to pursue this kind of softer policy, with only very
limited success.


14. (C) Zhunko also argued that the GOU should create a
serious state TV station for Crimea, in Russian but with a
"pro-Ukrainian" position to provide objective news about

Ukraine. (Note: Most people in Crimea currently get their
news from Russian TV stations. End Note.)

Crimean Tatar Issues
--------------


15. (C) Hrytsenko argued that there were no outstanding,
serious disputes with the Crimean Tatar community. On land
issues, he argued that the vast majority of returning Tatars
had already received land/housing or were building housing,
leaving only some 4,000 or so remaining. This was a small
problem that could easily be resolved once and for all,
Hrytsenko said, by using a register of deported Tatars to
identify those who have not received land/housing, and then
have the relevant local city council allocate land.
Hrytsenko also noted that some Tatars had illegally seized
some property, and the government had to oppose such actions
regardless of their motivation.


16. (C) Jemilev and Chubarov gave a much more pessimistic
view, lamenting that no real progress had been made in recent
years on issues of importance to Tatars. Jemilev noted that
the Georgia crisis had polarized the situation, with the
Tatars the only force in Crimea condemning Russia's actions
(ref A). Regarding land restitution, they complained that
corruption throughout the entire land issuance process meant
that local officials were giving land to themselves but
denying the legitimate claims of Tatars, or forcing Tatar
applicants to accept land in a less desirable area. They
called for a publicly available register of all land in
Crimea but claimed that Hrytsenko and other Crimean
politicians opposed such a register because they themselves
were the largest beneficiaries of the corrupt land deals.


17. (C) Jemilev and Chubarov lamented problems surrounding
the construction of a new mosque in Simferopol. Although
land had already been properly allocated, court cases now
prevented construction from going forward, with powerful
businessmen and politicians hoping to claim the valuable land
for themselves. They also described the Tatar community's
anger that pro-Russian, "paramilitary" Cossack groups were
allowed to operate, claiming that such groups were guilty for
the recent desecration of two Crimean Tatar cemeteries.
Jemilev suggested that the Tatars might consider forming
their own paramilitary group to counter the Cossacks,
although he noted that he appreciated the potential
consequences of such a move.

Development Priorities -- Infrastructure
--------------


18. (SBU) All political leaders seemed to agree that
improving basic infrastructure - particularly water/gas
supply for citizens - was critical for Crimea's economic
development. The Ambassador asked about the status of the
Kerch bridge to connect Crimea with Russia. Hrytsenko and
Plakida said the bridge would dramatically increase travel to
Crimea from Russia, and help bolster Crimea's potential as a
major trading route. The MFA, however, was blocking the
project until the border with Russia was fully demarcated.
The project would be expensive, with an expected price tag of
USD 480 million. A second major road project was a new
Simferopol-Yalta highway, which would involve a series of
tunnels through the mountains and cut down the trip from
about 90 minutes to 30 minutes. That project would be even
more expensive, costing several billion dollars. Both
projects, said Hrytsenko, required the adoption of enabling
legislation by the Verkhovna Rada.

Expanding USG Presence in Crimea
--------------


19. (SBU) Although the investment forum did not result in any
immediate new U.S. investment in Crimea, the Ambassador's
visit proved a useful opportunity to expand our visibility
there. Crimean political leaders welcomed the opportunity
for dialogue with the Embassy, despite the relatively more
anti-American attitudes of the Crimean population. We will
continue to look for ways to expand this dialogue in the
future.
TAYLOR