TYMOSHENKO APPEALS TO USG: UKRAINE HAS "HOURS, NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 002111 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO TTORGERSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018 TAGS: EFIN PGOV PREL ECON ETRD XH UP SUBJECT: TYMOSHENKO APPEALS TO USG: UKRAINE HAS "HOURS, NOT DAYS" TO TACKLE CRISIS REF: KYIV 2105 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (U) This is an Action Request. See Summary and Paragraphs 11 and 12. Summary -------------- ¶2. (C) At a late night meeting on October 20, Prime Minister Tymoshenko told the Ambassador that Ukraine had "hours, and not days" to restore confidence in the country's financial system. The situation in the country was more dire than commonly believed, she claimed. She and Finance Minister Pynzenyk asked the USG to encourage the IMF to approve a support package at an IMF Board meeting on October 22 in Washington. Tymoshenko also asked that the highest levels of the USG weigh in with President Yushchenko to cancel snap elections now scheduled for December 14. The IMF would put tough restrictions on Ukraine in return for support. Rada backing for the unpopular measures would be difficult in the best of cases, and impossible with elections looming, Tymoshenko and Pynzenyk argued. ¶3. (C) Action Request: Ukraine's financial situation is precarious, but most observers do not yet see a meltdown as a foregone conclusion. Nonetheless, swift IMF action now appears to be the only possibility to restore confidence in Ukraine in the short run, and we urge Washington to weigh in with the IMF as Tymoshenko is requesting. Whatever her political motives may be in seeking USG help to delay the election sought by Yushchenko, Tymoshenko is nonetheless correct that continued political infighting will prevent Ukraine from adequately addressing the crisis, and may even neutralize the positive effects of an IMF program. End summary and action request. "Hours, and Not Days" -------------- ¶4. (C) Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko summoned the Ambassador to an 11 p.m. meeting on October 20 to seek USG support for an IMF support package and to postpone early parliamentary elections. Flanked by Deputy PM Hryhoriy Nemyrya and Finance Minister Victor Pynzenyk, Tymoshenko used dramatic language to argue that Ukraine's financial system was in a far more precarious situation than commonly believed. Things were deteriorating rapidly, and Ukraine had "hours, and not days," to restore confidence. Pynzenyk said action was necessary by the end of the week. If swift action were not taken, both Tymoshenko and Pynzenyk told the Ambassador, the banking system and the hryvnia could collapse. Restoring confidence after a complete collapse would be a long and painful process, they said. ¶5. (C) Tymoshenko said that Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, head of the IMF delegation currently in Kyiv, was equally alarmed by the situation. The delegation had prepared a support package that now needed the approval of the IMF Board. Tymoshenko said the IMF would share all details of the package only after approval by the IMF Board. However, Tymoshenko claimed the package could be "the most ambitious program in IMF history." Nemyrya said it could be larger than the $14 billion figure mentioned by GOU and NBU officials in recent days. IMF To Link Support to Tough Conditions -------------- ¶6. (C) Although details were still missing, Tymoshenko and Pynzenyk said, Ukraine already knew that the IMF would expect tough measures in return for its support. Responding to a question by the Ambassador, Tymoshenko confirmed that Ukraine would need to limit growth in salaries and pensions, a main driver of growth, inflation and the ballooning current account deficit. Pynzenyk said the GOU would provide immediate and significant support to banks. It would also make changes to the budget and pass a number of other laws. They were not more specific on fiscal changes expected by the IMF, nor did they indicate whether the IMF might require the National Bank of Ukraine to modify its policy of pegging the hryvnia to the dollar. ¶7. (C) The measures would be highly unpopular, Pynzenyk said, and difficult to pass in the Rada. In particular, the Rada would not approve tough measures without assurances that the IMF would actually deliver on its part of the deal. If neither the IMF nor the Rada acted soon, the situation could worsen beyond repair, Pynzenyk said. Hence speed was of the essence: the IMF Board would discuss the proposed package on October 22 in Washington, Pynzenyk said. He and Tymoshenko asked that the USG weigh in with the IMF, and in particular First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky and the U.S. executive director, to guarantee approval of the package. At the very least, Pynzenyk said, the IMF should adopt "simplified measures" to document that it was backing Ukraine. Tymoshenko: Presidential Secretariat Doesn't Understand -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) According to Tymoshenko, the IMF had not conducted a direct dialog with the National Security and Defense Council (NSDF),which discussed emergency measures on October 20 (septel). Instead, the IMF held separate discussions with the GOU, the NBU and the Presidential Secretariat. She was vague on whether the measures envisaged by the NSDC actually addressed the conditions put forth by the IMF. In any case the Presidential Secretariat did not comprehend the depth of the crisis, she said. Pynzenyk said he talked to Oleksandr Shlapak, Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat, after the latter met with the IMF and concluded that Shlapak still did not understand the situation. He said he feared that President Yushchenko was not being properly briefed. PM Asks USG to Weigh in With Yushchenko -------------- ¶9. (C) Tymoshenko also asked that the highest levels of the USG weigh in with President Yushchenko to delay early parliamentary elections. During the October 20 NSDC meeting Yushchenko agreed to suspend his decree calling for new elections, she said. At a press conference moments later, however, Yushchenko announced that elections would only be delayed by a week to December 14. The move took her by surprise, Tymoshenko said. She no longer understood what drove the President. With elections on the horizon nobody in the Rada would support the unpopular measures needed for IMF backing. Insisting on elections in the present circumstances was irresponsible and would destroy the economic and political stability of the country. The proper decision would be for her and her ministers to resign, she said, but that would only deepen the overall crisis and leave nobody to sign an agreement with the IMF. The Party of Regions (PR) "would rule the country completely" if elections were held according to Yushchenko's timetable. The President "was fantasizing" if he believed claims by the PR that it would support his reelection bid, she said. World Bank, EBRD Also Ready to Help -------------- ¶10. (C) Nemyrya said the World Bank was also considering a loan package, known as DBL3, that would need support from WB President Robert Zoellick. He asked for USG support for this package as well. The EBRD was also sending a delegation to Kyiv. On the way out, Nemyrya told the Ambassador that Tymoshenko fully supported the idea of a Strategic Framework Agreement. Consultations and assistance related to the financial crisis would be welcome. Comment and Action Request: How Bad Is the Situation? -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Tymoshenko's assessment of the financial situation belongs to the most pessimistic that we are hearing in Kyiv. It is broadly expected that the crisis will lead to a significant drop in economic growth and to a devaluation of the hryvnia, but it is not a foregone conclusion among market participants that a meltdown is imminent -- otherwise it would have already occurred. The markets are currently frozen and in a wait and see mode. What happens next will depend on world events and Ukraine's policy responses. Although some market participants feel that the NBU and GOU are in control, many question whether policymakers fully understand the problems in the banking sector and have an idea what to do next. All are hoping that the IMF program will bring more transparency and provide a way forward. We agree that, whatever the underlying reality in the banking sector may be, swift IMF action is at the moment the only way to restore confidence in Ukraine in the short term, and we encourage Washington to weigh in with the IMF Board to secure formal support for a Ukraine program at the October 22 Board meeting. ¶12. (C) Tymoshenko may be privy to insider information not (yet) available to the markets. The situation is truly dire if that is the case. Whatever her motives in seeking USG help to stop the elections sought by Yushchenko, it is true that Ukraine needs unity to address the current crisis. Electioneering will prevent the Rada, the GOU and the President from making the hard decisions expected by the IMF, and could even neutralize any stabilizing effects of an IMF program. We therefore encourage a dialog with President Yushchenko aimed at tabling the idea of elections until an IMF program, along with parallel actions taken by Ukraine, have stabilized the country's financial system and restored confidence. End comment and action request. TAYLOR