ORANGE COALITION CRISIS: NO SIGN OF RECONCILIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 001804 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UP SUBJECT: ORANGE COALITION CRISIS: NO SIGN OF RECONCILIATION REF: A. KYIV 1754 ¶B. KYIV 1426 ¶C. KYIV 873 Classified By: Ambassador William Taylor for reasons 1.4 (b,d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Orange coalition has shown no movement toward reconciliation since the September 2 vote by President Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" party to withdraw. PM Tymoshenko, reportedly surprised by Our Ukraine's sudden exit, expressed willingness to meet with Yushchenko to try and work out a deal early in the crisis; Yushchenko did not make himself available. Yushchenko reiterated to the Ambassador his disdain for Tymoshenko and speculated that the current crisis could lead to a split in Yanukovych's Party of Regions. Deputy PM Nemyria, Tymoshenko's primary foreign policy advisor, told the Ambassador he was pessimistic that the coalition could be salvaged. He confirmed that the Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) was already well along in talks with Regions on a possible new coalition. End Summary. Yushchenko and Nemyria not Optimistic -------------- ¶2. (C) Deputy PM Nemyria told the Ambassador he was not optimistic that the Orange coalition could be salvaged. Nemyria said that Tymoshenko was open to a meeting between herself and the President to work things out. Nemyria felt that it was possible (if there were the will to do it) for the coalition to find common positions on such issues as Georgia, MAP, NATO and the future of the Black Sea Fleet. Tymoshenko had even been willing to support Yushchenko's reelection, while, however, insisting on the need for constitutional amendments to reduce the power of the presidency, although perhaps at a later date. ¶3. (C) In a September 7 meeting, Yushchenko expressed to the Ambassador his disdain for Tymoshenko, noting, "she is evil." He reluctantly agreed that a one-on-one with Tymoshenko to try and salvage the coalition might make sense. Yushchenko speculated that the current crisis could lead to some realignment of political parties. He hinted that Regions power-broker Akhmetov might split with Yanukovych. (This stems from Yanukovych's expulsion of National Security and Defense Council Chair Bohatyreva from Regions over her objection to Yanukovych's support for the independence declarations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.) Yushchenko Rebuffs Tymoshenko -------------- ¶4. (C) OU-PSD member and former FM Borys Tarasyuk told us that he met with Tymoshenko on September 4 to discuss ways to salvage the coalition. He confirmed that the OU vote to exit the coalition had surprised Tymoshenko. Tarasyuk agreed, with Tymoshenko's blessing, to try and set up a meeting between her and the President. Tarasyuk told us he tried over the next few days but that the President (who was taking time off at his Dacha to plant trees) would not find time for a meeting. MPs and Analysts Agree: Coalition Survival Unlikely -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Embassy met September 8-10 with MPs and political analysts, most of whom told us that the BYuT/OU-PSD coalition was unlikely to survive in its current form, and that a solution to the current crisis might not be found until the end of September. Leading political analyst Ihor Kohut told us that BYuT,s votes in the Rada on September 2 to limit presidential powers, as well as OU's vote to leave the coalition in response, represented the "natural conclusion" of a weak coalition. Kohut said that the Presidential Secretariat, led by the controversial Viktor Baloha and with an eye towards the upcoming presidential elections, has instituted a long-term plan to tear Tymoshenko down. Tymoshenko had to "answer with strength," Kohut said. Yushchenko Works the Phones -------------- ¶6. (C) Kohut said that Tymoshenko had expected a reaction from Yushchenko to the Rada votes, but did not expect OU-PSD to quit the coalition. Chairman of the Rada's National Security and Defense Committee Anatoliy Hrytsenko, who did not support the dissolution vote, told us he contacted Tymoshenko during OU-PSD,s September 2 faction meeting. He said Tymoshenko was "genuinely surprised" by the vote, but that she declined his offer to address the faction, claiming that Yushchenko and Baloha would ensure that they would gain the necessary votes to pull out. Hrytsenko added that when the initial vote came up short, MP Kril (United Center) arranged for Yushchenko to speak with individual MPs by phone to cajole them into voting to leave. After the vote, supported by 39 of 72 OU-PSD MPs, three of the OU-PSD component parties (People,s Self-Defense, Rukh, and the European Party) announced that they opposed the vote to leave the coalition. ¶7. (C) MP Koskiv (OU-PSD),who voted to leave the coalition, told us that there is "no substantive reason" for the coalition to survive, and that there was "no chance" that the coalition would continue in its current form. MP Sobolev (BYuT) told Emboff the issue needs to be discussed "at a higher level than faction heads," adding that only a personal agreement between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko could save the coalition. ¶8. (SBU) Despite public calls from both sides to save the coalition, analysts and MPs believe that reconciliation between BYuT and OU-PSD is unlikely before the September 13 deadline. Yushchenko has demanded that BYuT repudiate its September 2 votes and adopt his position on Russia/Georgia in order to save the coalition. Tymoshenko and her surrogates counter that Yushchenko and OU-PSD left the coalition, and they should return without pre-conditions. Tymoshenko has also reaffirmed her commitment to the September 2 Rada votes, stating that BYuT will vote to override any Yushchenko vetoes. Early Elections; Possible Split in Regions -------------- ¶9. (C) A recent poll from the Razumkov Center found public support for new elections at less than 21%. Kohut speculated that in facing elections, OU-PSD would likely break apart, with some going to BYuT and others joining Baloha,s pro-presidential United Center Party. Sobolev claimed that Baloha wants pre-term elections to strengthen his party, adding that even with 4% of the seats, Baloha would represent a swing vote in the Rada. ¶10. (C) Speculation of a split between the Yanukovych and Akhmetov camps in Regions have heightened recently with NSDC Chair Raisa Bohatyreva,s dismissal from the party and Regions MP Kolesnikov's negative press statement about MP Tabachnyk, a close Yanukovych ally. Kohut said that early elections would likely delay any formal split in the party, but that Akhmetov would likely give financial support to anyone who would take votes from BYuT. If the Rada avoids early elections, Akhmetov could press for a change within Regions or move away from the party ahead of presidential elections. BYuT-Regions: a "Strange Baby" -------------- ¶11. (C) On September 8 Tymoshenko said that while she still hopes for the restoration of the coalition, she sees a new coalition as preferable to early elections. Noted political analyst Sergiy Taran told us that this was a signal that Tymoshenko was open to a BYuT-Regions coalition, something she was called a "strange baby" in meetings with us. Sobolev told Emboff that there was some support within BYuT for a coalition with Regions, but that most members saw it as a last resort and were adopting a "wait and see" attitude. Former FM Tarasyuk expressed the views of many when he commented to us that Tymoshenko's base would find a coalition with Regions hard to swallow and that it would cost her votes. ¶12. (C) Taran told us he sees BYuT/Regions as a potential two-session (one year) coalition whose goal would be to change the constitution (ref C). Taran posited that this coalition would focus on neutral economic issues and temporarily set aside "grand issues" like language, religion, and NATO, and other issues that divide Ukraine. He added that Tymoshenko would not move too far towards Regions too soon, as it would limit her ability to maneuver, giving Yanukovych the upper hand in negotiations. ¶13. (C) MP Miroshnychenko (Regions) claimed to us that a BYuT/Regions coalition could be announced by the end of September. A remaining obstacle on both sides is whether, with an eye towards presidential elections, whether the parties can sell the coalition to their voters. Hrytsenko told us that he saw a potential BYuT/Regions coalition as likely, adding that, with the number of votes they currently control, BYuT and Regions could pretty much "do anything they want." MP Chornovil (Regions) said that Regions was not in negotiations with OU-PSD on a potential coalition. ¶14. (C) Deputy PM Nemyria told the Ambassador that BYuT would insist on the lead in foreign policy in any BYuT-Regions coalition. Nemyria indicated that he might serve as Foreign Minister in such a government. Revived Orange Coalition with Lytvyn Bloc -------------- ¶15. (C) BYuT MP Sobolev told us that another potential coalition could consist of BYuT, OU-PSD and the Lytvyn Bloc, where Speaker Yatsenyuk takes over for Baloha in the Presidential Secretariat and Lytvyn becomes Rada Speaker. Former FM Tarasuyk noted the advantages of such a coalition but said that Tymoshenko would balk at Lytvyn as Speaker. Given the harsh rhetoric between the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko camps, adding the Lytvyn Bloc could serve as "glue." He expected Tymoshenko would be willing to go for it, unless Lytvyn demanded too steep a price. Miroshnychenko speculated that any rapprochement in the coalition would be predicated on Baloha,s dismissal. Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) Failure by the coalition to reach agreement by September 13, which appears likley, will open up a 30 day period during which coalition formation will be open to all parties. During this period, the coalition could still reach a deal, a new coalition could form -- or no coalition could form. In the latter case Yushchenko may - or may not - call new elections. If he chose not to call elections, the current government would carry on in an acting capacity. The betting, at present, appears to favor formation of a BYuT-Regions coalition. That could change, however, if Tymoshenko and Yushchenko were to decide to make an effort at compromise. TAYLOR