Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KYIV1804
2008-09-11 17:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:
ORANGE COALITION CRISIS: NO SIGN OF RECONCILIATION
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHKV #1804/01 2551717 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 111717Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY KYIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6345 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 001804
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UP
SUBJECT: ORANGE COALITION CRISIS: NO SIGN OF RECONCILIATION
REF: A. KYIV 1754
B. KYIV 1426
C. KYIV 873
Classified By: Ambassador William Taylor for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
Summary
------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 001804
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UP
SUBJECT: ORANGE COALITION CRISIS: NO SIGN OF RECONCILIATION
REF: A. KYIV 1754
B. KYIV 1426
C. KYIV 873
Classified By: Ambassador William Taylor for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The Orange coalition has shown no movement toward
reconciliation since the September 2 vote by President
Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" party to withdraw. PM Tymoshenko,
reportedly surprised by Our Ukraine's sudden exit, expressed
willingness to meet with Yushchenko to try and work out a
deal early in the crisis; Yushchenko did not make himself
available. Yushchenko reiterated to the Ambassador his
disdain for Tymoshenko and speculated that the current crisis
could lead to a split in Yanukovych's Party of Regions.
Deputy PM Nemyria, Tymoshenko's primary foreign policy
advisor, told the Ambassador he was pessimistic that the
coalition could be salvaged. He confirmed that the
Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) was already well along in talks with
Regions on a possible new coalition. End Summary.
Yushchenko and Nemyria not Optimistic
--------------
2. (C) Deputy PM Nemyria told the Ambassador he was not
optimistic that the Orange coalition could be salvaged.
Nemyria said that Tymoshenko was open to a meeting between
herself and the President to work things out. Nemyria felt
that it was possible (if there were the will to do it) for
the coalition to find common positions on such issues as
Georgia, MAP, NATO and the future of the Black Sea Fleet.
Tymoshenko had even been willing to support Yushchenko's
reelection, while, however, insisting on the need for
constitutional amendments to reduce the power of the
presidency, although perhaps at a later date.
3. (C) In a September 7 meeting, Yushchenko expressed to the
Ambassador his disdain for Tymoshenko, noting, "she is evil."
He reluctantly agreed that a one-on-one with Tymoshenko to
try and salvage the coalition might make sense. Yushchenko
speculated that the current crisis could lead to some
realignment of political parties. He hinted that Regions
power-broker Akhmetov might split with Yanukovych. (This
stems from Yanukovych's expulsion of National Security and
Defense Council Chair Bohatyreva from Regions over her
objection to Yanukovych's support for the independence
declarations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.)
Yushchenko Rebuffs Tymoshenko
--------------
4. (C) OU-PSD member and former FM Borys Tarasyuk told us
that he met with Tymoshenko on September 4 to discuss ways to
salvage the coalition. He confirmed that the OU vote to exit
the coalition had surprised Tymoshenko. Tarasyuk agreed,
with Tymoshenko's blessing, to try and set up a meeting
between her and the President. Tarasyuk told us he tried
over the next few days but that the President (who was taking
time off at his Dacha to plant trees) would not find time for
a meeting.
MPs and Analysts Agree: Coalition Survival Unlikely
-------------- --------------
5. (C) Embassy met September 8-10 with MPs and political
analysts, most of whom told us that the BYuT/OU-PSD coalition
was unlikely to survive in its current form, and that a
solution to the current crisis might not be found until the
end of September. Leading political analyst Ihor Kohut told
us that BYuT,s votes in the Rada on September 2 to limit
presidential powers, as well as OU's vote to leave the
coalition in response, represented the "natural conclusion"
of a weak coalition. Kohut said that the Presidential
Secretariat, led by the controversial Viktor Baloha and with
an eye towards the upcoming presidential elections, has
instituted a long-term plan to tear Tymoshenko down.
Tymoshenko had to "answer with strength," Kohut said.
Yushchenko Works the Phones
--------------
6. (C) Kohut said that Tymoshenko had expected a reaction
from Yushchenko to the Rada votes, but did not expect OU-PSD
to quit the coalition. Chairman of the Rada's National
Security and Defense Committee Anatoliy Hrytsenko, who did
not support the dissolution vote, told us he contacted
Tymoshenko during OU-PSD,s September 2 faction meeting. He
said Tymoshenko was "genuinely surprised" by the vote, but
that she declined his offer to address the faction, claiming
that Yushchenko and Baloha would ensure that they would gain
the necessary votes to pull out. Hrytsenko added that when
the initial vote came up short, MP Kril (United Center)
arranged for Yushchenko to speak with individual MPs by phone
to cajole them into voting to leave. After the vote,
supported by 39 of 72 OU-PSD MPs, three of the OU-PSD
component parties (People,s Self-Defense, Rukh, and the
European Party) announced that they opposed the vote to leave
the coalition.
7. (C) MP Koskiv (OU-PSD),who voted to leave the coalition,
told us that there is "no substantive reason" for the
coalition to survive, and that there was "no chance" that the
coalition would continue in its current form. MP Sobolev
(BYuT) told Emboff the issue needs to be discussed "at a
higher level than faction heads," adding that only a personal
agreement between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko could save the
coalition.
8. (SBU) Despite public calls from both sides to save the
coalition, analysts and MPs believe that reconciliation
between BYuT and OU-PSD is unlikely before the September 13
deadline. Yushchenko has demanded that BYuT repudiate its
September 2 votes and adopt his position on Russia/Georgia in
order to save the coalition. Tymoshenko and her surrogates
counter that Yushchenko and OU-PSD left the coalition, and
they should return without pre-conditions. Tymoshenko has
also reaffirmed her commitment to the September 2 Rada votes,
stating that BYuT will vote to override any Yushchenko
vetoes.
Early Elections; Possible Split in Regions
--------------
9. (C) A recent poll from the Razumkov Center found public
support for new elections at less than 21%. Kohut speculated
that in facing elections, OU-PSD would likely break apart,
with some going to BYuT and others joining Baloha,s
pro-presidential United Center Party. Sobolev claimed that
Baloha wants pre-term elections to strengthen his party,
adding that even with 4% of the seats, Baloha would represent
a swing vote in the Rada.
10. (C) Speculation of a split between the Yanukovych and
Akhmetov camps in Regions have heightened recently with NSDC
Chair Raisa Bohatyreva,s dismissal from the party and
Regions MP Kolesnikov's negative press statement about MP
Tabachnyk, a close Yanukovych ally. Kohut said that early
elections would likely delay any formal split in the party,
but that Akhmetov would likely give financial support to
anyone who would take votes from BYuT. If the Rada avoids
early elections, Akhmetov could press for a change within
Regions or move away from the party ahead of presidential
elections.
BYuT-Regions: a "Strange Baby"
--------------
11. (C) On September 8 Tymoshenko said that while she still
hopes for the restoration of the coalition, she sees a new
coalition as preferable to early elections. Noted political
analyst Sergiy Taran told us that this was a signal that
Tymoshenko was open to a BYuT-Regions coalition, something
she was called a "strange baby" in meetings with us. Sobolev
told Emboff that there was some support within BYuT for a
coalition with Regions, but that most members saw it as a
last resort and were adopting a "wait and see" attitude.
Former FM Tarasyuk expressed the views of many when he
commented to us that Tymoshenko's base would find a coalition
with Regions hard to swallow and that it would cost her
votes.
12. (C) Taran told us he sees BYuT/Regions as a potential
two-session (one year) coalition whose goal would be to
change the constitution (ref C). Taran posited that this
coalition would focus on neutral economic issues and
temporarily set aside "grand issues" like language, religion,
and NATO, and other issues that divide Ukraine. He added
that Tymoshenko would not move too far towards Regions too
soon, as it would limit her ability to maneuver, giving
Yanukovych the upper hand in negotiations.
13. (C) MP Miroshnychenko (Regions) claimed to us that a
BYuT/Regions coalition could be announced by the end of
September. A remaining obstacle on both sides is whether,
with an eye towards presidential elections, whether the
parties can sell the coalition to their voters. Hrytsenko
told us that he saw a potential BYuT/Regions coalition as
likely, adding that, with the number of votes they currently
control, BYuT and Regions could pretty much "do anything they
want." MP Chornovil (Regions) said that Regions was not in
negotiations with OU-PSD on a potential coalition.
14. (C) Deputy PM Nemyria told the Ambassador that BYuT would
insist on the lead in foreign policy in any BYuT-Regions
coalition. Nemyria indicated that he might serve as Foreign
Minister in such a government.
Revived Orange Coalition with Lytvyn Bloc
--------------
15. (C) BYuT MP Sobolev told us that another potential
coalition could consist of BYuT, OU-PSD and the Lytvyn Bloc,
where Speaker Yatsenyuk takes over for Baloha in the
Presidential Secretariat and Lytvyn becomes Rada Speaker.
Former FM Tarasuyk noted the advantages of such a coalition
but said that Tymoshenko would balk at Lytvyn as Speaker.
Given the harsh rhetoric between the Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko camps, adding the Lytvyn Bloc could serve as
"glue." He expected Tymoshenko would be willing to go for
it, unless Lytvyn demanded too steep a price. Miroshnychenko
speculated that any rapprochement in the coalition would be
predicated on Baloha,s dismissal.
Comment
--------------
16. (C) Failure by the coalition to reach agreement by
September 13, which appears likley, will open up a 30 day
period during which coalition formation will be open to all
parties. During this period, the coalition could still
reach a deal, a new coalition could form -- or no coalition
could form. In the latter case Yushchenko may - or may not
- call new elections. If he chose not to call elections,
the current government would carry on in an acting capacity.
The betting, at present, appears to favor formation of a
BYuT-Regions coalition. That could change, however, if
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko were to decide to make an effort at
compromise.
TAYLOR
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UP
SUBJECT: ORANGE COALITION CRISIS: NO SIGN OF RECONCILIATION
REF: A. KYIV 1754
B. KYIV 1426
C. KYIV 873
Classified By: Ambassador William Taylor for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The Orange coalition has shown no movement toward
reconciliation since the September 2 vote by President
Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" party to withdraw. PM Tymoshenko,
reportedly surprised by Our Ukraine's sudden exit, expressed
willingness to meet with Yushchenko to try and work out a
deal early in the crisis; Yushchenko did not make himself
available. Yushchenko reiterated to the Ambassador his
disdain for Tymoshenko and speculated that the current crisis
could lead to a split in Yanukovych's Party of Regions.
Deputy PM Nemyria, Tymoshenko's primary foreign policy
advisor, told the Ambassador he was pessimistic that the
coalition could be salvaged. He confirmed that the
Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) was already well along in talks with
Regions on a possible new coalition. End Summary.
Yushchenko and Nemyria not Optimistic
--------------
2. (C) Deputy PM Nemyria told the Ambassador he was not
optimistic that the Orange coalition could be salvaged.
Nemyria said that Tymoshenko was open to a meeting between
herself and the President to work things out. Nemyria felt
that it was possible (if there were the will to do it) for
the coalition to find common positions on such issues as
Georgia, MAP, NATO and the future of the Black Sea Fleet.
Tymoshenko had even been willing to support Yushchenko's
reelection, while, however, insisting on the need for
constitutional amendments to reduce the power of the
presidency, although perhaps at a later date.
3. (C) In a September 7 meeting, Yushchenko expressed to the
Ambassador his disdain for Tymoshenko, noting, "she is evil."
He reluctantly agreed that a one-on-one with Tymoshenko to
try and salvage the coalition might make sense. Yushchenko
speculated that the current crisis could lead to some
realignment of political parties. He hinted that Regions
power-broker Akhmetov might split with Yanukovych. (This
stems from Yanukovych's expulsion of National Security and
Defense Council Chair Bohatyreva from Regions over her
objection to Yanukovych's support for the independence
declarations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.)
Yushchenko Rebuffs Tymoshenko
--------------
4. (C) OU-PSD member and former FM Borys Tarasyuk told us
that he met with Tymoshenko on September 4 to discuss ways to
salvage the coalition. He confirmed that the OU vote to exit
the coalition had surprised Tymoshenko. Tarasyuk agreed,
with Tymoshenko's blessing, to try and set up a meeting
between her and the President. Tarasyuk told us he tried
over the next few days but that the President (who was taking
time off at his Dacha to plant trees) would not find time for
a meeting.
MPs and Analysts Agree: Coalition Survival Unlikely
-------------- --------------
5. (C) Embassy met September 8-10 with MPs and political
analysts, most of whom told us that the BYuT/OU-PSD coalition
was unlikely to survive in its current form, and that a
solution to the current crisis might not be found until the
end of September. Leading political analyst Ihor Kohut told
us that BYuT,s votes in the Rada on September 2 to limit
presidential powers, as well as OU's vote to leave the
coalition in response, represented the "natural conclusion"
of a weak coalition. Kohut said that the Presidential
Secretariat, led by the controversial Viktor Baloha and with
an eye towards the upcoming presidential elections, has
instituted a long-term plan to tear Tymoshenko down.
Tymoshenko had to "answer with strength," Kohut said.
Yushchenko Works the Phones
--------------
6. (C) Kohut said that Tymoshenko had expected a reaction
from Yushchenko to the Rada votes, but did not expect OU-PSD
to quit the coalition. Chairman of the Rada's National
Security and Defense Committee Anatoliy Hrytsenko, who did
not support the dissolution vote, told us he contacted
Tymoshenko during OU-PSD,s September 2 faction meeting. He
said Tymoshenko was "genuinely surprised" by the vote, but
that she declined his offer to address the faction, claiming
that Yushchenko and Baloha would ensure that they would gain
the necessary votes to pull out. Hrytsenko added that when
the initial vote came up short, MP Kril (United Center)
arranged for Yushchenko to speak with individual MPs by phone
to cajole them into voting to leave. After the vote,
supported by 39 of 72 OU-PSD MPs, three of the OU-PSD
component parties (People,s Self-Defense, Rukh, and the
European Party) announced that they opposed the vote to leave
the coalition.
7. (C) MP Koskiv (OU-PSD),who voted to leave the coalition,
told us that there is "no substantive reason" for the
coalition to survive, and that there was "no chance" that the
coalition would continue in its current form. MP Sobolev
(BYuT) told Emboff the issue needs to be discussed "at a
higher level than faction heads," adding that only a personal
agreement between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko could save the
coalition.
8. (SBU) Despite public calls from both sides to save the
coalition, analysts and MPs believe that reconciliation
between BYuT and OU-PSD is unlikely before the September 13
deadline. Yushchenko has demanded that BYuT repudiate its
September 2 votes and adopt his position on Russia/Georgia in
order to save the coalition. Tymoshenko and her surrogates
counter that Yushchenko and OU-PSD left the coalition, and
they should return without pre-conditions. Tymoshenko has
also reaffirmed her commitment to the September 2 Rada votes,
stating that BYuT will vote to override any Yushchenko
vetoes.
Early Elections; Possible Split in Regions
--------------
9. (C) A recent poll from the Razumkov Center found public
support for new elections at less than 21%. Kohut speculated
that in facing elections, OU-PSD would likely break apart,
with some going to BYuT and others joining Baloha,s
pro-presidential United Center Party. Sobolev claimed that
Baloha wants pre-term elections to strengthen his party,
adding that even with 4% of the seats, Baloha would represent
a swing vote in the Rada.
10. (C) Speculation of a split between the Yanukovych and
Akhmetov camps in Regions have heightened recently with NSDC
Chair Raisa Bohatyreva,s dismissal from the party and
Regions MP Kolesnikov's negative press statement about MP
Tabachnyk, a close Yanukovych ally. Kohut said that early
elections would likely delay any formal split in the party,
but that Akhmetov would likely give financial support to
anyone who would take votes from BYuT. If the Rada avoids
early elections, Akhmetov could press for a change within
Regions or move away from the party ahead of presidential
elections.
BYuT-Regions: a "Strange Baby"
--------------
11. (C) On September 8 Tymoshenko said that while she still
hopes for the restoration of the coalition, she sees a new
coalition as preferable to early elections. Noted political
analyst Sergiy Taran told us that this was a signal that
Tymoshenko was open to a BYuT-Regions coalition, something
she was called a "strange baby" in meetings with us. Sobolev
told Emboff that there was some support within BYuT for a
coalition with Regions, but that most members saw it as a
last resort and were adopting a "wait and see" attitude.
Former FM Tarasyuk expressed the views of many when he
commented to us that Tymoshenko's base would find a coalition
with Regions hard to swallow and that it would cost her
votes.
12. (C) Taran told us he sees BYuT/Regions as a potential
two-session (one year) coalition whose goal would be to
change the constitution (ref C). Taran posited that this
coalition would focus on neutral economic issues and
temporarily set aside "grand issues" like language, religion,
and NATO, and other issues that divide Ukraine. He added
that Tymoshenko would not move too far towards Regions too
soon, as it would limit her ability to maneuver, giving
Yanukovych the upper hand in negotiations.
13. (C) MP Miroshnychenko (Regions) claimed to us that a
BYuT/Regions coalition could be announced by the end of
September. A remaining obstacle on both sides is whether,
with an eye towards presidential elections, whether the
parties can sell the coalition to their voters. Hrytsenko
told us that he saw a potential BYuT/Regions coalition as
likely, adding that, with the number of votes they currently
control, BYuT and Regions could pretty much "do anything they
want." MP Chornovil (Regions) said that Regions was not in
negotiations with OU-PSD on a potential coalition.
14. (C) Deputy PM Nemyria told the Ambassador that BYuT would
insist on the lead in foreign policy in any BYuT-Regions
coalition. Nemyria indicated that he might serve as Foreign
Minister in such a government.
Revived Orange Coalition with Lytvyn Bloc
--------------
15. (C) BYuT MP Sobolev told us that another potential
coalition could consist of BYuT, OU-PSD and the Lytvyn Bloc,
where Speaker Yatsenyuk takes over for Baloha in the
Presidential Secretariat and Lytvyn becomes Rada Speaker.
Former FM Tarasuyk noted the advantages of such a coalition
but said that Tymoshenko would balk at Lytvyn as Speaker.
Given the harsh rhetoric between the Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko camps, adding the Lytvyn Bloc could serve as
"glue." He expected Tymoshenko would be willing to go for
it, unless Lytvyn demanded too steep a price. Miroshnychenko
speculated that any rapprochement in the coalition would be
predicated on Baloha,s dismissal.
Comment
--------------
16. (C) Failure by the coalition to reach agreement by
September 13, which appears likley, will open up a 30 day
period during which coalition formation will be open to all
parties. During this period, the coalition could still
reach a deal, a new coalition could form -- or no coalition
could form. In the latter case Yushchenko may - or may not
- call new elections. If he chose not to call elections,
the current government would carry on in an acting capacity.
The betting, at present, appears to favor formation of a
BYuT-Regions coalition. That could change, however, if
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko were to decide to make an effort at
compromise.
TAYLOR