(S) SCENESETTER FOR THE KUWAIT PRIME MINISTER'S

S E C R E T KUWAIT 000936 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ARP LONNIE KELLY, NEA/I, NEA/IR NSC FOR ELLIOTT ABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER CVIS MASS ECON EINV IR IZ KU SUBJECT: (S) SCENESETTER FOR THE KUWAIT PRIME MINISTER'S SEPTEMBER 18-19 VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES: STRENGTHENING AN INDISPENSABLE REGIONAL PARTNER Classified By: The Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Ahmed al-Jaber Al Sabah's September 18-19 visit to Washington offers a timely opportunity to honor and reaffirm the unique and indispensable security relationship between our two countries; it is also an important opportunity to encourage the PM and his government to be more resolute in confronting a variety of social, political and security challenges which -- if not addressed -- will erode the foundations of our strong bilateral relationship. ¶2. (S) In contrast to the efficient autocracies to its west and south, Kuwait enjoys a proud 50-year tradition of elected parliaments and, since 2006, full political rights for women: a fact we should applaud. That said, Kuwait's current parliament reflects the country's political and demographic shift over the past several decades, as primacy has passed from a largely urban, relatively sophisticated merchant elite to an increasingly restive and confrontational bedouin population. After long years as second-class Kuwaitis, the growing Bedouin group is eager to take its "fair share" of the communal pie, with loyalties drawn according to tribal lines and Islamist salafist sympathies. ¶3. (S) The combination of a fractious Parliament, politically ill-disposed to take a hard line on shutting down support for those engaged in global "jihad," and Kuwait's relatively liberal legal system -- the State Security Court was abolished with U.S. approval following the 1991 liberation -- makes it all the more difficult for the GOK to shut down and effectively prosecute those suspected of funding or otherwise supporting terrorist activities. Kuwaitis fault weak leadership for the GOK's failure to deal effectively with growing salafist influence, as well as their relative economic stagnation -- despite record oil revenues -- in a country that used to pride itself on being in the vanguard of regional modernization, the so-called "Pearl of the Gulf." The Amir has twice dissolved Parliament in as many years and has threatened to do so again should the gridlock continue. Unfortunately, this would lead only to further delays in achieving necessary projects and reforms while the State founders. ¶4. (S) Our relationship with Kuwait is co-dependent: the Kuwaitis need us to remain a protective shield in a volatile and dangerous neighborhood; we need them to remain a reliable base and transit point for U.S. forces, maintain uninterrupted energy flows and continue significant investment in the U.S. We should use this visit to strengthen the Prime Minister (PM) by: -- underscoring the importance and durability of our security relationship with this major non-NATO ally, ideally with a full color guard ceremonial reception at the Pentagon when he meets the Deputy SecDef; -- applauding Kuwait's democracy, as difficult as it may be, and encouraging continued economic reforms; -- pushing hard for greater cooperation and transparency in combating terrorism; -- publicly welcoming Kuwait's naming of an Ambassador to Iraq (despite Iraq's delay in similarly identifying a counterpart) and its continuing cooperation with a former foe; -- applauding Kuwaiti support for the Annapolis process and regional peace initiatives, including its recent USD 80 million grant to the Palestinian Authority and its larger commitments. -------------- -------------- Regional Security Cooperation -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) The Kuwaiti people remain deeply grateful to the United States for leading Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Kuwait's approximately USD 1 billion annual contribution in material and logistical support to Operation Iraqi Freedom far exceeds that of all other nations combined. As during the President's visit in January, we recommend reiterating our appreciation for the critical role Kuwait plays in supporting our regional security efforts, as well as our intention to continue this close, mutually beneficial partnership for the foreseeable future. The PM will be listening for any indication the U.S. intends to increase its military footprint in Kuwait in light of regional developments. The PM may raise, with DOD interlocutors, delays in acquisition of U.S. military equipment under the Foreign Military Sales Program, a complaint regularly raised by Kuwaiti Chief of Staff LTG Fahd Ahmad Al-Amir. -------------- -------------- Positive Trends and Lingering Concern in Iraq -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) The Prime Minister shares our assessment that "the surge has worked" and that the Maliki government is progressively consolidating security and stability across the country, although he may ask about reports of PM Maliki's failure to integrate the Sunni "Sons of Iraq" who were critical to defeating the insurgency. Kuwait's long-designated ambassador to Baghdad, General Ali al-Moumin, expects to present his credentials formally in October. However, there is lingering enmity over Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion, and residual suspicion of Iraqi intentions, exacerbated by Iraq's own failure to name an ambassador to Kuwait and statements by Iraqi officials, including PM Maliki, either challenging the UN-demarcated boundary lines or making light of Kuwaiti concerns over the border encroachments of Iraqi farmers. This, in turn, contributes to Kuwaiti unwillingness to write off more than USD 17 billion in Iraqi debt, although the GOK has not actively attempted to collect on it thus far. Kuwait has disbursed only a small fraction of over 575 million dollars in pledged aid, citing a lack of reliable aid implementers on the ground; the Iraqis have acknowledged their bureaucratic obstacles in this regard. -------------- - Keeping the Pressure on Iran -------------- - ¶7. (S) Kuwait strongly supports international efforts to pressure Iran to abide by IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program. However, it is deeply concerned about being caught in the middle of a conflict between the U.S. (and/or Israel) and Iran. While few Kuwaitis view a ground attack on Kuwaiti soil as likely, many are concerned about possible missile attacks, Iranian terrorist sleeper cells, and dramatically increased insurance rates for oil tankers due to Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait's Foreign Minister (FM) has been clear and direct in calling for Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, reminding the Iranians that cutting off the Strait of Hormuz would be a punishment to Arab GCC states. The FM has also reiterated familiar Kuwaiti assurances that Kuwaiti soil will not serve as a platform for any attack on Iran. If push came to shove, however, we believe Kuwait would support U.S. action if Tehran sparked violence in the region. We recommend USG interlocutors (a) thank the Prime Minister for Kuwait's firm position on the need for Iran to meet its IAEA commitments, and (b) urge him to continue to press Iran on this subject both privately and in international fora. He should be urged to discourage Kuwaiti commercial ventures with Iran. For his part, we understand the PM will seek clarification of the P5 1 formulation acknowledging "Iran's legitimate regional security role," which the GCC countries believe comes at their expense. -------------- -------------- CT Cooperation Needs to Improve -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) Stiffening Kuwaiti spine in CT performance -- e.g., timeliness/transparency in intelligence sharing; follow-up on U.S. leads; consistent monitoring of extremists (including the seven remaining previously transferred GTMO detainees); and effective monitoring/auditing of charities -- should figure prominently in top-level interaction with the PM. Our best lever for achieving this aim is likely to be a frank and unvarnished appeal in a small session at the highest level, either by the President or the Vice President. The point might be punctuated with a list of promising intel leads passed to the GOK over the past year without visible result (or in many cases even evidence of Kuwaiti follow-up). Candor and clarity are the key, as the GOK, for its part, accuses us of similar opacity. It is especially important to have this conversation in light of the PM's likely raising of the GOK's long-standing desire to take custody of their remaining four GTMO detainees. Our assessment remains that Kuwait has not demonstrated either the political will or the capacity to mitigate or prevent future terrorist actions by their detainees. ¶9. (S) Strong evidence suggests that a small number of Kuwaiti nationals play an important role facilitating al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq through financing, recruitment and outreach. We are certain the GOK's intelligence organizations are aware of this activity, but choose to conform to the GOK leadership's perceived policy of co-opting extremists with the principal goal of deflecting domestic attacks and avoiding domestic controversy. As a result, Kuwaiti security services are unwilling to share information that could cause them political, public or operational discomfort, particularly when an investigation touches on a Kuwaiti citizen. We believe this policy is ultimately detrimental to both U.S. and Kuwaiti interests, as we assess that it is only a matter of time before these extremist elements focus their activities on Kuwait. ¶10. (S) U.S. interlocutors should encourage the PM to issue forthright public statements denouncing terrorism and specific attacks as they occur; the FM's strong denunciation of the reported suicide bombing attacks by Kuwaitis in Iraq earlier this year was exceptional rather than the norm. We should also encourage a "rehabilitation" program for radicalized Kuwaitis along the lines of the Saudi model. The GOK's own "moderation Initiative" lacks teeth. -------------- -- Terror Finance -------------- -- ¶11. (S) The USG's June decision to designate Kuwait's prestigious and respected Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization struck a nerve across society here, and elicited harsh criticism from GOK interlocutors who believe Muslim Charity is the antidote to Islamic extremism. Persistent GOK doubts about the factual basis for the RIHS designation will likely color its responses to future USG designations of Kuwaiti nationals (which they believe only adds to their notoriety),and could affect the GOK's willingness to commit fully to other requests for counterterrorism cooperation. If it is possible to provide a detailed briefing on the evidence showing RIHS complicity, this might help influence the GOK. Caveat: This should only be offered if we believe that we can make information available at a sufficient level of detail to overcome substantial GOK skepticism regarding the accusations against RIHS. ¶12. (C) In any event, the PM should be encouraged to drive through the parliament a long delayed anti-money laundering law to strengthen the GOK's legal authority to confront the problem. In early August, after 18 months of interagency deliberation, the Central Bank Governor sent the "final" draft of the law to the Ministry of Finance for review and forwarding to the Council of Ministers for approval. The Prime Minister should be encouraged to gain speedy executive branch approval of the draft law and send it to the National Assembly for expeditious enactment. -------------- Visas and Students -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Kuwaitis value their close relationship with the United States, a preferred destination for vacation, study, medical care and business. Visa applications by Kuwaitis in 2008 are projected to surpass pre-9/11 totals for the first time. Recognition of this strong Kuwaiti interest in close ties with the U.S. is helpful in countering a prevalent regional perception that the U.S. is not a welcoming place. A stand-alone meeting at DHS would usefully follow up Secretary Chertoff's highly successful visit last March, and offer an opportunity to draw positive attention to the pilot program on pre-screening of foreign students at ports of entry. Port-of-entry problems and delays in SAO clearances have a serious ripple effect in this small society, with complaints often rising to the FM's office (who recently asked the Ambassador whether Kuwaiti students were being "targeted"). USG attention to the issue in recent years has won favorable attention. -------------- - Trade and Investment -------------- - ¶14. (SBU) The PM may raise Kuwait's long-standing interest in a Free Trade Agreement. Kuwait still needs to make significant reforms in such areas as IPR legislation, full compliance with WTO obligations and removal of technical barriers to trade for a FTA to be worth considering once we regain Trade Promotion Authority. Kuwait continues to invest in the United States to the tune of more than USD 200 billion. In July, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation concluded an USD 11 billion petrochemical joint venture with Dow Chemical Company which will be based in Michigan. -------------- - Oil Production -------------- - ¶15. (U) The USG could welcome the recent GOK award of contracts, one to American company Fluor, to build what will be one of the largest refineries in the world in southern Kuwait. However, this issue has stimulated significant opposition in the National Assembly and may be delayed. More broadly, the GOK has not favored OPEC production cuts and recently announced the intention to increase its crude oil production from 2.5 to 4 million barrels per day over the next 20 years. The goal will be hard to reach, however, unless Kuwait welcomes upstream partnerships with responsible international companies. -------------- -- TIP Report -------------- -- ¶16. (C) The PM is unlikely to raise Kuwait's Trafficking in Persons status. GOK reluctance to address poor working conditions has spurred protests among low-income foreign workers over recent months. While the GOK has taken initial steps to address their concerns, it is premature to consider any move from Tier 3 to the Tier 2 Watchlist. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * JONES