KSS TO WAINSTEIN: KUWAIT CT LEGISLATION INADEQUATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000694 SIPDIS NEA/ARP, NEA/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018 TAGS: PTER PGOV KDRG PREL KTFN KU SUBJECT: KSS TO WAINSTEIN: KUWAIT CT LEGISLATION INADEQUATE REF: A. KUWAIT 557 ¶B. KUWAIT 512 ¶C. KUWAIT 565 Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHSCT) Kenneth Wainstein, in a June 11 meeting with Kuwait State Security (KSS) Director Muhaylan, conveyed the President's appeal for increased counterterrorism (CT) cooperation and information sharing among partners. Muhaylan complained of inadequate legislation to effectively pursue and prosecute suspected terrorists, and cited the Kuwaiti constitution as a limiting factor in CT cooperation. Muhaylan claimed that current intelligence sharing is not on an equal footing, as KSS, has received "not one word" of information or evidence against Kuwaiti's eight former GTMO detainees. He noted that continuing tensions between the Kuwaiti legislative and executive branches ensure that there will be no near-term improvement in Kuwait's inadequate CT legal framework. The best course forward, according to Muhaylan, is for the Amir to dissolve Parliament and impose CT measures by decree. As he states in every conversation with USG officials, Muhaylan lamented the dissolution of the Security Courts. End summary. Urging Cooperation and Information Sharing -------------- ¶2. (S) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHSCT) Kenneth Wainstein, accompanied by Ambassador, spoke on June 11 to Kuwait State Security (KSS) Director, Major General Suleiman Al-Muhaylan about the President's call for increased counterterrorism (CT) cooperation and information sharing among partners. He also relayed that, in a previous meeting with Kuwait's Prime Minister (septel),he had delivered a letter from the President to the Kuwaiti Amir that called for increased CT cooperation. ¶3. (S) Muhaylan welcomed the visit as a continuation of ongoing substantive CT dialogue, including recent visits by S/CT Dailey (ref A) and S/I Satterfield (ref B),and noted the utility of learning from the experience of others: "Working together is a must, not an option." He noted that Kuwait is especially vulnerable because of its location, and lamented that terrorists continually change their priorities and their tactics to keep one step ahead of security services. No Adequate CT Legislation in Kuwait -------------- ¶4. (S) APHSCT Wainstein stressed to Muhaylan that, despite recent CT gains in the region, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations remain a threat. He pointed to the growing menace of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas, and added that free societies like the United States and Kuwait are the intended targets of terrorists. The key CT focus must in Kuwait remain on terror facilitators, he stated. CT legislation in Kuwait is inadequate, and reflects permissive, pre-9/11 norms. APHSCT Wainstein urged Muhaylan not to underestimate the threat, and stressed the need to continue enhancing U.S.-Kuwaiti joint CT efforts. Limits on Sharing -------------- ¶5. (S) According to Muhaylan, KSS is ready to arrest or detain suspected extremists; but, unfortunately, "the law is not on our side." He lamented that KSS has "no influence" with the government. When asked by APHSCT Wainstein about sharing specific information on activities of Kuwaitis, Muhaylan replied that KSS provides everything to the USG that it can, within the confines of the constitution. KSS has no immunity from the law, which prohibits the release of some types of information to foreign governments. Nevertheless, KSS passes "a mere fraction" of information to Saudi Arabia than it shares with the United States. KUWAIT 00000694 002 OF 004 ¶6. (S) APHSCT Wainstein urged Muhaylan to be creative in relaying information without breaking any laws, and advised him to use the Kuwaiti intelligence apparatus to push the drive for new CT legislation. Former GTMO Detainees -------------- ¶7. (S) Muhaylan contended that the USG presented a double standard in its requests for more intelligence on Kuwaiti nationals and its demands for prosecution of suspected terrorists because "not one word" of evidence on eight Kuwaiti former GTMO detainees has been shared with KSS. He asked for information that the GOK can use to prosecute other detainees or suspected terrorists. APHSCT Wainstein agreed to review GTMO-related information sharing with CT partners upon his return to Washington. Kuwaiti Democracy 101 -------------- ¶8. (S) Muhaylan contended that democracy in Kuwait began its descent into chaos after the liberation of Kuwait in ¶1991. From that time, legislative anti-terror efforts were scaled back to protect freedom of speech, the Kuwait State Security Court was dismantled, and suspected terrorists were set free for lack of criminal evidence. He expressed little hope for new CT legislation in the near future, because the dysfunctional relationship between MPs and the Cabinet ensures that any such initiative would be stillborn. Though he had hoped for a new, more collaborative Parliament, he was profoundly disappointed that the May 17 election produced an even more recalcitrant body than before. (Ref C) GOK CT Actions -------------- ¶9. (S) Muhaylan cited some CT efforts undertaken recently by the GOK: --A Kuwaiti team visited terrorism rehabilitation centers in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and submitted a report to the GOK assessing the viability of developing such a center in Kuwait. --All mosques in Kuwait must now have KSS approval for Imams. --All foreign teachers must now have KSS approval. Saudi Radicals Influence Kuwaiti Extremists -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S) Muhaylan opined that radicalization in Saudi Arabia has directly affected the Kuwaiti outlook on extremism; religious hard-liners in Kuwait are inspired and motivated by fatwas issued by Saudi clerics. Due to passport control system flaws and family connections on either side of the border, many Kuwaiti extremists--as described by Muhaylan--have dual Saudi/Kuwaiti nationality, enabling easy passage between the two countries, and creating difficulty for Kuwaiti authorities in reconciling watchlist names with documents. Profiles of Kuwaiti Extremists -------------- ¶11. (S) Muhaylan profiled Kuwaiti extremists as young, high school dropouts with no standing in the community or potential for the future. Compared to jihadists from the earlier stages of OIF, he described the new generation of extremists as less impassioned and less able to seduce vulnerable recruits. He added that, since most Gulf recruits for Al-Qaeda are tasked with suicide operations in Iraq, they are taking another look at Afghanistan as a battlefield to prove their valor in combat. Downplaying Mohammed Al-Dossary's Role -------------- ¶12. (S) Muhaylan downplayed the role of Kuwaiti suspected terrorist facilitator Mohammed Al-Dossary, whom he described as psychologically ill, stating that earlier reports exaggerated his connections to Syrian terrorist, Abu Ghadiya. He added that Al-Dossary's current activities in Syria were limited to the shoe trade with Syrian merchants. Border Concerns KUWAIT 00000694 003 OF 004 -------------- ¶13. (S) Muhaylan claimed that, because of improvements in border monitoring, Kuwaiti jihadists have found it increasingly difficult to cross into Iraq via Saudi Arabia and Syria. This, he added, has opened up concerns that Kuwaiti jihadists now travel through Bahrain and the UAE en route to Iraq or Afghanistan. He added that the MOI was modifying controls on sea borders, with new abilities for close, far and land monitoring, with hopes to be fully operational by 2009. Charities -------------- ¶14. (S) APHSCT Wainstein emphasized the importance of cooperation efforts in identifying charities used in whole or in part to fund terrorism. He noted the disparity of views on this matter, but urged more operational officer level cooperation, promising continued efforts to encourage more transparency and cooperation. Future Scenarios -------------- ¶15. (S) Muhaylan stated that Kuwaitis do not understand the terror threat that faces the country and speculated on likely scenarios: ¶A. Kuwait suffers a major catastrophe. ¶B. (Sarcastically) Kuwait adopts the Jordanian model of repeatedly dissolving parliament to intentionally exhaust and bankrupt candidates. ¶C. The Amir dissolves the Parliament unconstitutionally (i.e. without the required new elections within 60 days) and begins issuing, by decree, CT laws that allow the GOK to bring to justice suspected terrorists. "Subverting Democracy" the Best Course for Kuwait? -------------- -------------- ¶16. (S) Muhaylan remarked that the best solution is an unconstitutional dissolution of Parliament by the Amir. However, he contended should this action take place, the GOK would have to endure USG condemnation for subverting democracy. Comment -------------- ¶17. (S) Ironically, Muhaylan blasted the Ambassador halfway through the meeting for the recently published TIP report placing Kuwait on Tier III. Claiming that Kuwait's human rights protections were the best in the GCC, Muhaylan faulted the USG for relying on unsubstantiated press reports and said the GOK had discovered that the various human rights groups operating in Europe had proven ties to Islamic extremists. End comment. ¶18. (S/NF) The participants of the meeting, which took place at Kuwait State Security (KSS) Headquarters, included: U.S. Ambassador Deborah K. Jones Kenneth APHSCT Wainstein, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Nicholas Rasmussen, Senior Director for Combating Terrorism, NSC John Duncan, Director for Combating Terrorism, NSC Kate Gladney, Aide to APHSCT Wainstein GRPO Head Tom Rosenberger (notetaker) KSS MG Suleiman Al-Muhaylan, Undersecretary for State Security Affairs and de facto KSS Director KSS Officers, names not provided ¶19. (U) This cable has been cleared by APHSCT Wainstein. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s KUWAIT 00000694 004 OF 004 Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * MISENHEIMER