AMONG KUWAITI SHI'A, NATIONAL LOYALTIES RUN DEEP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 KUWAIT 000471 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ARP E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2023 TAGS: PGOV PINR PTER KISL SOCI ECON KU IZ IR SUBJECT: AMONG KUWAITI SHI'A, NATIONAL LOYALTIES RUN DEEP REF: A. KUWAIT 0411 ¶B. KUWAIT 0313 ¶C. KUWAIT 0205 ¶D. KUWAIT 0175 Classified By: The Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Kuwait has always had a significant percentage of Shi'a citizens, and Sunni/Shi'a relations are traditionally good. According to most estimates, Shi'a currently constitute 30 percent of all Kuwaiti nationals, numbering some 350,000 individuals. There are also between 150,000 and 200,000 expatriate Shi'a currently residing in Kuwait, representing between 5 and 8 percent of the total population of 3,100,000. Kuwaiti Shi'a stand to make gains in the May 17 national elections, where they will likely benefit from a motivated and mobilized electoral base and a redistricting system that concentrates their votes in key constituencies; if so, they will likely attempt to redress their historical under-representation in the upper echelons of the government ministries and the military, in addition to advocating for more places of worship and increased Shi'a education in school curricula. ¶2. (S) Ultimately, Kuwaiti Shi'a are loyal first and foremost to Kuwait, which provides them with generous social and economic benefits. Kuwaiti Shi'a have also enjoyed political access to the ruling family throughout their long history in Kuwait, although a relatively new breed of opposition politicians are angling to change the traditional Shi'a/Al Sabah dynamic. Expatriate Shi'a appear to be largely apolitical, many having migrated to Kuwait to escape difficult political and economic conditions in their own countries. As such, the overwhelming majority of expatriate Shi'a do not appear to act as agents of foreign influence, although the potential exists for a small, conservative minority within the Shi'a community to act in such a capacity. End summary. Demographics -------------- ¶3. (U) According to most estimates, Shi'a constitute 30 percent of all Kuwaiti nationals, numbering some 350,000 individuals. The Kuwaiti Shi'a trace their origins to several regions surrounding the Gulf. Roughly 60 percent are of Persian origin, while 15 percent come from eastern Saudi Arabia (Al-Ahsa'),another 15 percent come from southern Iraq and the remaining 10 percent hail from Bahrain. Persian Shi'a were the first to settle in Kuwait and began arriving approximately 200 years ago. Their descendants now include many of the most influential and economically successful of the Kuwaiti Shi'a merchant families: the Behbehanis, the Dashtis, the Ma'rafis and the Qabazards. ¶4. (U) There are also between 150,000 and 200,000 expatriate Shi'a currently residing in Kuwait, representing between 5 and 8 percent of the total population of 3,100,000. 70,000 of these are of Persian origin, while the remainder are predominantly from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. These Shi'a are far less affluent than their Kuwaiti counterparts, and tend to work as laborers, craftsmen and small merchants. Generally speaking, these Shi'a came to Kuwait to escape difficult political and economic conditions in their home countries, although their economic and legal status here also remains precarious. Spiritual Influences -------------- ¶5. (U) According to Sayyid Mohammed Baqer Al-Mohri, a well-known and influential Shi'a cleric in Kuwait, Kuwaiti Shi'a tend to organize themselves according to their geographical origins and their spiritual leader, or "marja," which often coincide. Among the majority of Kuwaiti Shi'a, Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali Husaini Al-Sistani is the pre-eminent marja. SISTANI is viewed as a moderate, apolitical figure who does not subscribe to the notion of "wilayat al-faqih" (authority of Islamic jurisprudence). Sistani is considered a moderating force in the region who is concerned with improving security in Iraq and enhancing the fundamental living conditions of Iraqi Shi'a. SISTANI supporters note his role in encouraging Shi'a participation in Iraqi democratic elections and his opposition to sectarian conflict. KUWAIT 00000471 002 OF 006 ¶6. (U) Several of Kuwait's most prominent Shi'a families of Persian origin adopt Iran's Ayatollah Abu Al-Qasim Al-Khoei (died 1992),and his son Majeed Al-Khoei (died 2003) as their marja. These families include the Dashtis, the Qabazards, the Behbehanis, and the Ma'rafis. Abu Al-Qasim Al-Khoei was noted for his scholarly and ascetic approach to Islam, and he championed the use of ijtihad (interpretation) as opposed to taqlid (imitation) in his treatment of the Qu'ran and the hadith. Al-Khoei followers are essentially moderate and secular. ¶7. (U) Some Kuwaiti Shi'a of Persian origin also regard Iran's Grand Ayatollah Sadiq Hussaini Shirazi as their marja. Sadiq Shirazi is the brother of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Shirazi (died 2001),and the heir to Muhammad Shirazi's school of thought. The Shirazi school espouses political moderation, nonviolence, freedom of expression and universal respect for human rights. The Shi'a Justice and Peace Grouping, represented by MP Saleh Ashour in the 2006 parliament, adopts Sayyid Shirazi as its marja and is highly involved in social outreach activities in Kuwait. ¶8. (U) Hasawi Shi'a, those hailing from Al-Ahsa' in Saudi Arabia, claim Mirza Hasan Al-Ihqaqi (died 2006) as their marja. Prominent Hasawi families are Al-Arbash, Khraibit and Al-Shawwaf. Shi'a from Bahrain (the Baharna) take Hussein Bin-Asfour and Mirza Ibrahim Jamal Al-Deen as their marja Prominent Baharna families are Al-Qallaf, Al-Jum'ah, Al-Matrouk, Al-Sammak, Al-Khayyat, Al-Ostath, Al-Zaid and Karam. ¶9. (U) Lastly, approximately 10-15 percent of Kuwaiti Shi'a regard Iran's Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (died 1989) and his successor, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as their marja. These Shi'a believe in "wilayat al-faqih" and are the most religiously conservative and politically radical of the Kuwaiti Shi'a. Early History Marked by Strong Integration ... -------------- - ¶10. (U) Shi'a have enjoyed a long and prosperous history in Kuwait. This can be partly attributed to the Shi'as mutually beneficial relationship with the Kuwaiti ruling family, the Al Sabah. At a time when many Shi'a were still financially modest, the Al Sabah granted their leaders and businessmen access to the royal family, consulting with them in the governance of Kuwait. Beginning with the 1921 Shura (consultative) Council, the Al Sabah teamed with prominent Shi'a families to counterbalance Sunni urban political opposition. This cooperative arrangement continued with the pre-independence legislative councils of 1938 and 1939, and after independence in the First (1963),Second (1967),Third (1971) and Fourth (1975) National Assemblies. However, by the time of the Fifth National Assembly in 1981, the Shi'a political landscape had changed throughout the Muslim World. ... But the Iranian Revolution Changes the Landscape -------------- -------------- ¶11. (U) The 1979 Iranian Revolution was a watershed event for all Shi'a. Its success was an inspiration to younger Kuwaitis, some of whom began to adopt the revolution's ideology and break with the pro-government policies of their elders. Furthermore, nouveau-riche Kuwaiti Shi'a began to pursue broader agendas, such as fighting corruption and combating international injustice, and began drifting from the Al Sabah sphere of influence. These currents led to the marginalization of traditional pro-government Shi'a politicians and the rise of opposition candidates. This break first manifested itself in the Fifth National Assembly, which witnessed the election of the first Shi'a opposition MPs. ¶12. (U) Concurrently, Kuwaiti Shi'a came under increasing suspicion from their Sunni countrymen during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. During that time, the largely pro-Saddam Kuwaiti media called into question the loyalties of Kuwait's Shi'a community and generally tarnished its reputation. Consequently, the GOK began to expel Shi'as from prominent government and private sector positions in the ministries, the military, the police and the energy industry. Shi'a MPs who opposed GOK financial assistance to Iraq (e.g. Adnan Abdulsamad) also provoked Sunni ire. KUWAIT 00000471 003 OF 006 ¶13. (U) In addition, the rise of the Kuwait Islamic Da'wa Party in the 1970s and its increased militancy in the 1980s further compromised the Shi'a position. Al-Da'wa originated as a sectarian political movement in Iraq during the 1960s. However, with the rise of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime, many Da'wa members were exiled from Iraq and some eventually settled in Kuwait. While Al-Da'wa became politically active in Kuwait in the 1970s, it was its activities in the 1980s that earned it international infamy. In 1983, an Iranian Al-Da'wa cell led a foiled assassination attempt on Kuwait's Amir and was responsible for the simultaneous bombing of the French and U.S. Embassies in Kuwait. Consequently, official discrimination against Kuwaiti Shi'a increased during the 1980s, leading many Shi'a to refer to this era as "The Black Time." 1991 Brings Redemption -------------- ¶14. (U) After Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Kuwaiti Shi'a played a pivotal role in organizing an indigenous resistance movement prior to Kuwait's liberation by coalition forces in 1991. In addition, some prominent Kuwaiti Shi'a remained to combat Saddam's forces, including MPs such as Abdulmohsen Al-Jamal and Nasser Al-Sarkhouh. These actions served to vindicate the Kuwaiti Shi'a in the eyes of their Sunni countrymen (although both Sunnis and Shi'a who took part in the resistance complain, with reason, that their acts have received scant recognition from the Al Sabah). Since 1991, relations between Sunni and Shi'a Kuwaitis are much improved, and the Shi'a community has largely resumed its traditional pro-government, business-oriented role in Kuwaiti society. Nevertheless, political eddies from Al-Da'wa and Hizballah still course through domestic politics, with ongoing implications for Kuwaiti Shi'a. The Mugniyah Eulogy ... -------------- ¶15. (C) On February 17, approximately 1500 Shi'a attended a eulogy ceremony for slain Hizballah terrorist leader Imad Mugniyah (ref C). National Islamic Alliance (NIA) MPs Adnan Abdulsamad and Ahmed Lari participated in the event, in addition to NIA President Saleh Al-Mousa, its Secretary General Shaykh Hussein Al-Maatouq, its Treasurer Hassan Salman, and former NIA MPs Abdulmohsen Jamal and Nasser Sarkhouh. Abdulsamad reportedly proclaimed Mugniyah a "martyr" and threatened to grill the Minister of Interior, Shaykh Jaber Al-Khaled Al Sabah, who he claimed had no evidence tying Mugniyah to the murder of Kuwaiti citizens. (Note: The Interior Minister called Mugniyah's assassination "divine retribution" for his purported role in the death of two Kuwaiti nationals during the 1988 hijacking of Kuwait Airlines flight 422 (ref D). Mugniyah was reportedly attempting to secure the release of 17 members of Kuwaiti Al-Dawa, including his brother-in-law. End note.) ... And Its Aftermath -------------- ¶16. (C) Reacting to a popular (Sunni) outcry against the eulogy and its organizers, the GOK condemned the rally and accused its organizers of inciting sectarian tension. In the ensuing weeks, Kuwait's public prosecutor questioned three individuals and issued arrest warrants for five others on charges of sedition and belonging to an illegal political party. (Note: Political parties are illegal in Kuwait. Although NIA is technically a political grouping, it is in essence the Kuwait political branch of Hizballah. The GOK charged the NIA members on these grounds. End note.) The GOK also threatened to deport all third country nationals who partook in the eulogy. By March 14, the GOK had released all of the detained individuals on bail, pending prosecution. However, to date the GOK has not begun a single prosecution or deported any individuals for participating in the eulogy. GOK Reaction Breeds Discontent -------------- ¶17. (C) Many Kuwaiti Shi'a view the GOK's reaction as overblown and provocative, and criticize the media for sensationalizing its coverage of the eulogy. Since early 2008, the GOK has appeared determined to flex its muscles on KUWAIT 00000471 004 OF 006 a number of issues (e.g. pay raises for public sector employees, demolishing private structures built on public land and forcefully curtailing election primaries in tribal areas),and this incident proved no exception. Adnan Abdulsamad's comments about the Interior Minister, for which the minister subsequently filed a defamation suit, also likely played a role in provoking a strong GOK response. In addition, Shi'a commentators such as Abdulhussein Al-Sultan, Editor of the Al-Nahar daily newspaper, have portrayed the GOK's response as a Hizballah witch hunt. Other prominent Shi'a, such as Dr. Abdulwahed Al-Khalfan, Secretary General of the Shi'a Justice and Peace Grouping, speculate that National Security Bureau President Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd was attempting to settle old scores with Adnan Abdulsamad and break the power of the Shi'a opposition Popular Action Bloc (PAC) in Parliament. (Note: The PAC expelled MPs Abdulsamad and Lari in February after their refusal to apologize for their role in the Mugniyah eulogy. End note.) ¶18. (C) While most Kuwaiti Shi'a disavow the Mugniyah eulogy, viewing it as a provocative and ill-conceived gesture, the community is universal in its condemnation of the GOK's response. Many Shi'a draw comparisons to a similar eulogy for Sunni Al-Qaeda terrorist Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi in 2006, which elicited no official reaction. Shi'a cite prior GOK knowledge of the event, its harsh response and its susceptibility to media influence as further evidence of the government's caprice and inconsistency. As such, the Shi'a community intends to voice its disappointment via the ballot box in the upcoming May 17 election, and will likely vote more deliberately along sectarian lines. Shi'a May Gain in National Election -------------- ¶19. (C) Kuwaiti Shi'a stand to make gains in the May 17 national election, and will likely benefit from a motivated and mobilized base. Kuwaiti Shi'a are concentrated in the first, second and third constituencies of Kuwait. In the first constituency, they represent 44 percent of registered voters (ref A). Traditional Shi'a strongholds include the areas of Dasma, Bnaid Al-Gar, Qadisiya, Mansouriya, Di'iya, Rumaithiya, and Jabriya. Shi'a voters have historically split their votes among both Sunni and Shi'a candidates, which led to under-representation in Parliament (e.g. Sunni MP Jamal Al-Kandari was elected in Rumaithiya in 2006). Of the 50 members of the previous National Assembly, only four (8 percent) were Shi'a. ¶20. (C) Most political analysts predict that Shi'a voters will vote along more sectarian lines in the upcoming national election. This can be attributed to several factors. First, Shi'a will be voicing their displeasure at the GOK's handling of the Mugniyah incident. Second, Shi'a want to ensure more equitable representation in parliament. Third, Shi'a will want to leverage their new demographic advantage under the new electoral redistricting system. With the new system, registered voters may vote for up to four parliamentary candidates, and each electoral district will send 10 MPs to the National Assembly. By concentrating their votes, Shi'a should be able to elect multiple Shi'a representatives in the first, second and third constituencies. Under the old system, the Shi'a population was diluted across twenty-five electoral districts, making it difficult to secure an advantage in any of the constituencies. Shi'a MPs Likely to Remain in Opposition -------------- ¶21. (C) In addition, Shi'a candidates may run on tickets with other Islamists, particularly the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) (i.e. the Kuwait Muslim Brotherhood),to increase their chances of victory. Of all Shi'a candidates, Adnan Abdulsamad and Ahmed Lari, the infamous Mugniyah duo, paradoxically have the best chance of re-election. The GOK's strong response to the eulogy, and its concentration on these MPs specifically, has made them cult heroes among a portion of the Shi'a community. They now portray themselves as Shi'a champions who have stood against official injustice. As such, NIA can be expected to retain its representation in the new National Assembly, although it will likely be teaming with other opposition and Shi'a independent MPs to enhance its strength. NIA is Kuwait Hizballah KUWAIT 00000471 005 OF 006 -------------- ¶22. (C) According to prominent Shi'a analysts, NIA is the Kuwaiti political arm of Hizballah. By this, they mean that NIA subscribes to Hizballah's political ideology, that its members take Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as their marja and that they believe in "wilayat al-faqih." NIA MPs Abdulsamad and Lari have both reportedly visited Lebanon and consulted with Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah on political matters. In addition, Kuwait Hizballah has organized itself politically along similar lines as its Lebanese counterpart. NIA's organizational structure incorporates a Shura (consultative) Bureau, a Policy Bureau, an Organizational Bureau, in addition to election committees, religious and social committees, charities, youth centers, and student bodies at both Kuwait University and the Public Authority for Applied Education. Prominent NIA officers include: -- Saleh Al-Mousa (President, former Secretary General) -- Shaykh Hussein Al-Ma'touq (Secretary General, Shi'a cleric) -- Adnan Abdulsamad (former MP) -- Dr. Nasser Sarkhouh (former MP) -- Dr. Abdulmohsen Jamal (former MP, political activist and columnist) -- Ahmed Lari (former MP and former Municipal Council member) -- Dr. Fadhil Safar (Municipal Council member) -- Hassan Habib Al-Salman (former Municipal Council member) ¶23. (C) NIA is an opposition political grouping that currently draws support from roughly 10-15 percent of the Kuwaiti Shi'a community. While not the most powerful Shi'a political faction, the National Islamic Alliance is the most organized and dynamic. In the previous parliament, NIA MPs teamed with other Shi'a opposition MPs to form the Popular Action Bloc (PAC). NIA also cooperates with both the ICM and other opposition members in Parliament. Nevertheless, Shi'a parliamentarians of all stripes have traditionally had contentious relations with Salafist members of parliament. This recently resurfaced when Salafi MPs led calls to strip MPs Abdulsamad and Lari of their parliamentary immunities for their role in the Mugniyah eulogy, clearing the way for their eventual prosecution. (Note: The Amir's dissolution of parliament on March 19 effectively accomplished the same thing, although the GOK has made no move yet to disqualify either individual from the May 17 election. End note.) ¶24. (C) Shi'a analysts are also quick to point out, however, that NIA does not advocate change through violent means and that it is committed to the democratic process as practiced in Kuwait. Kuwaiti Shi'a, they explain, have no interest in returning to "the Black Time" of official persecution and political marginalization, and have disavowed the defunct radical approach of groups such as Al-Da'wa. As such, NIA is relatively more moderate than its 1980s counterparts and is apparently not interested in effecting political change in Kuwait through violence. In contrast, the GOK views NIA's sponsorship of the Mugniyah eulogy as a deliberately provocative gesture, directed by Hizballah leadership in Iran and Lebanon, and intended to incite sectarian tension in Kuwait. More likely is that NIA espouses positions that are calculated to draw sympathy from its Shi'a constituents, but that ultimately do not undermine Kuwaiti stability or jeopardize its position in parliament. Kuwaiti Shi'a Remain Loyal -------------- ¶25. (S) Ultimately, Kuwaiti Shi'a are loyal first and foremost to Kuwait. Several Shi'a merchant families, such as the Dashtis, the Behbehanis and the Ma'rafis, are among the wealthiest in all of Kuwait and enjoy access to the Al Sabah leadership comparable to the most influential of Sunnis. Kuwaiti Shi'a are pleased with their level of religious freedom and feel that PM Shaykh Nasser Al Sabah has been particularly even-handed in his treatment of them. That being said, Kuwaiti Shi'a do want to redress a number of grievances in the new National Assembly. In addition to being historically under-represented in Parliament, Shi'a are also under-represented in the upper echelons of the government ministries. Of the 236 undersecretaries in Kuwaiti ministries, only six are currently Shi'a, which Kuwaiti Shi'a claim is the result of official discrimination. This discrimination is also apparent in the intelligence services and the Kuwait Armed Forces, which has a pronounced lack of Shi'a in its senior officer corps; although Shi'a do KUWAIT 00000471 006 OF 006 appear to have found a home in the Kuwait Navy. Kuwaiti Shi'a would also like to see government restrictions lifted on the number of Husseiniyyas (Shi'a mosques) they are allowed to build and the inclusion of Shi'a education in school curricula. ¶26. (S) Hana Ma'rafi, Public Relations Director at the Public Authority for Civil Information, notes that Kuwaiti Shi'a are satisfied with the generous economic benefits of Kuwait's welfare state and are not interested in jeopardizing these benefits, fearing a return to "The Black Time" of the 1980s. Kuwaiti Shi'a are quick to condemn the actions of Al-Da'wa in the 1980s and note that the Amiri assassination attempt and embassy bombings were the work of a single Iranian cell. Having learned from history, Kuwaiti Shi'a remain relatively immune to outside political influences that would seek to undermine the peace and stability of Kuwait. Even NIA, which in theory would be the most susceptible to foreign influence, appears to be committed to the Kuwaiti democratic process, despite its questionable sponsorship of the Imad Mugniyah eulogy. Expat Shi'a Largely Apolitical -------------- ¶27. (S) According to Shi'a analyst Dr. Abdul-reda Assiri, Chairman of the Political Science Department at Kuwait University, expatriate Shi'a are largely apolitical. Generally, these Shi'a have migrated to Kuwait to escape difficult political and economic conditions in their own countries. As such, they tend to focus on their careers and avoid engaging in political activism. Kuwaiti immigration law also threatens these expatriates with deportation for relatively minor offenses, which the GOK is often quick to employ. Given their precarious economic and legal situation, the overwhelming majority of expatriate Shi'a do not appear to act as agents of foreign influence, although the potential exists for a small, conservative minority within the Shi'a community to act in such a capacity. Comment -------------- ¶28. (C) On the whole, Kuwaiti Shi'a represent a vital component of the Kuwaiti political and economic landscape. They share a long history with the country and have a large stake in its continued prosperity. It is likely that, with the new elections, Kuwaiti Shi'a will finally achieve proportional representation in the National Assembly. Kuwaiti Shi'a will likely leverage these gains to push for more equitable representation throughout the government and security apparatus, in addition to advancing their social agenda. Opposition Shi'a MPs will likely continue to work in concert with other opposition parties, such as the ICM, to pressure the GOK for better governance and more conservative social policies. Nevertheless, the balance of Shi'a power rests with its pro-government, business-oriented merchant class. These elements can be expected to continue their traditional role as a counter-balance to domestic, Sunni opposition, and maintain a strong hand in the future course of Kuwaiti politics. End comment. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * Jones