AMONG KUWAITI SHI'A, NATIONAL LOYALTIES RUN DEEP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 KUWAIT 000471

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2023
TAGS: PGOV PINR PTER KISL SOCI ECON KU IZ IR
SUBJECT: AMONG KUWAITI SHI'A, NATIONAL LOYALTIES RUN DEEP

REF: A. KUWAIT 0411

B. KUWAIT 0313

C. KUWAIT 0205

D. KUWAIT 0175

Classified By: The Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Kuwait has always had a significant
percentage of Shi'a citizens, and Sunni/Shi'a relations are
traditionally good. According to most estimates, Shi'a
currently constitute 30 percent of all Kuwaiti nationals,
numbering some 350,000 individuals. There are also between
150,000 and 200,000 expatriate Shi'a currently residing in
Kuwait, representing between 5 and 8 percent of the total
population of 3,100,000. Kuwaiti Shi'a stand to make gains
in the May 17 national elections, where they will likely
benefit from a motivated and mobilized electoral base and a
redistricting system that concentrates their votes in key
constituencies; if so, they will likely attempt to redress
their historical under-representation in the upper echelons
of the government ministries and the military, in addition to
advocating for more places of worship and increased Shi'a
education in school curricula.


2. (S) Ultimately, Kuwaiti Shi'a are loyal first and foremost
to Kuwait, which provides them with generous social and
economic benefits. Kuwaiti Shi'a have also enjoyed political
access to the ruling family throughout their long history in
Kuwait, although a relatively new breed of opposition
politicians are angling to change the traditional Shi'a/Al
Sabah dynamic. Expatriate Shi'a appear to be largely
apolitical, many having migrated to Kuwait to escape
difficult political and economic conditions in their own
countries. As such, the overwhelming majority of expatriate
Shi'a do not appear to act as agents of foreign influence,
although the potential exists for a small, conservative
minority within the Shi'a community to act in such a
capacity. End summary.

Demographics
--------------


3. (U) According to most estimates, Shi'a constitute 30
percent of all Kuwaiti nationals, numbering some 350,000
individuals. The Kuwaiti Shi'a trace their origins to
several regions surrounding the Gulf. Roughly 60 percent are
of Persian origin, while 15 percent come from eastern Saudi
Arabia (Al-Ahsa'),another 15 percent come from southern Iraq
and the remaining 10 percent hail from Bahrain. Persian
Shi'a were the first to settle in Kuwait and began arriving
approximately 200 years ago. Their descendants now include
many of the most influential and economically successful of
the Kuwaiti Shi'a merchant families: the Behbehanis, the
Dashtis, the Ma'rafis and the Qabazards.


4. (U) There are also between 150,000 and 200,000 expatriate
Shi'a currently residing in Kuwait, representing between 5
and 8 percent of the total population of 3,100,000. 70,000
of these are of Persian origin, while the remainder are
predominantly from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. These
Shi'a are far less affluent than their Kuwaiti counterparts,
and tend to work as laborers, craftsmen and small merchants.
Generally speaking, these Shi'a came to Kuwait to escape
difficult political and economic conditions in their home
countries, although their economic and legal status here also
remains precarious.

Spiritual Influences
--------------


5. (U) According to Sayyid Mohammed Baqer Al-Mohri, a
well-known and influential Shi'a cleric in Kuwait, Kuwaiti
Shi'a tend to organize themselves according to their
geographical origins and their spiritual leader, or "marja,"
which often coincide. Among the majority of Kuwaiti Shi'a,
Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali Husaini Al-Sistani is the
pre-eminent marja. Sistani is viewed as a moderate,
apolitical figure who does not subscribe to the notion of
"wilayat al-faqih" (authority of Islamic jurisprudence).
Sistani is considered a moderating force in the region who is
concerned with improving security in Iraq and enhancing the
fundamental living conditions of Iraqi Shi'a. Sistani
supporters note his role in encouraging Shi'a participation
in Iraqi democratic elections and his opposition to sectarian
conflict.

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6. (U) Several of Kuwait's most prominent Shi'a families of
Persian origin adopt Iran's Ayatollah Abu Al-Qasim Al-Khoei
(died 1992),and his son Majeed Al-Khoei (died 2003) as their
marja. These families include the Dashtis, the Qabazards,
the Behbehanis, and the Ma'rafis. Abu Al-Qasim Al-Khoei was
noted for his scholarly and ascetic approach to Islam, and he
championed the use of ijtihad (interpretation) as opposed to
taqlid (imitation) in his treatment of the Qu'ran and the
hadith. Al-Khoei followers are essentially moderate and
secular.


7. (U) Some Kuwaiti Shi'a of Persian origin also regard
Iran's Grand Ayatollah Sadiq Hussaini Shirazi as their marja.
Sadiq Shirazi is the brother of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad
Shirazi (died 2001),and the heir to Muhammad Shirazi's
school of thought. The Shirazi school espouses political
moderation, nonviolence, freedom of expression and universal
respect for human rights. The Shi'a Justice and Peace
Grouping, represented by MP Saleh Ashour in the 2006
parliament, adopts Sayyid Shirazi as its marja and is highly
involved in social outreach activities in Kuwait.


8. (U) Hasawi Shi'a, those hailing from Al-Ahsa' in Saudi
Arabia, claim Mirza Hasan Al-Ihqaqi (died 2006) as their
marja. Prominent Hasawi families are Al-Arbash, Khraibit and
Al-Shawwaf. Shi'a from Bahrain (the Baharna) take Hussein
Bin-Asfour and Mirza Ibrahim Jamal Al-Deen as their marja
Prominent Baharna families are Al-Qallaf, Al-Jum'ah,
Al-Matrouk, Al-Sammak, Al-Khayyat, Al-Ostath, Al-Zaid and
Karam.


9. (U) Lastly, approximately 10-15 percent of Kuwaiti Shi'a
regard Iran's Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (died 1989)
and his successor, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as their
marja. These Shi'a believe in "wilayat al-faqih" and are the
most religiously conservative and politically radical of the
Kuwaiti Shi'a.

Early History Marked by Strong Integration ...
-------------- -


10. (U) Shi'a have enjoyed a long and prosperous history in
Kuwait. This can be partly attributed to the Shi'as mutually
beneficial relationship with the Kuwaiti ruling family, the
Al Sabah. At a time when many Shi'a were still financially
modest, the Al Sabah granted their leaders and businessmen
access to the royal family, consulting with them in the
governance of Kuwait. Beginning with the 1921 Shura
(consultative) Council, the Al Sabah teamed with prominent
Shi'a families to counterbalance Sunni urban political
opposition. This cooperative arrangement continued with the
pre-independence legislative councils of 1938 and 1939, and
after independence in the First (1963),Second (1967),Third
(1971) and Fourth (1975) National Assemblies. However, by
the time of the Fifth National Assembly in 1981, the Shi'a
political landscape had changed throughout the Muslim World.

... But the Iranian Revolution Changes the Landscape
-------------- --------------


11. (U) The 1979 Iranian Revolution was a watershed event for
all Shi'a. Its success was an inspiration to younger
Kuwaitis, some of whom began to adopt the revolution's
ideology and break with the pro-government policies of their
elders. Furthermore, nouveau-riche Kuwaiti Shi'a began to
pursue broader agendas, such as fighting corruption and
combating international injustice, and began drifting from
the Al Sabah sphere of influence. These currents led to the
marginalization of traditional pro-government Shi'a
politicians and the rise of opposition candidates. This
break first manifested itself in the Fifth National Assembly,
which witnessed the election of the first Shi'a opposition
MPs.


12. (U) Concurrently, Kuwaiti Shi'a came under increasing
suspicion from their Sunni countrymen during the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq War. During that time, the largely pro-Saddam
Kuwaiti media called into question the loyalties of Kuwait's
Shi'a community and generally tarnished its reputation.
Consequently, the GOK began to expel Shi'as from prominent
government and private sector positions in the ministries,
the military, the police and the energy industry. Shi'a MPs
who opposed GOK financial assistance to Iraq (e.g. Adnan
Abdulsamad) also provoked Sunni ire.

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13. (U) In addition, the rise of the Kuwait Islamic Da'wa
Party in the 1970s and its increased militancy in the 1980s
further compromised the Shi'a position. Al-Da'wa originated
as a sectarian political movement in Iraq during the 1960s.
However, with the rise of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist
regime, many Da'wa members were exiled from Iraq and some
eventually settled in Kuwait. While Al-Da'wa became
politically active in Kuwait in the 1970s, it was its
activities in the 1980s that earned it international infamy.
In 1983, an Iranian Al-Da'wa cell led a foiled assassination
attempt on Kuwait's Amir and was responsible for the
simultaneous bombing of the French and U.S. Embassies in
Kuwait. Consequently, official discrimination against
Kuwaiti Shi'a increased during the 1980s, leading many Shi'a
to refer to this era as "The Black Time."

1991 Brings Redemption
--------------


14. (U) After Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
Kuwaiti Shi'a played a pivotal role in organizing an
indigenous resistance movement prior to Kuwait's liberation
by coalition forces in 1991. In addition, some prominent
Kuwaiti Shi'a remained to combat Saddam's forces, including
MPs such as Abdulmohsen Al-Jamal and Nasser Al-Sarkhouh.
These actions served to vindicate the Kuwaiti Shi'a in the
eyes of their Sunni countrymen (although both Sunnis and
Shi'a who took part in the resistance complain, with reason,
that their acts have received scant recognition from the Al
Sabah). Since 1991, relations between Sunni and Shi'a
Kuwaitis are much improved, and the Shi'a community has
largely resumed its traditional pro-government,
business-oriented role in Kuwaiti society. Nevertheless,
political eddies from Al-Da'wa and Hizballah still course
through domestic politics, with ongoing implications for
Kuwaiti Shi'a.

The Mugniyah Eulogy ...
--------------


15. (C) On February 17, approximately 1500 Shi'a attended a
eulogy ceremony for slain Hizballah terrorist leader Imad
Mugniyah (ref C). National Islamic Alliance (NIA) MPs Adnan
Abdulsamad and Ahmed Lari participated in the event, in
addition to NIA President Saleh Al-Mousa, its Secretary
General Shaykh Hussein Al-Maatouq, its Treasurer Hassan
Salman, and former NIA MPs Abdulmohsen Jamal and Nasser
Sarkhouh. Abdulsamad reportedly proclaimed Mugniyah a
"martyr" and threatened to grill the Minister of Interior,
Shaykh Jaber Al-Khaled Al Sabah, who he claimed had no
evidence tying Mugniyah to the murder of Kuwaiti citizens.
(Note: The Interior Minister called Mugniyah's assassination
"divine retribution" for his purported role in the death of
two Kuwaiti nationals during the 1988 hijacking of Kuwait
Airlines flight 422 (ref D). Mugniyah was reportedly
attempting to secure the release of 17 members of Kuwaiti
Al-Dawa, including his brother-in-law. End note.)

... And Its Aftermath
--------------


16. (C) Reacting to a popular (Sunni) outcry against the
eulogy and its organizers, the GOK condemned the rally and
accused its organizers of inciting sectarian tension. In the
ensuing weeks, Kuwait's public prosecutor questioned three
individuals and issued arrest warrants for five others on
charges of sedition and belonging to an illegal political
party. (Note: Political parties are illegal in Kuwait.
Although NIA is technically a political grouping, it is in
essence the Kuwait political branch of Hizballah. The GOK
charged the NIA members on these grounds. End note.) The
GOK also threatened to deport all third country nationals who
partook in the eulogy. By March 14, the GOK had released all
of the detained individuals on bail, pending prosecution.
However, to date the GOK has not begun a single prosecution
or deported any individuals for participating in the eulogy.

GOK Reaction Breeds Discontent
--------------


17. (C) Many Kuwaiti Shi'a view the GOK's reaction as
overblown and provocative, and criticize the media for
sensationalizing its coverage of the eulogy. Since early
2008, the GOK has appeared determined to flex its muscles on

KUWAIT 00000471 004 OF 006


a number of issues (e.g. pay raises for public sector
employees, demolishing private structures built on public
land and forcefully curtailing election primaries in tribal
areas),and this incident proved no exception. Adnan
Abdulsamad's comments about the Interior Minister, for which
the minister subsequently filed a defamation suit, also
likely played a role in provoking a strong GOK response. In
addition, Shi'a commentators such as Abdulhussein Al-Sultan,
Editor of the Al-Nahar daily newspaper, have portrayed the
GOK's response as a Hizballah witch hunt. Other prominent
Shi'a, such as Dr. Abdulwahed Al-Khalfan, Secretary General
of the Shi'a Justice and Peace Grouping, speculate that
National Security Bureau President Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd was
attempting to settle old scores with Adnan Abdulsamad and
break the power of the Shi'a opposition Popular Action Bloc
(PAC) in Parliament. (Note: The PAC expelled MPs Abdulsamad
and Lari in February after their refusal to apologize for
their role in the Mugniyah eulogy. End note.)


18. (C) While most Kuwaiti Shi'a disavow the Mugniyah eulogy,
viewing it as a provocative and ill-conceived gesture, the
community is universal in its condemnation of the GOK's
response. Many Shi'a draw comparisons to a similar eulogy
for Sunni Al-Qaeda terrorist Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi in 2006,
which elicited no official reaction. Shi'a cite prior GOK
knowledge of the event, its harsh response and its
susceptibility to media influence as further evidence of the
government's caprice and inconsistency. As such, the Shi'a
community intends to voice its disappointment via the ballot
box in the upcoming May 17 election, and will likely vote
more deliberately along sectarian lines.

Shi'a May Gain in National Election
--------------


19. (C) Kuwaiti Shi'a stand to make gains in the May 17
national election, and will likely benefit from a motivated
and mobilized base. Kuwaiti Shi'a are concentrated in the
first, second and third constituencies of Kuwait. In the
first constituency, they represent 44 percent of registered
voters (ref A). Traditional Shi'a strongholds include the
areas of Dasma, Bnaid Al-Gar, Qadisiya, Mansouriya, Di'iya,
Rumaithiya, and Jabriya. Shi'a voters have historically
split their votes among both Sunni and Shi'a candidates,
which led to under-representation in Parliament (e.g. Sunni
MP Jamal Al-Kandari was elected in Rumaithiya in 2006). Of
the 50 members of the previous National Assembly, only four
(8 percent) were Shi'a.


20. (C) Most political analysts predict that Shi'a voters
will vote along more sectarian lines in the upcoming national
election. This can be attributed to several factors. First,
Shi'a will be voicing their displeasure at the GOK's handling
of the Mugniyah incident. Second, Shi'a want to ensure more
equitable representation in parliament. Third, Shi'a will
want to leverage their new demographic advantage under the
new electoral redistricting system. With the new system,
registered voters may vote for up to four parliamentary
candidates, and each electoral district will send 10 MPs to
the National Assembly. By concentrating their votes, Shi'a
should be able to elect multiple Shi'a representatives in the
first, second and third constituencies. Under the old
system, the Shi'a population was diluted across twenty-five
electoral districts, making it difficult to secure an
advantage in any of the constituencies.

Shi'a MPs Likely to Remain in Opposition
--------------


21. (C) In addition, Shi'a candidates may run on tickets with
other Islamists, particularly the Islamic Constitutional
Movement (ICM) (i.e. the Kuwait Muslim Brotherhood),to
increase their chances of victory. Of all Shi'a candidates,
Adnan Abdulsamad and Ahmed Lari, the infamous Mugniyah duo,
paradoxically have the best chance of re-election. The GOK's
strong response to the eulogy, and its concentration on these
MPs specifically, has made them cult heroes among a portion
of the Shi'a community. They now portray themselves as Shi'a
champions who have stood against official injustice. As
such, NIA can be expected to retain its representation in the
new National Assembly, although it will likely be teaming
with other opposition and Shi'a independent MPs to enhance
its strength.

NIA is Kuwait Hizballah

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--------------


22. (C) According to prominent Shi'a analysts, NIA is the
Kuwaiti political arm of Hizballah. By this, they mean that
NIA subscribes to Hizballah's political ideology, that its
members take Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as their marja and
that they believe in "wilayat al-faqih." NIA MPs Abdulsamad
and Lari have both reportedly visited Lebanon and consulted
with Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah on political matters.
In addition, Kuwait Hizballah has organized itself
politically along similar lines as its Lebanese counterpart.
NIA's organizational structure incorporates a Shura
(consultative) Bureau, a Policy Bureau, an Organizational
Bureau, in addition to election committees, religious and
social committees, charities, youth centers, and student
bodies at both Kuwait University and the Public Authority for
Applied Education. Prominent NIA officers include:

-- Saleh Al-Mousa (President, former Secretary General)
-- Shaykh Hussein Al-Ma'touq (Secretary General, Shi'a cleric)
-- Adnan Abdulsamad (former MP)
-- Dr. Nasser Sarkhouh (former MP)
-- Dr. Abdulmohsen Jamal (former MP, political activist and
columnist)
-- Ahmed Lari (former MP and former Municipal Council member)
-- Dr. Fadhil Safar (Municipal Council member)
-- Hassan Habib Al-Salman (former Municipal Council member)


23. (C) NIA is an opposition political grouping that
currently draws support from roughly 10-15 percent of the
Kuwaiti Shi'a community. While not the most powerful Shi'a
political faction, the National Islamic Alliance is the most
organized and dynamic. In the previous parliament, NIA MPs
teamed with other Shi'a opposition MPs to form the Popular
Action Bloc (PAC). NIA also cooperates with both the ICM and
other opposition members in Parliament. Nevertheless, Shi'a
parliamentarians of all stripes have traditionally had
contentious relations with Salafist members of parliament.
This recently resurfaced when Salafi MPs led calls to strip
MPs Abdulsamad and Lari of their parliamentary immunities for
their role in the Mugniyah eulogy, clearing the way for their
eventual prosecution. (Note: The Amir's dissolution of
parliament on March 19 effectively accomplished the same
thing, although the GOK has made no move yet to disqualify
either individual from the May 17 election. End note.)


24. (C) Shi'a analysts are also quick to point out, however,
that NIA does not advocate change through violent means and
that it is committed to the democratic process as practiced
in Kuwait. Kuwaiti Shi'a, they explain, have no interest in
returning to "the Black Time" of official persecution and
political marginalization, and have disavowed the defunct
radical approach of groups such as Al-Da'wa. As such, NIA is
relatively more moderate than its 1980s counterparts and is
apparently not interested in effecting political change in
Kuwait through violence. In contrast, the GOK views NIA's
sponsorship of the Mugniyah eulogy as a deliberately
provocative gesture, directed by Hizballah leadership in Iran
and Lebanon, and intended to incite sectarian tension in
Kuwait. More likely is that NIA espouses positions that are
calculated to draw sympathy from its Shi'a constituents, but
that ultimately do not undermine Kuwaiti stability or
jeopardize its position in parliament.

Kuwaiti Shi'a Remain Loyal
--------------


25. (S) Ultimately, Kuwaiti Shi'a are loyal first and
foremost to Kuwait. Several Shi'a merchant families, such as
the Dashtis, the Behbehanis and the Ma'rafis, are among the
wealthiest in all of Kuwait and enjoy access to the Al Sabah
leadership comparable to the most influential of Sunnis.
Kuwaiti Shi'a are pleased with their level of religious
freedom and feel that PM Shaykh Nasser Al Sabah has been
particularly even-handed in his treatment of them. That
being said, Kuwaiti Shi'a do want to redress a number of
grievances in the new National Assembly. In addition to
being historically under-represented in Parliament, Shi'a are
also under-represented in the upper echelons of the
government ministries. Of the 236 undersecretaries in
Kuwaiti ministries, only six are currently Shi'a, which
Kuwaiti Shi'a claim is the result of official discrimination.
This discrimination is also apparent in the intelligence
services and the Kuwait Armed Forces, which has a pronounced
lack of Shi'a in its senior officer corps; although Shi'a do

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appear to have found a home in the Kuwait Navy. Kuwaiti
Shi'a would also like to see government restrictions lifted
on the number of Husseiniyyas (Shi'a mosques) they are
allowed to build and the inclusion of Shi'a education in
school curricula.


26. (S) Hana Ma'rafi, Public Relations Director at the Public
Authority for Civil Information, notes that Kuwaiti Shi'a are
satisfied with the generous economic benefits of Kuwait's
welfare state and are not interested in jeopardizing these
benefits, fearing a return to "The Black Time" of the 1980s.
Kuwaiti Shi'a are quick to condemn the actions of Al-Da'wa in
the 1980s and note that the Amiri assassination attempt and
embassy bombings were the work of a single Iranian cell.
Having learned from history, Kuwaiti Shi'a remain relatively
immune to outside political influences that would seek to
undermine the peace and stability of Kuwait. Even NIA, which
in theory would be the most susceptible to foreign influence,
appears to be committed to the Kuwaiti democratic process,
despite its questionable sponsorship of the Imad Mugniyah
eulogy.

Expat Shi'a Largely Apolitical
--------------


27. (S) According to Shi'a analyst Dr. Abdul-reda Assiri,
Chairman of the Political Science Department at Kuwait
University, expatriate Shi'a are largely apolitical.
Generally, these Shi'a have migrated to Kuwait to escape
difficult political and economic conditions in their own
countries. As such, they tend to focus on their careers and
avoid engaging in political activism. Kuwaiti immigration
law also threatens these expatriates with deportation for
relatively minor offenses, which the GOK is often quick to
employ. Given their precarious economic and legal situation,
the overwhelming majority of expatriate Shi'a do not appear
to act as agents of foreign influence, although the potential
exists for a small, conservative minority within the Shi'a
community to act in such a capacity.

Comment
--------------


28. (C) On the whole, Kuwaiti Shi'a represent a vital
component of the Kuwaiti political and economic landscape.
They share a long history with the country and have a large
stake in its continued prosperity. It is likely that, with
the new elections, Kuwaiti Shi'a will finally achieve
proportional representation in the National Assembly.
Kuwaiti Shi'a will likely leverage these gains to push for
more equitable representation throughout the government and
security apparatus, in addition to advancing their social
agenda. Opposition Shi'a MPs will likely continue to work in
concert with other opposition parties, such as the ICM, to
pressure the GOK for better governance and more conservative
social policies. Nevertheless, the balance of Shi'a power
rests with its pro-government, business-oriented merchant
class. These elements can be expected to continue their
traditional role as a counter-balance to domestic, Sunni
opposition, and maintain a strong hand in the future course
of Kuwaiti politics. End comment.

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
Jones