POLITICAL OVERVIEW OF KUWAIT IN RUN-UP TO ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000411 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AND INR/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2033 TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI ECON KU SUBJECT: POLITICAL OVERVIEW OF KUWAIT IN RUN-UP TO ELECTIONS REF: A. KUWAIT 0320 ¶B. KUWAIT 0313 ¶C. KUWAIT 0307 ¶D. KUWAIT 0205 Classified By: CDA Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: With candidate registration commencing on April 14, Kuwait's electoral field is beginning to take shape. The GOK is hoping that the new five-district electoral system will deliver more nationally focused candidates as well as a more cooperative Parliament. Islamist candidates stand to benefit in this election from favorable demographic and social trends as well as a perception of GOK ineptitude in managing Parliament. The Shi'a community will likely vote along sectarian lines in response to perceived GOK heavy-handedness after the Imad Mugniyah eulogy. Kuwait's tribes are annoyed at the GOK's unprecedented (albeit unsuccessful) crackdown on tribal primaries, which has prompted a strong backlash from bedouin communities and increased the prospects of tribal opposition candidates. Women are generally not expected to win any parliamentary seats, although several strong candidates may boost their chances by teaming with established liberals. These elections will not affect Kuwait's relations with the U.S. End summary. Effects of Redistricting -------------- ¶2. (C) On August 1, 2006, the Amir issued Law Number 42 reducing the number of electoral districts in Kuwait from twenty-five to five. The GOK hopes to achieve two objectives via this electoral redistricting. First, by dramatically increasing the size of each constituency, the GOK seeks to reduce the phenomenon of vote buying. Prospective parliamentarians may no longer secure election by paying off several hundred voters - their constituencies now encompass tens of thousands of voters. Second, it seeks to ensure the election of parliamentarians with broader popular appeal, as opposed those who represent narrow factional, sectarian or tribal interests. In addition, with each voter now having the option of selecting up to four candidates, vice two, the GOK hopes voters will have more freedom to select a greater variety candidates. ¶3. (C) At this stage, it appears unlikely that the May 17 elections will validate these theories. However, post has observed some general trends in the run-up to the May 17 elections. First, redistricting has apparently not decreased the incidence of vote buying. Rumors abound of parliamentary candidates amassing millions of dinars for election rigging. Current estimates place the value of a single vote at KD 1,000 (USD 3,700). In one instance, an embassy employee was approached about participating in a vote buying scheme, where she was promised KD 250 (US 925) for each vote delivered. The GOK is reportedly attempting to combat this phenomenon by monitoring candidates' bank accounts, but the authorities have yet to indict anyone for this offense. ¶4. (C) Furthermore, factionalism appears to be more pronounced in these elections. GOK opposition to tribal primaries (see para 11) has produced a strong backlash among Kuwait's bedouin communities, which may encourage the election of more opposition tribal MPs. In addition, the Shi'a community will likely vote along more sectarian lines in response to perceived GOK persecution in the wake of the Imad Mugniyah eulogy (ref B). Islamist candidates are also increasing their inter-organizational cooperation, creating pan-Islamist "tickets" in certain constituencies. ¶5. (C) For general reference, post is including some observations on each of the five constituencies below: 1st Constituency: -- 18 residential districts -- 66,643 registered voters (30,071 male / 36,572 female) -- Largest Shi'a constituency (44% of total voters) -- Mostly urban Kuwaitis (68% of total) vs. tribal Kuwaitis (32%) 2nd Constituency: -- 13 residential districts -- 41,367 registered voters (19,263 male / 22,104 female) -- Sunni urban majority (57%),traditional business and economic families -- Competition between the Sunni liberal and the Sunni KUWAIT 00000411 002 OF 004 Islamic factions -- Small pockets of Shi'a (19%) and tribal (15%) Kuwaitis 3rd Constituency: -- 15 residential districts -- 58,676 registered voters (25,617 male / 33,057 female) -- Sunni urban majority (69%),mostly business class with some tribal elements -- Traditionally liberal, but trending Islamist -- Recent inroads by the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) (i.e. Kuwait Muslim Brotherhood) -- Some Shi'a (15%),mostly concentrated in Jabriya 4th Constituency: -- 19 residential districts -- 93,712 registered voters (39,360 male / 54,352 female) -- Heavily tribal (74%),though generally pro-government -- Mutran and Rashayda tribes dominate -- Recent inroads by the ICM as a substitute for the Salafi movement 5th Constituency: -- 23 residential districts -- 101,296 registered voters (48,876 male / 54,418 female) -- Heavily tribal (69%) -- Awazim and Ajman tribes dominate Islamists -------------- ¶6. (C) Kuwait's Islamists stand to benefit in this election from favorable demographic and social trends as well as a perception of GOK ineptitude in managing Parliament. Well before Parliament's dissolution, members of the Salafi Islamic Grouping (SIG) and the ICM began positioning themselves as champions of transparent governance and proponents of political reform - to include the legalization of political parties and opposition to corruption. In addition, their support for populist measures such as pay raises for public sector employees and gender segregation at Kuwaiti universities has broadened their appeal. In addition, the GOK's highly unpopular decision to raze private structures built on public land and a proposed Amiri decree restricting public gatherings (see para 10) have given the Islamists additional causes to champion this election season. ¶7. (C) Kuwait's Islamists, particularly the ICM, also benefit from superior organizational and campaigning ability. In an April 7 conversation with poloff, ICM Political Relations Chief Mohammed Al-Dallal noted that the ICM had selected its candidates before the Amir had even chosen to dissolve Parliament. According to Dallal, the ICM is planning to field 12-14 candidates in the upcoming elections. Dallal also noted that the ICM goes to great lengths to court the youth vote, and that it will likely be joining tickets with the SIG and the Shi'a in some constituencies to improve its chances of victory. Nevertheless, SIG and ICM support for a constitutional amendment naming Islamic Sharia law as "the sole source of legislation" in Kuwait prompts many citizens to question their ultimate objectives. Shi'a -------------- ¶8. (C) The Shi'a community represents 30-35 percent of the population of Kuwait. Recently, it has been energized by perceived GOK prejudices in the wake of the Imad Mugniyah eulogy. While the GOK argues that it was protecting national security interests by arresting and questioning members of "Kuwait Hizbollah," the Shi'a street feels that the GOK was settling old scores with former MPs Adnan Abdulsamad and Ahmed Lari (ref B). Furthermore, GOK detentions of former Shi'a MPs, prominent social leaders and a Shi'a cleric stoked Shi'a fears of a broader GOK policy of collective punishment. ¶9. (C) Based on conversations with Shi'a political and cultural leaders, it now appears that the Shi'a community intends to vote along more sectarian lines in the upcoming elections. The Shi'a hope to elect from 8 to 12 MPs and intend to push for greater representation in the upper levels of Kuwait's ministerial hierarchy. Furthermore, the Shi'a will likely split tickets with other Islamists such as the SIG and the ICM to increase their chances of election in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd constituencies. In addition, former MPs Abdulsamad and Lari have become increasingly popular among the Shi'a because of perceptions of GOK heavy-handedness, and KUWAIT 00000411 003 OF 004 are now regarded by some as folk heroes who have confronted GOK persecution. Nevertheless, there is some division within the Shi'a community between those who support the traditional, pro-government, merchant-class MPs and those who sympathize with the National Islamic Alliance (i.e. "Kuwait Hizbollah"),as represented by former MPs Abdulsamad and Lari. GOK-Tribal Conflict -------------- ¶10. (C) Historically, Kuwaiti tribal councils have pre-selected their parliamentary candidates via tribal primaries and then compelled their tribesmen (plus their spouses) to vote for these candidates in national elections. The GOK opposes this practice, arguing that it promotes factionalism, restricts free and fair competition, and advances candidates whose loyalty belongs to a tribe rather than to residents of the defined electoral district. According to the Kuwaiti Elections Law of 1998, participating in a primary election is a crime. The Council of Ministers also considered issuing a decree requiring individuals to obtain a license from the Ministry of Interior before organizing a public gathering. However, widespread popular opposition to this move, led by the Islamists and the tribes, prompted the GOK to shelve this initiative. ¶11. (C) The GOK has used Kuwait Elections Law liberally to disrupt tribal primaries since March 19, resulting in a series of standoffs between the Ministry of Interior and tribal Kuwaitis. On April 11, Kuwait Special Forces resorted to tear gas to disperse a group of 1,000 stone-throwing Kuwaitis from the Awazim tribe, who had earlier been participating in a primary election. In another incident, Kuwaiti special forces used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse a crowd of 500 Awadi tribesman who were protesting GOK mistreatment outside the Criminal Investigation Department. To date, the GOK's unprecedented push against tribal primaries shows no sign of success. ¶12. (C) The crackdown has prompted a backlash among Kuwait's bedouin tribesman, who are threatening to grill interim Interior Minister Shaykh Jaber Al-Khaled Al Sabah should he be re-seated at the National Assembly. In addition, prospective tribal MPs, in cooperation with Islamist candidates, are threatening to vote down the Amir's April 7 decree and rescind portions of the 1998 Elections Law upon their return to Parliament. In response, the GOK has threatened to disqualify parliamentary candidates it deems to be running on the basis of a tribal primary victory. Overall, this standoff has been the leading story in the run-up to the elections and has the potential to encourage the election of more opposition tribal MPs. Women -------------- ¶13. (C) Women represent 55.5 percent of Kuwait's electorate, outnumbering registered male voters by 200,499 to 161,185. However, Kuwaiti women were unable to leverage this advantage in 2006 to elect Kuwait's first female MP, and many political observers believe that history will repeat itself in the upcoming elections. Indeed, the prevailing sentiment among female candidates is that they are running in these elections to gather experience, but that they don't expect to win any parliamentary seats. Nevertheless, Kuwaiti women are fielding some strong candidates, such as Dr. Rola Dashti and Dr. Aseel Al-Awadhi, who is sharing a ticket with the pro-government National Democratic Alliance in the third constituency. Some pundits predict that the best opportunity for a woman to be elected is to join a strong male ticket. If that is the case, then 2008 may be an historic year for Kuwaiti women. Post will provide a further analysis of Kuwait female candidates septel. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) In the past weeks, the GOK has made several calculated moves to reassert its authority, such as: dissolving Parliament, pursuing the Mugniyah eulogizers, destroying illegal diwaniyas, restricting public assemblies and disrupting tribal primaries. These moves, while demonstrating GOK power, have also antagonized large swathes of the Kuwaiti population and may end up backfiring come May ¶17. Kuwaiti political observers generally predict a 20-30 percent turnover in the National Assembly, although such projections are difficult due to the new redistricting system. In addition, the GOK will likely make several revisions to the composition of its Cabinet, including a KUWAIT 00000411 004 OF 004 potential change in the position of Prime Minister (reported septel). The outcome of these elections will likely have no impact on Kuwaiti foreign policy or its relations with the U.S. End comment. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * Misenheimer