(C) KUWAIT'S DEMOCRATIC JALOPY - STILL CHUGGING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001187 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/I, AND S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KW SUBJECT: (C) KUWAIT'S DEMOCRATIC JALOPY - STILL CHUGGING DESPITE BUMPS IN THE ROAD REF: A. KUWAIT 1110 ¶B. KUWAIT 1144 ¶C. KUWAIT 1166 ¶D. KUWAIT 1175 ¶E. KUWAIT 1178 ¶F. KUWAIT 1183 Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 14.b and d ¶1. (S) Summary: Kuwait's developing democracy is undergoing yet another of the transitional wheezing attacks that seem to grip it every several years, but it is nowhere near death. Like the 70's)era Chevrolet Impalas that continue to ply Kuwait's choked freeways, alongside European sports cars and super-chromed, souped-up American SUV's, it is a beloved if increasingly decrepit and outdated model: a jalopy, as it were, held together by the political equivalent of baling wire and the occasional hard whack of a spanner, that somehow manages to keep going, albeit in fits and starts. The Amir is unlikely to take decisive action any time soon, recognizing that alternatives to the current scenario will be difficult and divisive. We will thus see neither a dictatorship - which would be unworkable - nor a failed democracy. That said, growing fissures within Kuwaiti society have become increasingly visible with the current "crisis" and ultimately may force consideration of major adjustments, such as constitutional reform or a politically selected Deputy Prime Minister, hitherto considered off limits. In the meantime, we assess minimal risk to US interests in the short term (5-10 years). End summary. ¶2. (S) Over the past several months, this tiny constitutional emirate has been buffeted by viral panic associated with the global financial crisis (and resultant drop in the price of oil, its lifeblood) compounded by monumental government ineptitude, from the leadership on down through the cabinet and parliamentarians. An oft-heard note in the midst of the political cacophony has been the call for the dissolution of parliament, for what would be the third time in as many years, with the concomitant desire that the Amir elect to rule by fiat, even unconstitutionally. This, proponents argue, would stanch the growing tide of Salafist influence and enable the country to reclaim its earlier reputation as the progressive "Pearl of the Gulf," rather than continue to lag further behind in infrastructure and socioeconomic development as its more autocratic neighbors ) notably Qatar and the UAE -- speed ahead. ¶3. (S) Others argue with equal force that any effort to constrain or curtail Kuwait's deeply entrenched democratic dialogue - as embodied in its traditional diwaniyas (the equivalent of a salon for political discourse, frequented on a regular basis by tens of thousands of Kuwaiti males, generally) and its 17 daily newspapers would result in strong protests and perhaps even bloodshed as government security forces would be forced to contend with outraged students, political liberals, Shi'a and newly enfranchised tribals fearful of losing their claim to a larger piece of affluent Kuwait's social welfare pie. ¶4. (S) There are several realities here. First and foremost is that the U.S. and our entrenched security presence enables - in the psychological sense - a relatively frivolous approach to politics. As long as the oil flows out and the dollars flow in, Kuwaitis can afford to engage in these parlor games and the Amir can dither over tough decisions with impunity. After all, what do most Kuwaitis lack for? Nothing. Many believe the USG is calling the shots in any event. The Russian Ambassador here asserted the other evening that "75 percent of Kuwaitis want dissolution, but they are afraid that you (i.e. the U.S. government) won't allow it." ¶5. (S) Our own conversations with a broad range of Kuwaitis suggests the split may be more along the lines of 50/50, with political liberals, secularists (if such a term can be used here) Islamist tribals and Shi'a intellectuals concerned the U.S. will turn a blind eye to unconstitutional dissolution in hopes of pushing through projects beneficial to our parochial interests (such as the Fourth Refinery or long-pending CT legislation),or in return for continued investment. As this post has noted earlier (reftels),we bump up against the horns of a dilemma: Certainly many of our specific interests would be better served with a more efficient, directive government, akin to the UAE or Saudi models, at least in theory and for awhile. But that would undermine our political assertion that only democracy, in the long term, mitigates the potential for extremism. ¶6. (S) The Ambassador has been urged by some parties - KUWAIT 00001187 002 OF 003 including at least one member of the ruling Al Sabah family - to intervene to prevent dissolution, and just as strongly by others - including the Amir's half-brother and confidant Shaykh Misha'al - to keep firmly out of the country's governmental knickers. What has been communicated clearly to senior leadership by the Ambassador, discreetly, is a request that they not blindside us, as their most important ally; we will have a reaction to any unconstitutional dissolution and it would be best that we have a full context in which to craft any response. To Shaykh Misha'al, whose influence goes well beyond his position in the GOK's organizational chart, the Ambassador has noted that handing our newly elected leadership an inaugural gift that certainly would be perceived by many as a huge step backward for an important regional ally would send a confusing signal, at least. ¶7. (S) The worst case scenario sketched out by one of the Al Sabah inner circle known for his occasionally Cassandra-esque predictions, posits a drawn out unconstitutional dissolution that "metastasizes" into something resembling a dictatorship, with an accompanying crackdown on the press and internet communications, and resultant violent reactions from various groups. Our analysis is that the habit of democracy is simply too firmly entrenched for that to occur. The Amir knows this, and thus the protracted political minuet of the past few weeks, designed to take the country into the Eid holiday, a parliamentary recess and ) without embarrassment - through the January 17-18 Arab Economic Summit here while he considers his options. He is a wily politician, if not a decisive leader, and has been quietly and regularly checking the political pulse of his constituency even as his public remarks have made clear he will not tolerate an ongoing situation of rancorous political gridlock. ¶8. (S) The Prime Minister is universally liked as an individual and considered too weak to run a government. The Amir has made clear he has no intention of removing him. So the alternative, according to some, would be to assign "tough ministers," in the words of one interlocutor, who will take on the members of parliament themselves. One individual cited with some frequency is Ahmad al-Fahd Al Sabah, the Amir's nephew, President of the National Security Bureau and an open rival to the PM, known for his influence amongst the tribals, as well as for his inherent corruptibility given his relatively impecunious (by Kuwaiti standards) financial circumstances. ¶9. (S) Whatever happens, one thing is clear: no matter who holds the PM's office, the mechanics of Kuwait's democracy are increasingly incapable of addressing its changing demographics. Old-style methods of governance, through consensus and the granting of favors, no longer work to address the growing demands of an increasingly diverse and conservative populace, resulting again and again in political gridlock. Even now, and increasingly, many modalities are being discussed from reconfiguring the cabinet, to creating an elective Deputy PM position, to establishing political parties (not wished by the Al Sabah),to amending the constitution, to having an elected PM (not wished by most). There are persuasive pros and cons to be made in each case; thus we should avoid being prescriptive. ¶10. (S) When you press the Kuwaitis ) and particularly the urban, merchant elite ) they really don't want anything to change. But change is unavoidable. The largely urban merchant families that characterized Kuwait's demographic 30 years ago have one wife and 2-3 children in whom they invest heavily in education; the tribal families have 2-3 wives and 5-6 children per wife, with typically lower educational standards. The pyramid has tipped. Meanwhile, the basic structure of governance has not changed since 1963, with 50 elected parliamentarians, no political parties, and an inviolate constitution. So the Amir, it could be argued, has no alternative but to dissolve parliament in order to set things straight. ¶11. (S) Even if the Amir were to take that step - the preferred route of many avowed cultural liberals - there is a sense he would still be forced to make concessions to an increasingly conservative Salafist demographic base, intent on reforming Kuwaiti society along its religious lines. In the longer run such a trend could have consequences for our bilateral relationship, with or without a parliament. No one believes for a moment that Kuwaitis, whether Salafist or secular, would ever urge the withdrawal of American troops; but they could certainly reduce the subsidies granted to us, or sharply curtail our access and operational flexibility. Similarly, major deals with American companies, or KIA investment in the U.S. could be directed elsewhere to appease elements unhappy with our policies in the Muslim world, and KUWAIT 00001187 003 OF 003 Palestine. ¶12. (S) Although it is almost unimaginable to most analysts, there are incipient whispered suggestions that the politically decrepit Al Sabah, on whose goodwill we rely, may have outlived their usefulness and are now more concerned with controlling Kuwait's wealth than with ruling. For its part, the ruling family hopes to discover a formula to invigorate its leadership and dispel the residual ill-will from the unseemly fashion in which the current Amir unseated his predecessor, the "non compos mentis" but nonetheless highly respected Shaykh Sa'ad Al Sabah. ¶13. (S) But all this is much further down the road. For now, absent a "Boris Yeltsin" or other energetic reformer and visionary, this old Chevy will continue to smoke and clank down the highway. It will be a drawn-out process with no immediate solution, but neither is it likely to be explosive. Our role should be to continue to speak out publicly and clearly about the organic nature of democracies and the need for the machinery of the process to keep pace with societal dynamics, and the Kuwaitis' need to accommodate change while maintaining inherent respect for institutions, rule of law and the protection of their minorities. Meanwhile we must sustain our efforts to strengthen those institutions through educational exchanges, IV programs, government to government exchanges, NGO's and corporate involvement. There is no quick fix to societal transition. ¶14. (C) In the event of unconstitutional dissolution, which we assume would take place if at all sometime after the January 17-18 Arab Economic Summit, we believe the contingency press guidance submitted earlier remains relevant. Talking Points: - We have seen reports that the Amir of Kuwait has dissolved Kuwait's National Assembly for an undetermined period of time. - Kuwait is an important ally of the United States with a long and unique tradition of democratic governance. We hope this will be a temporary measure. - We are aware that strained relations between the Government of Kuwait and the National Assembly and the resulting political paralysis have been a source of frustration for many Kuwaitis, some of whom have called for the Parliament's dissolution. - We strongly support Kuwait's democratic traditions and note that Parliament is only one part of that equation; democracy is also about respect for rule of law and institutions. Honest differences between the executive and legislative branches should not lead to governmental paralysis. - We would also hope that Kuwait's well-entrenched freedom of speech, as represented by its lively press and diwaniya tradition, will be respected during this period. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * JONES