RUMORS SWIRL OF IMMINENT PARLIAMENTARY DISSOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001144 SIPDIS NEA/ARP E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KU SUBJECT: RUMORS SWIRL OF IMMINENT PARLIAMENTARY DISSOLUTION REF: A. A. JONES-SAWYER EMAIL DATED 10-19-2008 ¶B. B. JONES-SAWYER EMAIL DATED 10-19-2008 ¶C. C. DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE CONTAINED JONES-SAWYER EMAIL DATED 10-19-2008 Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Summary: A member of the ruling family with access to the Al Sabah inner council sought an urgent meeting with the Ambassador late yesterday afternoon to warn that the Amir intended to dissolve parliament unconstitutionally, perhaps as early as November 19. The expectation, according to this source, was that parliament would remain dissolved for at least a year and possibly two. Source, who asked not to be identified, expressed concern that the government would seek to sharply curtail free speech during this period, to include blocking internet sites, and that Kuwaiti security services would find themselves unable to manage peacefully any resultant demonstrations by students or Islamist groups. Source added his own cynical observation that the Al Sabahs would fail to improve governance during this period ("There is no Boris Yeltsin to step in and take charge"),which, he suggested, would lead to erosion of popular support for the status quo, with unpredictable consequences. Following this discussion, Ambassador contacted Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammed's office director, Shaykh Ahmed Nasser Al Sabah -- also the Prime Minister's son -- who said no decision had "yet" been made but offered assurances the U.S. would be kept in the loop. As of this afternoon, November 19, things remain tense but quiet, although speculation is rampant. Post has submitted contingency press guidance (ref C email). End summary. ¶2. (C) The Amir returned from the U.S. two nights ago amidst rumors he would dissolve parliament should Salafist MP's make good on their threats to grill the PM, Shaykh Nasser Al-Mohammed, for having waived an entry ban for a visiting Iranian Shi'a Imam alleged to have blasphemed the Companions of the Prophet. Late yesterday afternoon, the Ambassador was contacted urgently by a member of the ruling family with access to inner circles who warned the Amir was on the verge of dissolving the National Assembly for a period of up to two years, during which time he would expand the Council of Ministers from 16 to 25 positions. According to this source, the Amir had convoked senior military and security officials one day prior to ensure they could manage any reactions to this announcement, which follows a period of growing conflict between the tribal and Salafist elements in parliament and the government, and a threat to subject the Prime Minister to interpellation. ¶3. (C) Among the concerns expressed by the "shaykhly informant" were that a) Kuwait's security forces are incapable of peacefully containing the potential demonstrations that might follow; and b) the Al Sabah will prove incapable of demonstrating leadership even absent a fractious parliament, which will lead to calls for a change in governance, leading to potential instability. Source urged Ambassador "not to follow in the footsteps of Ambassador Glaspie (with Saddam Hussein) and offer 'no opinion' on Kuwait's internal politics." ¶4. (C) Following this conversation, Ambassador contacted the FM's Office Director, Dr. Shaykh Ahmad Al-Nasser, who is also the PM's son, and advised that we were hearing well-sourced rumors the Amir intended to dissolve parliament for an extended period. If this were the case, Ambassador suggested, the GOK would be wise to keep us informed if it hoped for a balanced official U.S. response, noting that some would view this development as a step backward. Shaykh Ahmad took the point but said -- for the moment -- no decision had been made. He assured the Ambassador the GOK would keep us informed of developments as they evolved. As of four thirty in the afternoon, the situation remains tense but calm, while the rumor mill churns. ¶5. (C) If the Amir dissolves Parliament he has two options: either a constitutional dissolution (in which he sets a date for new parliamentary elections within sixty days) or an unconstitutional dissolution (in which the Amir announces that the government will rule by decree for a period exceeding sixty days.) It is possible he would announce an intention to rule by decree for an unlimited period, but it is generally anticipated that he would specify the period for rule by decree, be it one year, two years or more. The Amir dissolved Parliament constitutionally in June 2006 and again in March 2008. While the account of our ruling family source appeared a bit breathless and shadowy, his assessments corroborate reports we are hearing from a variety of other sources. KUWAIT 00001144 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Comment: Should he choose to dissolve parliament, the Amir may well cite the current financial crisis and the government's need to act decisively without constraint as the driving motivation, rather than acknowledge parliamentary (and general) unhappiness with his weak PM. Many MPs are faulting splits within the ruling family as the source of Kuwait's increasing political and developmental drift. Our concern -- apart from seeing a significant constitutional disruption of the only government that even approaches democracy among the Gulf's Arab states -- is that this action has the potential to lead potentially extremist movements to go underground (rather than expose themselves to the national spotlight, as is currently the case, which often undercuts their agendas) and/or that the USG will somehow be perceived to have supported dissolution for the sake of pushing through our own agenda, including the criminalization of terror financing. While many Kuwaitis have openly called for dissolution, probably the majority of liberal reformers do not wish for this outcome and will criticize any perceived acquiescence on our parts. Of course, the real problem is that the Al Sabah have demonstrated neither the inclination nor the capacity to lead, parliament or none. End comment. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * JONES