Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KUWAIT1144
2008-11-19 14:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

RUMORS SWIRL OF IMMINENT PARLIAMENTARY DISSOLUTION

Tags:  PGOV PREL KU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4802
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #1144/01 3241425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191425Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2361
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001144 

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KU
SUBJECT: RUMORS SWIRL OF IMMINENT PARLIAMENTARY DISSOLUTION

REF: A. A. JONES-SAWYER EMAIL DATED 10-19-2008

B. B. JONES-SAWYER EMAIL DATED 10-19-2008

C. C. DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE CONTAINED JONES-SAWYER
EMAIL DATED 10-19-2008

Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001144

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KU
SUBJECT: RUMORS SWIRL OF IMMINENT PARLIAMENTARY DISSOLUTION

REF: A. A. JONES-SAWYER EMAIL DATED 10-19-2008

B. B. JONES-SAWYER EMAIL DATED 10-19-2008

C. C. DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE CONTAINED JONES-SAWYER
EMAIL DATED 10-19-2008

Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary: A member of the ruling family with access
to the Al Sabah inner council sought an urgent meeting with
the Ambassador late yesterday afternoon to warn that the Amir
intended to dissolve parliament unconstitutionally, perhaps
as early as November 19. The expectation, according to this
source, was that parliament would remain dissolved for at
least a year and possibly two. Source, who asked not to be
identified, expressed concern that the government would seek
to sharply curtail free speech during this period, to include
blocking internet sites, and that Kuwaiti security services
would find themselves unable to manage peacefully any
resultant demonstrations by students or Islamist groups.
Source added his own cynical observation that the Al Sabahs
would fail to improve governance during this period ("There
is no Boris Yeltsin to step in and take charge"),which, he
suggested, would lead to erosion of popular support for the
status quo, with unpredictable consequences. Following this
discussion, Ambassador contacted Foreign Minister Dr.
Mohammed's office director, Shaykh Ahmed Nasser Al Sabah --
also the Prime Minister's son -- who said no decision had
"yet" been made but offered assurances the U.S. would be kept
in the loop. As of this afternoon, November 19, things
remain tense but quiet, although speculation is rampant.
Post has submitted contingency press guidance (ref C email).
End summary.


2. (C) The Amir returned from the U.S. two nights ago amidst
rumors he would dissolve parliament should Salafist MP's make
good on their threats to grill the PM, Shaykh Nasser
Al-Mohammed, for having waived an entry ban for a visiting
Iranian Shi'a Imam alleged to have blasphemed the Companions
of the Prophet. Late yesterday afternoon, the Ambassador
was contacted urgently by a member of the ruling family with
access to inner circles who warned the Amir was on the verge
of dissolving the National Assembly for a period of up to two
years, during which time he would expand the Council of
Ministers from 16 to 25 positions. According to this source,
the Amir had convoked senior military and security officials
one day prior to ensure they could manage any reactions to
this announcement, which follows a period of growing conflict
between the tribal and Salafist elements in parliament and

the government, and a threat to subject the Prime Minister to
interpellation.


3. (C) Among the concerns expressed by the "shaykhly
informant" were that a) Kuwait's security forces are
incapable of peacefully containing the potential
demonstrations that might follow; and b) the Al Sabah will
prove incapable of demonstrating leadership even absent a
fractious parliament, which will lead to calls for a change
in governance, leading to potential instability. Source
urged Ambassador "not to follow in the footsteps of
Ambassador Glaspie (with Saddam Hussein) and offer 'no
opinion' on Kuwait's internal politics."


4. (C) Following this conversation, Ambassador contacted the
FM's Office Director, Dr. Shaykh Ahmad Al-Nasser, who is also
the PM's son, and advised that we were hearing well-sourced
rumors the Amir intended to dissolve parliament for an
extended period. If this were the case, Ambassador
suggested, the GOK would be wise to keep us informed if it
hoped for a balanced official U.S. response, noting that some
would view this development as a step backward. Shaykh Ahmad
took the point but said -- for the moment -- no decision had
been made. He assured the Ambassador the GOK would keep us
informed of developments as they evolved. As of four thirty
in the afternoon, the situation remains tense but calm, while
the rumor mill churns.


5. (C) If the Amir dissolves Parliament he has two options:
either a constitutional dissolution (in which he sets a date
for new parliamentary elections within sixty days) or an
unconstitutional dissolution (in which the Amir announces
that the government will rule by decree for a period
exceeding sixty days.) It is possible he would announce an
intention to rule by decree for an unlimited period, but it
is generally anticipated that he would specify the period for
rule by decree, be it one year, two years or more. The Amir
dissolved Parliament constitutionally in June 2006 and again
in March 2008. While the account of our ruling family source
appeared a bit breathless and shadowy, his assessments
corroborate reports we are hearing from a variety of other
sources.

KUWAIT 00001144 002 OF 002




6. (C) Comment: Should he choose to dissolve parliament,
the Amir may well cite the current financial crisis and the
government's need to act decisively without constraint as the
driving motivation, rather than acknowledge parliamentary
(and general) unhappiness with his weak PM. Many MPs are
faulting splits within the ruling family as the source of
Kuwait's increasing political and developmental drift. Our
concern -- apart from seeing a significant constitutional
disruption of the only government that even approaches
democracy among the Gulf's Arab states -- is that this action
has the potential to lead potentially extremist movements to
go underground (rather than expose themselves to the national
spotlight, as is currently the case, which often undercuts
their agendas) and/or that the USG will somehow be perceived
to have supported dissolution for the sake of pushing through
our own agenda, including the criminalization of terror
financing. While many Kuwaitis have openly called for
dissolution, probably the majority of liberal reformers do
not wish for this outcome and will criticize any perceived
acquiescence on our parts. Of course, the real problem is
that the Al Sabah have demonstrated neither the inclination
nor the capacity to lead, parliament or none. End comment.







********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
JONES

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -