IMPLEMENTATION OF DHS API/PNR PROGRAM RAISES

S E C R E T KUWAIT 001096 NOFORN SIPDIS NEA/ARP, NEA/I, DHS FOR TOM WARRICK E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CVIS KU SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF DHS API/PNR PROGRAM RAISES PRIVACY CONCERNS FOR GOK OFFICIALS REF: A. WARRICK/JONES EMAIL DATED OCTOBER 11 ¶B. 2008 ¶C. KUWAIT 991 ¶D. KUWAIT 1022 ¶E. KUWAIT 1075 Classified By: A/DCM OLIVER JOHN FOR REASONS 1.4 b, d ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In follow-up to discussions held between Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff and the Kuwaiti Prime Minister held September 19, 2008, between, Homeland Security Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy Thomas Warrick and accompanying delegation from DHS met with GoK officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Interior MOI National Security Bureau (NSB) and Kuwait State Security (KSS) to discuss a proposed classified DHS program to establish a legal framework and technical system for the real-time acquisition and sharing of Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. DAS Warrick highlighted Secretary Chertoff's commitment to increasing counterterrorism (CT) cooperation and information sharing that would benefit both countries. The Kuwaitis agreed that the API/PNR system would provide better intelligence collection and linkage of known/unknown terrorists entering/exiting Kuwait, but expressed reservations about providing the United States with private data on Kuwaiti citizens. GoK officials also pointed out that DOMESTIC legal and political considerations would be significant obstacles, but both Kuwait State Security held and the NSB held out the possibility of providing data, on a classified basis, for non-Kuwaitis. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) On October 20-21, 2008 DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy Thomas Warrick and an accompanying DHS delegation met separately with Deputy Director of Kuwait's National Security Bureau, Shaykh Thamer Al-Ali Al Sabah, Director, Follow-Up and Coordination Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Khaled Mohammed Al-Maqamis; Director of Kuwait State Security (KSS) General Sulayman Muhaylan; and Director of Engineering, Kuwait Civil Aviation, Sami Al-Hulaibi to propose establishing a program for the real-time acquisition and sharing of Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. DAS Warrick stressed that this initiative had the blessings of both DHS Secretary Chertoff and Kuwaiti Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al Sabah, and briefed GoK officials on the prospective advantages to joint U.S./Kuwait security that could be derived from participation in the API/PNR program. These included obtaining access to constantly updated data from airline records that would, potentially, permit both countries to identify possible terrorist or criminal threats. ¶3. (S/NF) Warrick noted that, additionally, the PNR portion of the program would provide CT officials in both countries access to data (e.g. telephone, email travel itinerary and credit card information) that could expand information about known persons of concern and broaden the scope of information on these individuals to include other persons and entities of interest with whom the target individuals may be in contact. Information available from API/PNR, he noted, is much more extensive than that Kuwait presently accesses through its current APP (Computer-assisted) passenger pre-screening) system Warrick noted that the European Union, after resolving some initial privacy concerns, had announced it was implementing an API/PNR-type system. Underscoring the benefits to Kuwait of participation in API/PNR, Warrick told GoK officials that an MOU would permit the USG to identify to the GOK persons of concern through existing channels and relationships for sharing information, and that armed with this information, the GOK could either monitor such persons or deny them entry. -------------- GoK Says Sharing API/PNR Data on Kuwaitis Poses DOMESTIC and Legal Obstacles -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Shaykh Thamer expressed several reservations about providing the USG data on Kuwaiti citizens, chiefly privacy concerns. Thamer pointed out that he, personally, would be very uncomfortable knowing that the USG or other agencies had access to his personal travel itinerary, credit card information or other personal data and that similar objections from many members of Parliament -- especially from those who have Hezbollah or Islamist connections -- would constitute a severe political legal obstacle to acceptance of such a program. Speaking candidly, Thamer also stated that he had concerns over a perceived disinclination on the part of the USG to cooperate in the sharing of CT-related information. He asserted that the GOK has appealed to the USG for the rationale behind the U.S. Treasury's designation of the Kuwait-based Revival of the Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) but had received nothing in response. Thamer indicated that the USG,s non-cooperation on RIHS did not encourage the GOK to sign on to API/PNR. Thamer also noted that Kuwait,s constitution limits the government,s ability to collect data of the kind proposed under API/PNR and that changing this was difficult given current political realities. Thamer suggested, as an alternative, that the USG examine the possibility of going through the UNSC to obtain a mandate for the exchange of information akin to that contemplated under API/PNR; such a step would ease the way for the GOK to work through its DOMESTIC legal underbrush. ¶5. (S/NF) In response, Warrick noted that DHS has taken great pains to ensure that privacy concerns were protected and that only persons of real CT or criminal concern are tapped by the program. The system, he noted, significantly expands the capacities of participating countries to protect themselves from terrorists or criminals beyond what is available at present from API or simple visa checking processes. While acknowledging Thamer,s concerns and expressing a willingness to explore these further, Warrick emphasized the USG,s strong interest in developing a DHS/NSB relationship. Turning to the subject of legal obstacles, Warrick also urged Thamer to explore whether, as has been done in other countries, simple administrative procedures and regulations -- such as the ones the GOK presently uses to obtain APP data -- might be utilized to enhance cooperation without the need for new legislation. Thamer took this on board but was non-commital. -------------- CT Cooperation A Major Concern for the GoK -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) The Director of MFA's Follow-up and Coordination Department, Ambassador Maqamis was receptive to the information presented by DAS Warrick, pointing out that the GoK is on the same side when it comes to fighting terrorism. He was chiefly concerned with the technical aspects of the system, noting that he was familiar with the operating system already in place (Note: GoK currently operates under the APP system which links directly with SITA (an information technology company based in Geneva with facilities in the U.S. that handles an extensive communication network for government agencies and air transport companies) and asked whether DHS would provide the necessary technical assistance to implement a new system. He also requested a written version of the technical aspects of the system, as well as a copy of the proposed MOI, to present to officials in the GoK for further discussion. ¶7. (S/NF) Warrick said a team from DHS would provide technical assistance and answer any questions for the GoK. He added that the proposed Memorandum of Intent had been sent to Kuwait's Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Salem Al-Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah and would be provided to the GoK. Maqamis said he would request a copy from Ambassador Salem. Maqamis was also interested in how Kuwait's current system compared to the new system. Warrick explained that the major difference between APP and API/PNR is the greater use to which API and PNR information can be put. It allows the host country to make connections between criminals and terrorists it already has knowledge of, and previously unknown associates, through exchange of information i.e. credit card, telephone, and travel companions. Maqamis was receptive to the system adding that it was a very positive and advanced step regarding the exchange of information. -------------- Kuwaiti Citizens Privacy A Sensitive Subject to KSS -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Kuwait's State Security (KSS) Director General Sulayman Muhaylan provided DAS Warrick with a general overview of the obstacles that KSS has faced over the past two years following Kuwait's implementation of APP. He noted that for certain companies and institutions, in the past GoK allowed the entry of foreign nationals without receiving the approval of KSS, making it difficult for KSS to know who was entering/exiting the country. General Muhaylan boasted that he had succeeded in taking control of this issue mostly through a direct line of communication with Kuwait Civil Aviation (KCIA). Muhaylan cautioned that the sharing of private information on Kuwaiti citizens with the U.S. Government was a sensitive issue. He also noted that such a program, given the privacy issues, would be rejected by Parliament. ¶9. (S/NF) On the other hand, he said KSS is very interested in collecting information on non-Kuwaitis, and that this would not be a concern since only Kuwaiti privacy was protected under Kuwaiti law. Muhaylan said the Kuwaitis were proposing to establish a committee to discuss the sharing of information, to include implementation of the proposed API/PNR system, noting that in order to establish the committee it would have to be approved by the Minister of Interior. Muhaylan said he would recommend the committee discuss implementation of API/PNR, data collection concerns, exchange of information and legal concerns. Once the committee was formed, he asked if DHS would provide a technical team to answer questions and provide explanations to the committee. Finally, he stressed that KSS is not the final authority to approve the API/PNR; while KSS would support any cooperation with the U.S. and is very open with U.S. intelligence agencies, privacy is a very sensitive issue in the Gulf Region. ¶10. (S/NF) Warrick asked Muhaylan about establishing a working group to discuss all aspects of API/PNR and to sort out legal and other concerns. Warrick asked Muhaylan what specific provisions of Kuwaiti law governed privacy issues, but Muhaylan did not identify any specific provisions of Kuwaiti law, nor did he take Warrick up on an invitation to have lawyers sit together so the USG could better understand Kuwaiti law on this subject. Warrick stressed that the exchange of information between GoK and USG would provide intelligence information that would benefit both countries and make Kuwait aware of people about whom they should be concerned but were aware. In regard to legal concerns pertaining to Kuwaiti citizens, he asked if the GoK would be receptive to moving forward with API/PNR implementation were it to collect information only on non-Kuwaitis. The General responded by stating that, "in regards to non-Kuwaitis, KSS is very open to an exchange of information." -------------- Regional Implementation Would Benefit All GCC Countries -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) During their October 21 meeting at Kuwait International Airport, KCIA Engineering Director, Sami Al-Hulaibi told DAS Warrick that he was pleased with the benefits of the current APP system and welcomed any improvements to the system, adding that he would like to see such a system implemented globally. He noted that 19 of 43 airlines are currently cooperating with KCIA (including Iran Air) in providing required information and expects more to come on board in the near future. Warrick asked why all airlines were not complying with the APP requirements, to which Al-Hulaibi replied that the problem is the lack of Kuwaiti law requiring compliance or providing penalties for non-compliance. He stressed that the Memorandum of Intent which had overall security responsibility for the country, should require compliance from all airlines. (Note: Al-Hulaibi said following Chertoff's meetings with the Prime Minister, he has seen more cooperation from the MOI End note.) He also stressed that unless all countries in the region implement the same system, API/PNR would not benefit Kuwait, pointing out that some regional airports lack the required infrastructure and technology. ¶12. (S/NF) Warrick asked how KCIA was able to secure legislation to implement the use of APP at Kuwait International Airport and whether the same approach might be used to implement API/PNR. Al-Hulaibi explained that the Higher Council of Aviation, which includes the President of DGCA, Minister of Commerce and the Undersecretary Ministry of Interior, agreed a system was needed to increase security at Kuwait's Airport. The Ministry of Finance financed the project and a Directive was sent to KCIA requiring implementation of APP. Expressing concern over privacy information and legislative issues, Al-Hulaibi said getting the approval for sharing API/PNR information with the U.S. Government would be an obstacle. ¶13. (S/NF) Comment: The Kuwaitis were clearly offering up a coordinated interagency position that they could not or would not provide the USG with API/PNR data on Kuwaiti citizens. The GOK is unwilling to have this become yet another flashpoint in relations with the Kuwaiti Parliament. KSS did not claim a legal problem with collecting API/PNR data on their own citizens. Thus, it remains to be explored whether the Kuwaitis would agree to accept DHS assistance to set up an API/PNR program that would give API/PNR data on non-Kuwaiti citizens to the USG. End comment. ¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Tom Warrick ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * JONES