DHS CYBERSECURITY DISCUSSIONS FOCUS ON INTERNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001084 SIPDIS NEA/ARP, PLEASE PASS TO DHS A.MOLET E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KHLS AINT KU SUBJECT: DHS CYBERSECURITY DISCUSSIONS FOCUS ON INTERNAL PROTECTIONS AND PRIVACY REF: A. 07 KUWAIT 1285 ¶B. KUWAIT 1075 Classified By: Political Counselor Peter O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b an d d Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Kuwaiti Central Agency for Information (CAIT) and National Security Bureau officials discussed with DHS Deputy U/S Scott Charbo on October 21 the vulnerabilities and challenges faced by the GOK in staving off electronic attacks on its information technology (IT) systems. The GOK officials raised privacy concerns and highlighted disruptions waged from within GOK systems, allegedly by GOK officials and/or Iranian agents. The GOK welcomed the dialogue, the result of Secretary Chertoff's September 19 meeting with Kuwaiti PM Shaykh Nasser Al Sabah, and expressed a desire for future exchanges. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On October 20, DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate Deputy Under Secretary Scott Charbo discussed cybersecurity on October 20 with officials from Kuwait's CAIT and with NSB's Deputy Director Shaykh Thamer Al Sabah. CAIT's Director General Ali Al-Shuraidah and Shaykh Thamer warmly welcomed the visit and expressed hope that it would be the first of many cybersecurity exchanges. CAIT: "How do we protect ourselves from within?" -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Al-Shuraideh's concern focused primarily on privacy and internal security. He asserted that some GOK staff were either permitting or perpetrating attacks and abuses on IT systems. He explained that CAIT would coordinate with the Ministry of Interior in investigating malware transmissions, but that there are no clear guidelines that govern interagency cooperation. He queried Charbo repeatedly on privacy issues and on the right and capability of a governmental entity to monitor its citizens electronically. (Note: Reftel report of the 2007 arrest of a blogger who posted remarks critical of the Amir suggests that the government's authority to monitor and shut down websites is clear in only two areas: denigrating Islam and criticizing the Amir. End note.) Reflecting on the PM's September 19 discussion with Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff, Charbo piqued Al-Shuraideh's interest with his description of Einstein I and II software packages and their utility in detecting malware and other electronic intrusions. "How do we protect our systems from Iranian infiltration?" -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Echoing Al-Shuraideh's concerns on cyber attacks -- notably from within -- NSB's Shaykh Thamer charged Iran and its agents with spamming and corrupting GOK websites, targeting in particular the Ministry of Awqaf (Endowments) and Islamic Affairs. He viewed such attacks as Iranian efforts to exploit a sectarian rift between Kuwaiti Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. In particular, he queried Charbo on how to identify perpetrators from within government circles who hack into accounts for which they are not granted access. Thamer also lamented the expense and ineffectiveness of a previous attempt to establish a governmental intranet. Because of the poor safeguards built into the system, within a two month period in 2006 every GOK website was hacked, Thamer said. ¶5. (SBU) Like Al-Shuraideh, Thamer raised concerns over the absence of legislation governing privacy and internet monitoring. He expressed his desire for the GOK to be more active in investigations after detections of malware usage, but complained that legal parameters were not clear for law enforcement. Comment and Next Steps -------------- ¶6. (C) Both CAIT and NSB warmly received Deputy U/S Charbo's visit, which responded directly to Kuwaiti PM Shaykh Nasser's request when in Washington September 19. The fact that the CAIT meeting was attended by representatives of the MFA and the NSB demonstrated a desire for interagency cooperation on cybersecurity. In both meetings, the officials candidly listed the GOK's IT weaknesses: difficulties in hiring qualified professionals, suspicions of internal tampering, lack of legislation and guidelines to dictate governmental KUWAIT 00001084 002 OF 002 capabilities and limits, and lack of interagency cooperation. Our interlocutors asserted that the GOK has the will and the resources to address the problem. They expressed an interest in participating in future training, conferences and other exchanges with the USG. We look forward to a continuing dialogue in this area and believe the prospects for eventual cooperation are good. End comment. ¶7. (U) Deputy U/S Charbo has cleared this cable. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * JONES