KUWAITI AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO BAGHDAD CONCERNED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001007 SIPDIS NEA/ARP, NEA/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER IZ KU SUBJECT: KUWAITI AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO BAGHDAD CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY REF: KUWAIT 991 Classified By: Political Counselor Peter O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b an d d ¶1. (C) Summary: Ali Al-Mou'min, Kuwait's newly-designated Ambassador to Iraq, expects to arrive in Baghdad no later than mid-October, prior to an anticipated visit by the Kuwaiti PM. According to Al-Mou'min, the GOK has made few preparations for his arrival in Baghdad and he will be, at least during the initial stages, a one-man show. Al-Mou'min expressed concern about his personal security in Iraq and hopes that the USG and other Coalition Forces will play a role in protecting him and facilitating his settling-in period. To date, Embassy has not received any request through official channels to support Al-Mou'min's mission in Baghdad. Al-Mou'min's priority issues after arrival will be to locate a residence and land for a future embassy and to engage the GOI on lingering border and debt resolution issues. End Summary. October Arrival Anticipated -------------- ¶2. (C) In a September 23 meeting with POLCOUNS and Consul, Lieutenant General (retired) Ali Al-Mou'min, Kuwait's newly sworn-in ambassador-designate to Iraq (reftel),outlined some of the challenges he expects to face when he takes up his post in Baghdad. Al-Mou'min told Emboffs he anticipates arriving in Baghdad "no later than mid-October" as he will need to be in place prior to an anticipated post-Eid visit to Iraq by Kuwaiti Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Al Sabah. Al-Mou'min also noted that he cannot present his credentials in Baghdad until Iraqi President Jalal Talabani returns from his convalescence in the U.S. ¶3. (C) Al-Mou'min suggested that the GOK has done little by way of preparations for his arrival and tenure in Baghdad. He said the GOK had not yet taken any steps to appoint a support staff or identify a residence or offices. He "assumes" the Iraqi government will accomodate him at the beginning of his stay by making available space in a guest house or hotel inside the Green Zone and that his first tasks as the GOK's "one man band" in Iraq will be to locate a permanent residence and then identify land for the construction of an eventual Kuwaiti Embassy. (Note: We had earlier understood that the GOK had selected two contiguous buildings in the Green Zone and were awaiting Iraqi approval.) Concerns About Personal Security -------------- ¶4. (C) Al-Mou'min frankly admitted that he is concerned about his personal safety -- noting that he has already received e-mails threatening to "slaughter him like Al-Zarqawi" and accusing him of being a CIA agent -- and "expects" that coalition forces will handle his security, at least in the initial period. The Kuwaiti Ambassador-designate noted that, as a Kuwaiti diplomat, he is an attractive target to any number of extremists and, for this reason, he is unwilling to entrust his safety to the Iraqis. He said he is investigating the possibility of hand-selecting a group of Kuwaiti soldiers to serve as his security team and is also looking into the feasibility of employing a private security firm. Al-Mou'min further stated that he hopes (read: expects) that the USG will support his stay in Iraq by allowing him to travel between KUWAIT and Iraq and within Iraq on U.S. military aircraft and by allowing him access to U.S. Embassy facilities in the International Zone, including cafeteria, pool and gymnasium. The GOK, he stated, will pay for such services, which it views as small recompense for the extensive support KUWAIT has provided to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) over the years. (Note: The U.S. military has provided air transportation for Al-Mou'min on numerous trips to and within Iraq in his capacity as director of Kuwait's Humanitarian Operations Center during the post-Saddam era, but we have not received any official requests from the GOK concerning Al-Mou'min's future role in Iraq. End Note.) Borders and Debt Priority Issues -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador-designate said that after settling in, his priorities will be to work with the GOI to put to rest two percolating border issues and the issues of debt and compensation remaining from the 1990 invasion. Al-Mu'min expressed frustration over the border issues (one along the KUWAIT 00001007 002 OF 003 land border and one relating to the maritime demarcation line through the Khor Abdallah) which the GOK has long regarded as resolved. Concerning the first border issue, Al-Mou'min said the GOK has already provided funds through the UN Compensation Office to re-establish inside Iraq some 200 Iraqi families who are presently camped out on the Kuwaiti side of the border, but the Iraqis have failed to fulfill their end of the bargain. Al-Mou'min indicated that negotiations on the debt and recompensation issue will be difficult, but there is little leeway on the Kuwaiti side. The GOK, he noted, cannot legally forgive or reduce Iraqi debt without approval by the Parliament and such approval will not be forthcoming "for years" given the lingering anger many Kuwaitis feel towards Iraq. It is more than enough, Al-Mou'min suggested, that the GOK has refrained from pressing Iraq for immediate repayment of its debts. Al-Mou'min acknowledged that many Kuwaitis remain "phobic" about Iraq; the psychological wounds that were inflicted on Kuwait during seven months of brutal Iraqi occupation will take time to heal. Humanitarian Operations Center Winding Down -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to an issue close to his heart, Al-Mou'min regretted that the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) in Kuwait, which he has headed since it opened in early 2003, is running out of steam. During the HOC's early days, he noted, the Center benefitted from the particiption of some 18 energetic Coalition officers and good support from the GOK to fulfill its mandate of disbursing aid in Iraq and facilitating the treatment and evacuation of wounded Iraqi civilians. The HOC, Al-Mou'min proudly noted, had also facilitated a large number of highly successful workshops on issues ranging from medical treatment to civil affairs and human rights that included large numbers of Iraqis. With time and the turnover of personnel, Al-Mou'min said, GOK interest in the HOC has waned. While work on medical evacuations continues unimpeded, the Ministry of Interior has made it increasingly difficult for the HOC to include Iraqis in its workshops, ostensibly for reasons of security. Al-Mou'min said no successor has been named to replace him, and it is possible he will retain a role in the management of the HOC even after he takes up his post in Baghdad. It is also possible, he suggested, that the GOK will disband the HOC in the not-too-distant future. (Note: A viable HOC would play an important role in any sudden or large-scale movements out of Iraq because of its long experience in working with Iraqi counterparts on country issues and because of its capacity to facilitate visa issuance to Iraqis. End Note.) Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Al-Mou'min is a respected and engaging interlocutor who has done commendable work in his management of the HOC. As a prominent Kuwaiti Shia who has traveled frequently into Iraq in connection with his HOC activities, his contributions to bridge-building between KUWAIT and Iraq -- particularly between the two countries' Shia communities -- have been significant. He is, however, clearly taking up his posting in Baghdad with more than a little trepidation. He represents a country that realizes, at some level, that it is in its own interest to contribute to a stable and secure Iraq but which remains, at the same time, fearful and deeply suspicious of its northern neighbor. Al-Mou'min knows that he has a difficult road ahead. The effort to build lasting amicable ties between KUWAIT and Baghdad will require time, attention, and effort from both sides as well as a continuing helping hand from the coalition partners. It is in the USG interest to encourage Arab embassies to re-establish in Baghdad. While we have not yet received an official request from the GOK to facilitate Al-Mou'min's settling-in period in Iraq, it might be useful to consider what the parameters of such potential assistance might include. Meanwhile, we weill seek to clarify with the MFA here what arrangements have been made. End Comment. ********************************************* * For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s KUWAIT 00001007 003 OF 003 Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ ********************************************* * JONES