POLICY LEVEL TALKS WITH MALAYSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 000989 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS, PM E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2028 TAGS: MARR MOPS MASS PREL PGOV PTER MY SUBJECT: POLICY LEVEL TALKS WITH MALAYSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY Classified By: DCM Robert Rapson for reason 1.4 (B and D). SUMMARY AND COMMENT ¶1. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for South and Southeast Asia James Clad conducted policy-level talks with the Malaysian Ministry of Defense on October 30. The talks, led on the Malaysian side by Dr. Haji Ismail Haji Ahmad, Defense Ministry Undersecretary for Policy, saw discussion on five major topics: maritime security, U.S.-India engagement, the annual report on Chinese military power, regional security issues, and development of the Afghan National Police. Both sides viewed the talks positively and as an occasion to build upon our already good military-military ties by providing strategic level engagement. In both the policy-level talks and separate office calls with Defense officials (reported separately), DASD Clad took the opportunity to highlight the enduring U.S. interest in continued engagement with Southeast Asia regardless of the upcoming change in administration, an assurance which our Malaysian interlocutors appeared to deeply appreciate. DASD Clad invited the Malaysians to participate in follow-on talks in Washington in May 2009, and the Malaysians indicated their interest in continuing the talks. ¶2. (C) Comment: The Malaysian delegation participated enthusiastically in the talks and readily exchanged ideas. The Malaysian defense officials appeared interested in moving the bilateral defense relationship forward and viewed these talks as valuable, although their presentations did not go into much substantive depth. We do not read this as a lack of desire to participate in bilateral talks, but reflecting a Malaysian view that the policy talks were equally, if not more important for their symbolism. Post feels satisfied with the results of the visit and looks forward to continuing the defense policy talks with Malaysia. End Summary and Comment. MOVING FORWARD WITH STRATEGIC DEFENSE DIALOGUE ¶3. (C) DASD for South and Southeast Asia James Clad and a team consisting of LTC Larry Redmon (OSD Country Director for Malaysia),COL Robert Claypool (Joint Staff J5),Mr. Abe Denmark (OSD-China Team),Mr. Rodger Welch (JIATF-W J3), Professor Marvin Ott (National War College) and LTC Stephen Ma (PACOM J-5) conducted policy level talks with Malaysia,s Ministry of Defense on 30 October 2008. The policy talks concept followed discussions with Malaysian defense officials during the April 2008 visit by Assistant Secretary of Defense Shinn and DASD Clad, and the bilateral meeting between Secretary Gates and then-Defense Minister Najib Tun Razak at the 2008 Shangri-La Dialogue. In these encounters, both sides acknowledged the already good mil-mil relationship, yet wished to build upon and round out the defense relationship with a strategic dialogue. The resulting October talks, led on the Malaysian side by Dr. Haji Ismail Haji Ahmad, Defense Ministry Undersecretary for Policy Division, saw discussion on five major topics: maritime security, U.S.-India engagement, the annual U.S. report on Chinese military power, regional security issues, and development of the Afghan National Police. MARITIME SECURITY ¶4. (C) In light of the successful recent deployment of three Royal Malaysian Navy ships to the Gulf of Aden to aid in the recovery of two hijacked Malaysian-flagged commercial vessels, the OSD delegation sought to draw Malaysia out on possible future contributions to coalition maritime security efforts. Although no Malaysia contributions are planned for coalition efforts, Ismail indicated that Malaysia would consider any United Nations-sponsored maritime security effort. In addition, Ismail mentioned that the upcoming CARAT exercise with Pacific Command represented a good platform to develop better maritime security competency and offered that Malaysian Navy ships, with 2-3 months notice, could be made available to exercise in conjunction with visiting U.S. ships. (Comment: Pacific Fleet already seeks to incorporate passing exercises, or PASSEX, into ship visits. End Comment.) However, Ismail also commented that exercises were less beneficial to the RMN than money for more advanced equipment. Ismail noted significant anti-piracy results in the Straits of Malacca, largely due to high-tech equipment now used in the operational area. INDIA, CHINA AND REGIONAL ISSUES ¶5. (C) The U.S. team led discussions on the U.S.-India KUALA LUMP 00000989 002 OF 003 relationship and a report on China's military power, which were generally well received. Ismail noted that Malaysia maintains relatively broad military engagement with India through both a basic exercise program and through Indian training and maintenance for Malaysia's squadron of SU-30s. Malaysia expressed interest in participating in Exercise MALABAR, if invited by India. The Malaysians' response to the report on China's military power was low key, but they did indicate that China's behavior is often &unpredictable8 and noted the discrepancy between China's stated and actual military budget, along with the relative costs of labor and equipment as compared to both the U.S. and Malaysia. Ismail also reiterated that Malaysia's official position is to support China's "one China" policy. In sideline conversations, Dr. Ismail, LTG Salleh, and delegation member MG Ismail Ibrahim (Assistant Chief of Staff for Defense Planning) all used the phrase "we are being closely watched" when referring to China's profile on Malaysia's political horizon. Ismail described Malaysia as being in "a strategic predicament" with China, and both Salleh and Ismail provided two recent examples of "being watched" (monitored covertly by Chinese vessels, see separate reporting). ¶6. (C) Malaysia led the discussion on regional security issues, choosing to focus solely on the conflict in the southern Philippines. Ismail said the GoM has decided to withdraw all representation from the International Monitoring Team by the end of November, as their investment of approximately US $12 million and security personnel over four years has yielded negligible results towards a long-term solution to the conflict. (Comment: Remarks by other Malaysian officials have implied that Malaysia had not made a definitive decision to withdraw completely from the IMT. End Comment.) Malaysia remains optimistic, however, that the Philippines will eventually develop a longer term plan to address lingering territorial issues in the peace process. Under this topic, the U.S. team learned that the Malaysians had received a request from Sri Lanka for jungle warfare training from the Sri Lankan ambassador a few weeks earlier. The Malaysians saw this request * which is still being considered * as demonstrable evidence that the Colombo authorities see a military solution as the only way to eliminate the LTTE. Malaysia, they said, had become more concerned by the prospect that LTTE terrorism might eventually appeal to marginalized ethnic Tamil Malaysian youth. ¶7. (C) Malaysia received a brief, at their request, on the Afghan National PQice force development because they anticipate receiving a request from President Karzai to aid in police training. The U.S. team reviewed the progress to date on standing up the police force, current challenges and training needs. Despite indications at the Shangri-La Dialogue that Malaysia would consider providing such training, the Malaysian delegation evaded discussion on contributions to Afghanistan and offered no insights into any plans to train Afghan police forces. (Comment: We assess Malaysia as unlikely to make any such contributions in the near term, particularly inside Afghanistan. At the sidelines of the Gates/Najib meeting on June 1, the Malaysians said that any training for Afghanistan would need to occur inside Malaysia, at least initially. In the medium term, we believe Malaysia could consider offering some training in Malaysia for a limited number of Afghan personnel in response to an upcoming request from the Afghan government. End Comment.) FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES ¶8. (C) Aside from the aforementioned opportunities for further engagement related to maritime security (CARAT, PASSEXs) and Exercise MALABAR, the talks generated other potential areas for cooperation. Given that Malaysia has demonstrated a greater ability to deploy its forces overseas, Major General Dato Ismail, the Malaysian Armed Forces J5, believed that more developed higher-level information sharing with the U.S. would be beneficial. MG Ismail indicated a desire for submarine training with the U.S. as Malaysia fields two Scorpene submarines next year. DASD Clad encouraged Malaysia,s participation in next year's ASEAN Regional Forum Voluntary Demonstration of Response (VDR) disaster relief exercise in the Philippines. DASD Clad highlighted the utility of Malaysia developing and sharing its ideas on the South China Sea to encourage a common KUALA LUMP 00000989 003 OF 003 understanding of this contested region. DASD Clad invited the Malaysians to participate in follow-on talks in Washington in May 2009, and the Malaysians indicated their interest in continuing the talks. KEITH