GLOBAL HAWK, MALAYSIA AND NONPROLIFERATION GOALS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000884

SIPDIS

FOR EAP, PM AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2028
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS MY
SUBJECT: GLOBAL HAWK, MALAYSIA AND NONPROLIFERATION GOALS

REF: A. JAKARTA 1574

B. SINGAPORE 834

Classified By: Ambassador James R. Keith, reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (S) Summary: The potential U.S. sale of the Global Hawk
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to Singapore via a possible
exception or unilateral reclassification within the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) would -- absent MTCR
consensus -- negatively affect our engagement in Malaysia on
the critical issues of nonproliferation and export controls.
Malaysian leaders do not give us the benefit of the doubt
when we speak of nonproliferation, and our decision on the
potential sale of Global Hawk will have direct bearing on our
credibility. It is important for our priority goals in
Malaysia, and we believe in the greater region, that the U.S.
remains within the MTCR consensus, including on the issue of
UAVs and Global Hawk. To do otherwise could entail
considerable long term cost to our nonproliferation goals in
Malaysia, and harm U.S. efforts to attract Malaysia and other
countries to support robust, enduring global arms control and
nonproliferation regimes. End Summary.


2. (S) The potential U.S. sale of the Global Hawk UAV to
Singapore via a possible exception or unilateral
reclassification within the MTCR would -- absent MTCR
consensus -- significantly impact our foreign policy
objectives in Malaysia, not in terms of the Malaysia's likely
reaction to the sale itself, but because it would negatively
affect our engagement on the critical issues of
nonproliferation and export controls. On the
political-military side, there is clear potential for
Malaysia to launch into sharp rhetoric following the
announcement of a sale. Malaysian politicians will be
tempted to use the issue to raise concerns about the close
U.S.-Singapore security relationship and suspicions the
technology will be used to spy on Malaysia. In the end,
however, we expect Malaysia would accept such a sale as a
fait accompli, particularly if Malaysia is not able to argue
that Global Hawk portends violation of Malaysian airspace.
We do not anticipate the Malaysian military reacting in a way
that would undermine our bilateral defense relationship.


3. (S) The greater impact from the Global Hawk sale,
depending on how it is approached within the MTCR framework,
is tied intimately to our nonproliferation goals in Malaysia,
including our critical goal of frustrating Iran's current and
future use of Malaysia as a transshipment point. These goals
include our now five-year, interagency effort to convince
Malaysia to institute an export control regime, and to accept
and adhere to universal guidelines for control of nuclear and
missile-related exports. We have placed serious effort, up
to and including White House engagement, to urge adherence to
UN sanctions and controls over missile-related equipment and
technology here, especially regarding transhipments to Iran.
We have provided four years of U.S. technical assistance to
impart best practices for export controls, including for
drafting of a necessary legal framework. We also have begun
a dialogue with the National Labs about lending expertise
that can help Malaysia make the right decisions about best
non-proliferation practices if it decides to pursue peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. In short, there is a lot at stake
just in Malaysia, let alone in the rest of the region.


4. (S) Malaysian leaders do not give us the benefit of the
doubt when we speak of global and regional nonproliferation
objectives, and our decision on the potential sale of Global
Hawk will have direct bearing on our credibility. Malaysians
commonly are suspicious of U.S. motives with regard to
interpretation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
critical of our nuclear stockpile, and all to ready to allege
U.S. double-standards related to Israel. Likewise, until
proven otherwise, Malaysians assume that our objections to
Iran's nuclear activities reflect a U.S. ideological agenda
and our political designs in West Asia, not genuine
nonproliferation concerns. A unilateral reclassification of
Global Hawk as a Category II item within the MTCR or an
exception for Global Hawk absent MTCR consensus in order to
allow a sale to Singapore would reinforce strongly Malaysia's

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suspicions regarding U.S. motives behind our nonproliferation
agenda.


5. (S) If we are to succeed in pushing Malaysia and the
region toward adoption of universal guidelines for control of
nuclear and missile-related exports, we should avoid sending
the signal that universal guidelines or controls apply to
everyone else but not to us and our close friends. If
countries like Malaysia come to believe that our statements
of support for global standards that arise from institutions
ranging from MTCR to NPT to FATF only apply if we say they
do, as opposed to universally on all member states, we will
be giving away considerable ground in our effort to advance
both nonproliferation and export control aims.


6. (S) For these reasons, it is important for our priority
goals in Malaysia, and we believe in the greater region, that
the U.S. remains within the MTCR consensus, including on the
issue of UAVs and Global Hawk. To do otherwise could entail
considerable cost to our credibility and stature on an issue
of vital importance to our long-term security. We recognize
that there are important equities at stake in the potential
Global Hawk sale to Singapore. It is important to weigh
these carefully against the long-term costs to our
nonproliferation goals in Malaysia and the region, and the
negative impact on U.S. efforts to attract Malaysia and other
countries to support robust, enduring global arms control and
nonproliferation regimes.
KEITH