UMNO RESISTS POPULAR CALLS FOR REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 000609 SIPDIS FOR EAP AND INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2028 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON KDEM KJUS MY SUBJECT: UMNO RESISTS POPULAR CALLS FOR REFORM REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 604 - ABDULLAH CONFIRMS 2010 HANDOVER ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 588 - NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION ¶C. KUALA LUMPUR 575 - NAJIB FIGHTS BACK ¶D. KUALA LUMPUR 572 - NAJIB IMPLICATED IN MURDER ¶E. KUALA LUMPUR 570 - GOM DELIVERS PROTEST TO USG ¶F. KUALA LUMPUR 563 - ANWAR ON OFFENSIVE ¶G. KUALA LUMPUR 562 - NO ACTION ON LINGAM PROBE ¶H. KUALA LUMPUR 557 - ANWAR TAKES REFUGE ¶I. KUALA LUMPUR 536 - WILL SABAH DEFECT? ¶J. KUALA LUMPUR 160 - ELECTION SHOCK KUALA LUMP 00000609 001.5 OF 003 Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b and d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Malaysian electorate delivered a strong endorsement for change and a major set-back for Prime Minister Abdullah's United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and National Front (BN) coalition in the March elections, but UMNO thus far has resisted reform. The shocking election result in part represented a rejection of the incumbents' arrogance of 50 years in power, disappointment with lack of reforms, and disaffection with race-driven politics. Despite initial calls for reforms and Abdullah's rhetorical commitment, four months later UMNO elite politicking and fixation on maintaining state power have crowded out consideration of significant change. No reform wing in UMNO is identifiable; status quo interests have blocked meaningful rule-of-law measures; and democratic reform within UMNO itself is dead for now because this would risk defeat for the unpopular Abdullah in the UMNO elections. UMNO's inability thus far to set a reform course despite the broad popular demands for change sets the stage for political tension and some instability in the year ahead. Political tension could manifest itself through defections from UMNO and BN, emboldened challenges from Anwar Ibrahim and the Opposition, and sharper civil society protests. UMNO could fail to consolidate with its Chinese, Indian and East Malaysia partners, leaving BN an unstable coalition. In this medium-term environment, we will need to proceed carefully with U.S. priorities in areas such as economic reform and rule-of-law. In the long-term, popular demands for reform and increased political competition are likely to lead, through trial and error, to a stronger Malaysian democracy, but it will take time. End Summary. Lessons of March 8 -------------- ¶2. (C) The Malaysian electorate delivered a strong message for change on March 8 by denying UMNO and its National Front (BN) government a two-thirds parliamentary majority for only the second time in Malaysia's history, and for the first time giving control of five states, representing over half of the national economy, to the Opposition. The unexpected set-back saw Chinese and Indian voters defect en masse from BN, while a swing margin of Malays also shifted against the government. Only East Malaysians voted reflexively along past patterns. The shocking result represented in part a rejection of UMNO and BN's arrogance of power and corruption, disappointment with PM Abdullah's inability to enact reforms, and disaffection with old-style, race-driven politics. The disparate opposition parties, held together for once due to the the savvy and charismatic Anwar Ibrahim, received the full advantage of this voter discontent, and shattered the paradigm that only UMNO could form a multi-racial coalition. Malaysian voters demonstrated they had outgrown the 1950s political model that since Independence has perpetuated the attributes of a one-party state. UMNO Falls Back on Elite Politics -------------- ¶3. (C) Despite the shock of the March election, and initial calls for party and government reforms, four months later traditional UMNO elite politics and focus on maintaining state power have crowded out consideration of meaningful change. By the end of the first parliament session in late May, PM Abdullah and UMNO's deliberation of reform had faded as the party largely regained its composure in the face of Opposition threats to bring down the government. No reform wing in UMNO is identifiable, no model for positive UMNO evolution has emerged, and party discussion centers on KUALA LUMP 00000609 002.3 OF 003 individual leaders not institutions. Rather than seek a new foundation and consolidate its BN partners with positive actions, conservatives and opportunists have harked back to Malay chauvinism, while hardliners like Home Minister Syed Hamid have signaled they will use extensive state powers, including the latent threat of emergency measures such as the Internal Security Act, to keep UMNO in power. Money-politics and outright intimidation keep in check those who may waiver, including parties in East Malaysia that have no affinity toward BN, only pragmatic attachment, but are essential to the government's majority in Parliament. Reform Threatens Status Quo -------------- ¶4. (C) A status quo UMNO and bitter intra-party power struggles are antithetical to reform efforts. Rule-of-law measures threaten UMNO's critical patronage network, control mechanisms, and the personal welfare of many powerful figures, including PM Abdullah's immediate circle. A truly independent judiciary and Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) would pose future threats to Abdullah's family, to his anointed successor Najib, and many other senior leaders. Up against the status quo, Cabinet progressives like Zaid Ibrahim and Shabery Cheek are marginalized and PM Abdullah's modest judicial reforms have not reached Parliament. Democratic reform within the UMNO party is dead for now because an opening-up likely would spell defeat for the unpopular Abdullah in the December UMNO elections. Abdullah's July 10 announcement that he will hand-over power to DPM Najib in two years time highlights that UMNO remains set in undemocratic, top-down ways. Amidst calls for his resignation, Abdullah has justified his continuation in office as time he needs to pursue his reform agenda. The politically weakened Abdullah will continue to give rhetorical support to reform, back modest changes, and shelter some reformers in the Cabinet, but significant measures have poor short-term prospects. Dynamic Tension -------------- ¶5. (C) UMNO thus far has been unable to set a reform course, as a party and as a government, despite what we see as well established, broad popular demands for change dating back to at least Abdullah's first election in 2004; this sets the stage for dynamic political tension and some level of instability in the year ahead. Political tension could manifest itself in many ways. Within UMNO, it is unlikely to lead the grassroots to challenge party leadership, but could result in some senior figures breaking away (with Tengku Razaleigh and Muhyiddin as examples) and taking parts of the party with them. Popular demands for change are not synonymous with support for Anwar Ibrahim and the Opposition. That said, Anwar is attempting to ride the wave of dissatisfaction in order to topple the BN government without waiting for the next election. Public disappointment with lack of serious reforms could feed into more frequent public protests and defections of government MPs from BN component parties. Civil society organizations, such as the Bar Council, could position themselves as more vocal critics of government actions. Frustration with the government's direction could also produce alienation and accelerate emigration, particularly among the affluent and highly educated. (Contrary to the seminal experience of 1969, many of the disaffected now have choices.) The UMNO-led government could face continuing instability, rather than consolidation, as UMNO would find it difficult to reestablish solidarity with its badly injured Chinese and Indian components, and East Malaysian commitment to BN would remain tenuous. Dealing with Medium-Term Instability -------------- ¶6. (C) In conditions of underlying political tension and continued government instability in the medium-term, we will need to be aware of new risks and identify new openings to pursue U.S. interests, whether publicly or behind the scenes. Currently, Malaysian politicians have found us to be a convenient external scapegoat for economic problems and Opposition challenges. Our bilateral military and security relationships are generally protected from such treatment, but could attract more scrutiny if it becomes politically expedient for the domestic audience. In the economic realm, Malaysia could increasingly struggle with politically KUALA LUMP 00000609 003.3 OF 003 difficult decisions affecting, for example, Malay preferences and government transparency, which impact matters like a Free Trade Agreement and Malaysia's future competitiveness. U.S. interests in strengthening the rule-of-law have become at the same time more compelling and more politically sensitive. ¶7. (C) While tension and instability may persist in the medium term, we continue to assess that in the longer run popular demands for reform and increased political competition will create gradually more checks and balances in the system and therefore a stronger, more dynamic Malaysian democracy. This will take time and successful navigation, through trial and error. The odds are in favor of Malaysia on balance making the right decisions over time because the costs of erroneous judgments will be high. Malaysia will face a more sophisticated, demanding electorate and greater transparency at home, and sharper competition in the region no matter what UMNO does. KEITH