CHINESE DIPLOMATS COMMENT ON MALAYSIA RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000410 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS, EAP/CM, AND EAP/EP STATE PASS TO USTR FOR WEISEL AND BELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018 TAGS: PREL ETRD MARR CVIS CH MY SUBJECT: CHINESE DIPLOMATS COMMENT ON MALAYSIA RELATIONS Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES R. KEITH, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Malaysia-China bilateral economic relations are growing by leaps-and-bounds, with two way trade growing by over 16 percent last year to $37 billion. Senior-level official encounters have become frequent, especially with the growth of the ASEAN plus 3 and the establishment of the East Asia Summit. People-to-people exchanges have also mushroomed, with 689,283 Chinese tourists visiting Malaysia in 2007 (up 57.8% from 2006). Chinese Embassy officials nevertheless did not appear to be particularly well-informed about Malaysian domestic politics, and they described a bilateral relationship that continued to be burdened by Malay mistrust of the PRC. We gathered from our conversations that the Malaysians may seek the kind of "a la carte" relations with the PRC that they have with the U.S., in which they rigorously segment interests they perceive to have in common with us from those areas in which they don't and react very cautiously to the prospect of improving political relations across-the-board. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The DCM and Political Chief have recently had a number of conversations with Chinese Embassy DCM Gu Jingqi and his Political Counselor Chen Feng. DCM hosted both of them to lunch on April 9, during which they indicated that their bilateral political and military relations with Malaysia are not growing as quickly as their economic ties. On Malaysian Domestic Politics -------------- ¶3. (C) It does not appear that the Chinese Embassy has good Malaysian contacts on domestic political developments outside the Chinese community, despite the presence in the Embassy of several Bahasa speaking officers, including Gu himself. Gu admitted that he had gotten the March 8 election result completely wrong, predicting to his ministry that BN would win an absolute majority in Parliament. Gu repeatedly cited conversations he had had with Singapore Embassy officials on Malaysian domestic politics, as if they were final authorities on the subject, but also noting that they also got the election wrong. He reported that his embassy has no contacts with Anwar Ibrahim or any Malaysian opposition parties, adding that no one from his Embassy has ever visited the PAS-dominated state of Kelantan. He seemed to find comfort in the assertion that the Singaporeans had told him that they never visited Kelantan either. (NOTE: Singaporeans tell us that they visit the state often.) On China-Malaysia Defense Relations -------------- ¶4. (C) Gu evinced frustration with the slow pace of improvement in China-Malaysia defense relations. He declared that not much had happened since the two countries had concluded an agreement to increase military-to-military exchanges in 2006, with only "several" Chinese officers now attending the Malaysian Defense University. "Still," he explained, "all decisions about even small defense-related issues have to be made at very senior levels of the Malaysian government, and the mid-level Malaysian officers don't trust us just because we are Chinese." Gu said he thought the Malaysia-U.S. defense relationship was much stronger and volunteered that he was envious of the level of U.S. defense sales to Malaysia. China had so far sold the Malaysians almost nothing, he said. On the Chinese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur -------------- 5.(C) To our surprise, Gu made a face when DCM asked how Ambassador Cheng Yonghua was doing, and said only that Cheng's wife had recently visited him and that he had taken an extensive vacation for this reason. (NOTE: Cheng is a career Japan-hand who speaks excellent Japanese but poor English. We have seen him with an English-Chinese interpreter in tow at some diplomatic functions.) Gu said his Embassy had 30 diplomatic personnel, which is of medium size as Chinese embassies go. In a late-2007 conversation with PolCouns, Chinese PolCouns Chen Feng indicated that China is focused foremost on economics and trade. He mentioned substantial ethnic Chinese-Malaysian interest in investments in Guangdong province, due in part to family ties to the area. He noted healthy growth in bilateral trade, adding that Chinese participation in the second Penang bridge project represented one of China's largest overseas projects at this time. Chen was unaware of any Chinese interest in the proposed northern Malaysia pipeline and had little to say on the Malacca Straits. KUALA LUMP 00000410 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) The bilateral political agenda appeared secondary and there were not many openings to work on political issues, Chen said. In contrast to what Gu told us, Chen believed the Malaysian government's fears of Mainland China's links to ethnic Chinese-Malaysians appeared to have largely subsided as memories faded of the Communist insurgency in Malaysia. He pointed out last year's visit to China by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA, the dominant ethnic Chinese political party) president Ong Ka Ting as a positive sign of Malaysia's reduced concerns in this area. (Note: Reporting in a separate channel offers a different perspective. End Note.) ¶7. (C) Chen noted in passing that China and Malaysia had an issue with Chinese fishing vessels in disputed waters in the South China Sea, and that the Chinese Embassy had helped to release Chinese fishermen detained in East Malaysia. A senior official in Malaysia's Foreign Minister recently described the encroachment of Chinese fishing vessels as a greater problem, one that reflected Malaysian anxiety over China's excessive maritime claims. China approached Malaysia to enter into bilateral agreements for developing oil/gas blocks in the South China Sea, but Malaysia remained wary because it did not want to lend legitimacy to Chinese claims. People-to-People Relations -------------- ¶8. (C) The Chinese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur has one of the busiest consular sections among all of China's overseas posts, according to Chen, due to a high rate of visa issuances, but he did not have statistics on hand. Some 10,000 Chinese students currently study in Malaysia. Many of the students use Malaysia as a springboard to continue studies in the U.S., Australia or elsewhere. Only about 1,000 Malaysians study in China at this time, he said. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite growing economic and people-to-people ties, it appeared to us that the Chinese Embassy is somewhat frustrated with the pace of growth in the political and military spheres. Gu's remark that the ethnic Malay political elite still doesn't trust the Chinese rings true, especially in military affairs. Bio note: Gu Jingqi speaks good English, in addition to Bahasa, and, still in his thirties, describes himself in glowing terms as China's youngest DCM. He is self-confident, one might say brash, though a third country diplomatic colleague described him to DCM as "immature and way over the top." He once invited Perm Five counterparts to dinner and spent a good part of the evening urging the female Russian First Secretary to down another shot of white lightening. Waggish participants later agreed that she out-drank him. KEITH