OTHMAN CONFIRMS MALAYSIA'S STAGED IMT PULL-OUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000343 SIPDIS FOR EAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MOPS EAID KISL JA RP MY SUBJECT: OTHMAN CONFIRMS MALAYSIA'S STAGED IMT PULL-OUT FROM MINDANAO REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 94 - FEBRUARY PROXIMITY TALKS ¶B. MANILA 238 - ARROYO REVISES MILF PEACE PROPOSAL ¶C. KUALA LUMPUR 4 - AMBASSADOR MEETS DPM NAJIB Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Malaysian facilitator for the Philippines (GRP)/Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace talks Othman Abdul Razak, speaking with polchief April 28, confirmed Malaysia's decision to withdraw in stages from the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao beginning on/about May 10 and concluding in August. Malaysian Foreign Minister Rais Yatim made a premature public announcement of the pull-out decision before it was conveyed formally to the GRP. Malaysia took the decision in order to increase pressure on the GRP to reach a compromise with the MILF, and would reverse the decision if Manila re-engaged constructively in the talks. Othman, however, said the GRP response so far had been negative, and public talk in Manila of replacing Malaysia in the IMT with another country, like Indonesia, could hasten Malaysia's withdrawal. Malaysia has not decided to end its facilitation role, though it may come to that after the full IMT withdrawal. Othman stated that he increasingly believed President Arroyo and the GRP lacked the political will to reach a negotiated solution. The IMT made sense only as part of a peace process, not as a mechanism for perpetual cease-fire. Malaysia has pulled back from its IMT threats before, but this time it has set in motion a formal decision that will be more difficult to reverse. End Summary. Staged Withdrawal -------------- ¶2. (C) Othman, during an hour-long meeting with polchief on April 28, confirmed that Deputy Prime Minister Najib and the Malaysian Cabinet had decided to withdraw Malaysia's approximately 50 military personnel from the IMT. (Comment: Othman in theory reports to Prime Minister Abdullah, but he associated the decisions related to Mindanao to Najib, who as Defense Minister has appeared more active on the issue. End Comment.) This would be done in stages beginning on/about May 10 and concluding at the end of August (the end of the IMT's current mandate). Othman claimed the decision came on his advice that the GRP was not engaging in earnest in the peace process. Malaysia had threatened to withdraw from the IMT on several occasions, most recently after the aborted December 2007 round, but never carried through with the threat. With no traction in the talks since December, Malaysia's credibility was on the line. ¶3. (C) Othman explained the withdrawal would be in stages in order to give Manila opportunity to respond constructively, for example, by compromising on the major outstanding issue of ancestral domain (both territory and governance in a proposed Bangsamoro Judicial Entity). Malaysia retained the option of halting or reversing the withdrawal depending on Manila's actions. Othman said Malaysia had not decided to withdraw its facilitation role (Othman's function),but this also could end following the final IMT withdrawal in August. Foreign Minister Jumps the Gun -------------- ¶4. (C) Malaysia's new Foreign Minister Rais Yatim "mistakenly" announced the GOM's withdrawal decision to the press, before Malaysia had sent formal notification to the GRP. FM Rais "doesn't understand the situation and my role," Othman explained with some exasperation. The GOM, via the Foreign Ministry and the Armed Forces Commander, intended to convey the formal notification by May 2. Nevertheless, DPM Najib had informed two visiting GRP cabinet officials of the withdrawal during a recent meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Manila Responding Negatively -------------- ¶5. (C) While Malaysia stood ready to reverse the withdrawal decision, Othman said Manila's response thus far had been "negative." Othman had received no indication that the withdrawal decision was prompting GRP movement on the current negotiating impasse. Instead, GRP officials were speaking publicly about the replacing Malaysian troops with those of KUALA LUMP 00000343 002 OF 002 another country. Polchief noted that Indonesia had been mentioned in the press, and Othman reacted with some emotion that such talk by the GRP could precipitate a more rapid Malaysian pull-out. Further, he said that bringing in another country to participate in the IMT was not a unilateral GRP decision, but also needed the consent of the MILF. Othman added that GRP talk of negotiating directly was unrealistic as the MILF did not want direct talks without a third party facilitator. No Political Will -------------- ¶6. (C) Othman said that he was increasingly pessimistic regarding the GRP-MILF talks. Othman claimed that in February he had extracted more concessions out of the MILF on the ancestral domain. Manila, however, had taken the position that it must conduct a "legal review," not only of the ancestral domain issue, but of all previously negotiated points. Othman said he increasingly believed President Arroyo and the GRP did not have the political will necessary to conclude an agreement with the MILF and take the risks necessary to achieve peace, such as finding creative ways to circumvent constitutional barriers. He recounted a meeting with Arroyo earlier in the year in which the President remarked that "Mindanao would be someone else's problem in 2010," which Othman interpreted as a lack of commitment to reach a deal with the MILF during her administration. The IMT made sense only in the context of a peace process. However, Manila seemed to view the IMT as a mechanism to help enforce a perpetual cease-fire independent of negotiations. ¶7. (C) Othman commented that OIC efforts to resuscitate implementation of the 1996 accord between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) should proceed in parallel with the MILF talks. The two streams should compare notes after the conclusion of the MILF negotiations, not before. ¶8. (C) In response to Othman's points, Polchief stated that the U.S. remained committed to encouraging the GRP to complete its legal review of the ancestral domain proposal and to move forward with the MILF toward a signed initial document. Polchief also noted that all sides had recognized the IMT's contribution to lessening hostilities in Mindanao. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Othman no doubt intended his comments to influence as much as to inform, and he expressly hoped that the U.S. would add pressure on the GRP, particularly on the ancestral domain issue. Malaysia risks its regional influence and reputation if it is tagged with a failure in the MILF peace process, and ceding its role to Indonesia would be particularly galling, as Othman's reaction suggests. We do not know if Othman would attempt to use his MILF connections to frustrate alternative IMT or negotiating arrangements, but we would not rule that out. Malaysia has pulled back from its IMT threats before, but this time it has set in motion a formal decision that will be more difficult to reverse, and seemingly require some tangible movement in the talks. Foreign Minister Rais Yatim's gaff may have cost the Malaysians initial leverage out of the IMT decision. In any event, Othman left us with the impression that Malaysia's facilitation role as well as IMT participation could draw to a close in the coming months. KEITH