AI IN W. BENGAL SITREP 20 - APHIS ADVISOR VISITS BIRD FLU

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KOLKATA 000069 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT PLS PAS CDC -COX AND BLOUNT AND HHS-STEIGER AND HICKEY E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFLU EAGR TBIO SENV PREL PGOV AMED CASC IN BG SUBJECT: AI IN W. BENGAL SITREP 20 - APHIS ADVISOR VISITS BIRD FLU AFFECTED AREAS OF WEST BENGAL REF: KOLKATA 54 AND PREVIOUS KOLKATA 00000069 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: On February 13-15, USDA-APHIS Scientific and Technical Advisor for Emergency Management, Joseph Annelli and New Delhi Embassy Senior Attache for Agricultural Affairs, Oliver Flake visited a West Bengal district affected by the recent H5N1 outbreak. They also visited the India-Bangladesh border to assess the possibility of cross-border transmission of the virus. During their visit to Kolkata and adjoining districts, Annelli and Flake visited organized and backyard poultry farms, interacted with senior W. Bengal government officials, and met an FAO delegation also present in West Bengal. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On February 14, the US team visited Krishnagar town, in West Bengal's Nadia district, located about 75 miles north of Kolkata. The GOWB had declared eight administrative blocks in the area as affected by AI between January 19 and 22. The team first visited backyard poultry farms in the Krishnagar I administrative block, adjacent to the town. The Block first reported poultry deaths on January 16 and H5N1 outbreak was confirmed on January 19. Culling operation started January 20. Nadia completed culling 376,000 birds by January 28. The farms have now been disinfected and sealed, with the birds buried in isolated pits. The district administration has put up prominent notices over burial pits, imposing a five-year ban on use of the land. Senior district officials briefed the US team during the site visit. The team found no live birds within the affected areas. ¶3. (SBU) The US team then met with Nadia District Magistrate Omkar Singh Meena who was in charge of the district's response to the AI outbreak. Meena told the group that due to the AI outbreak in neighboring Bangladesh, the GOWB had alerted his office as early as July 2007 to the possibility of AI in W. Bengal. At that time, the GOWB held a two-day workshop for district magistrates in border districts and ordered them to activate the GOWB's AI response contingency plan. Meena told the US team that key personnel of his administration also received training and were familiar with the plan, although the lower-level functionaries had not been sensitized to the AI response program. Additionally, offices of small town officials were not well-equipped with sufficient infrastructure to enable them to access GOI's AI action plan electronically. ¶4. (SBU) When the outbreak was confirmed on January 19 (Saturday),Meena said he was able to mobilize about 800 people and obtain adequate funds within a 12-hour time period. Apart from trained personnel from Animal Resource and Health departments, volunteers came from panchayats (village councils), NGOs and political party workers across the political spectrum. The WB Land Reforms Department supplied detailed maps and helped demarcate boundaries. Meena also indicated that logistical supplies like disinfectants, tarpaulins were readily available, although there was a shortage of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in the first two days. ¶5. (SBU) Meena did note that there was a need to reassess the infrastructure with the GOWB to respond to a subsequent AI outbreak. Meena thought that the overall surveillance system should be made stronger, with GIS support. There was also a need for regional level laboratories for faster virus detection and response. Meena said that the GOWB was "in the dark" about where the infection came from and urged the "international community to take responsibility" of identifying the source of the infection. He remarked facetiously that the strain of H5N1 affecting W. Bengal was apparently an "intelligent" strain as it did not choose to cross the inter-state border to reach Bihar, Jharkhand or Assam. (Note: there have been reports of bird deaths in Assam, but test results came back negative for H5N1. End note.). Meena conveyed that his administration initially followed the state's disaster management plan to tackle the bird flu situation and were successfully able to control the outbreak. ¶6. (SBU) Annelli and Flake then traveled 20 miles east of Krishnagar Town to reach the India-Bangladesh border at Dattaphulia. The local commandant of Indian Border Security Force (BSF) briefed the visitors. The team then drove along the main border road and up to the border itself (cross border movement was not possible as these parts of the border are fenced with barbed wire and guarded by BSF personnel). However, along both sides of the road were banana plantations, which were KOLKATA 00000069 002.2 OF 002 deliberately planted to assist illegal cross-border cattle trade from India to Bangladesh. The team was informed that poultry movement from Bangladesh can possibly occur through this route. The Icchamati River, meandering in and out of Bangladesh, forms a natural border with India in some areas, however. The team observed ducks and poultry on the Bangladesh side (in areas also affected by AI) coming back and forth between the two countries. The team also saw backyard poultry farms in operation within 300 yards of the "no man's land" that exists on both sides of the official border. ¶7. (U) On February 15, Annelli and Flake drove about 65 miles northwest of Kolkata to Bardhaman to visit a large poultry farm owned by Arambagh Hatcheries Ltd (AHL). AHL is the largest poultry operation in West Bengal and has about 100 commercial farms that breed and rear chicken. AHL has facilities for a car tire bath, hand and shoe wash, disinfectant mist and vehicle spray before approaching the coops. The AHL facilities had better bio-security measures than backyard poultries. However, such operations are always at the mercy of backyard poultry operations as one single outbreak in the vicinity could be dangerous for their operation. AHL officials suggested to Annelli that the GOWB should ensure strict bio-security facilities and a vaccination regime for backyard poultries. ¶8. (U) The team also met with GOWB officials. First, they spoke with WB Health Department Secretary Rajendra Shukla. Shukla briefed the group on the spread of the disease using daily updated maps of affected areas and discussed GOWB testing procedures. He explained in depth that the GOWB was able to mobilize significant human resources in a short period of time, which was key to containing the spread of the disease. The team also met with WB ARD Secretary Dilip Chakravorty. Annelli suggested the possibility of a regional approach to combating AI, including Bangladesh, Burma, India, and China. When asked if the GOWB needed any assistance on AI, Chakravorty said that they did not need equipment, but there was a need for more awareness building and sensitivity training on AI. He acknowledged that Consulate officials had approached his department with an assistance proposal but he explained the department's inability to take an independent decision on this proposal as the central government has the final decision making authority. He said such assistance would have to be channeled via the GOI in New Delhi. ¶9. (U) While the US team was traveling through the affected areas, there were reports of poultry mortality from a farm in Umacharanpur village (Falakata administrative block) of Jalpaguri district in North Bengal. Media reported the death of 400-1,000 birds since February 12. A senior ARD official told post that samples from the farm have returned negative for H5N1. The official said with poultry trade banned in West Bengal till February 12, the owner could not sell chicken to buy poultry feed and that the birds died of starvation. JARDINE