MAOISTS SEEK TO EXPAND PRESENCE IN WEST BENGAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KOLKATA 000104 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PHUM PINR ASEC IN SUBJECT: MAOISTS SEEK TO EXPAND PRESENCE IN WEST BENGAL REF: A) 07 KOLKATA 345 B) 07 KOLKATA 340 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. On March 4 and 14, Econoff met separately with a journalist who reports on and interacts with Maoist insurgents, and the former GOWB Home Secretary, who was responsible for overall state security and for the state government's response to the Maoist threat. Both acknowledged that the Maoists have expanded their influence within West Bengal and discussed how the ultra-left Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) has entered urban areas and has leveraged political unrest and anti-government protests to further its growth in the state. The GWOB has failed to respond effectively to the Maoist threat and unless the GOWB begins to implement some counter-measures, the Maoists will expand their violent activities in rural areas and into urban centers in the near future. End Summary. -------------- Expanding Influence -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In an effort to better understand the Maoist situation in West Bengal, Econoff met separately with journalist Aloke Banerjee, who covers Maoist issues, and with former GOWB Home Secretary Prasad Ranjan Ray, who was responsible for security SIPDIS affairs in the state until last month. Both Banerjee and Ray agreed that the Maoist presence in West Bengal is growing. According to Banerjee, the Maoists are making inroads into urban areas with an interest in recruiting students and workers. Behind this shift is the implied benefit of concentrating the law enforcement focus on the cities, leaving the rural region open to for the Maoists to increase their presence in the villages, said Banerjee. Ray also highlighted the Maoists' increased focus on youth recruitment and their greater visibility in cities like Kolkata. (Note: In recent months, the media has reported an increase in Maoist propaganda appearing on walls in the city. On March 24, Kolkata's leading English daily, The Telegraph, reported the arrest of five women with suspected Maoist links for putting up posters "inciting people to wage war against the state." End Note.) Ray added that West Bengal provides financial resources, safe houses, and acts as a transit point for Maoists in the northeastern region (Note: In March 2004 Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) Politburo Member Mahon Baidya (aka Kiran) was arrested in northern West Bengal town of Siliguri. In November 2006 Baidya was released with fellow CPN-M Politburo Member C.P. Gajurel, also detained in WB's Jaipalguri prison, to support CPM Politburo Member Sitaram Yechury's diplomatic efforts in Nepal. End Note.) According to Ray, there is little actionable intelligence available on the plans and movements of Maoists before attacks occur and the GOWB is unsure of where the group has obtained funding and weapons. (Comment: Maoists have recently been obtaining many weapons by attacking more remote armories and police stations and obtain funds through extortion. End Comment.) ¶3. (SBU) Emphasizing that the principle of armed struggle and overthrow of the existing government is central to Maoist precepts, Banerjee explained that the Maoists have become interested in new methods through which to expand their influence in West Bengal. Maoist interest traditionally has been in anti-feudal movements aimed at fomenting dissent and struggle amongst India's landless rural workers and sharecroppers, according to Banerjee. However, the Maoists, who predominantly reside in the less developed, forested regions within states, are now experimenting with ways to introduce conflict in West Bengal outside of their normal areas of influence. ¶4. (SBU) One of the "experiments" Banerjee described was the Maoist incursion into Nandigram, West Bengal where land acquisition issues stirred up protests and violent clashes (reftels). According to Banerjee, who maintains contacts within the CPI-Maoist apparatus, the Maoists were interested in the potential to transform political resistance over land acquisition policy into armed agitation. Looking to Nandigram as a proving ground of their potential strength outside of the forest areas, the Maoists entered Nandigram for a short period of time and left by early November of last year. ¶5. (SBU) According to Banerjee, the Maoist evaluation of the Nandigram experience was positive and the group believes that it can operate outside of its traditional forest bases for a KOLKATA 00000104 002 OF 003 limited amount of time. The CPI-Maoists remain wary of paramilitary forces, however, which they believe are capable of pushing them out of areas like Nandigram. The Maoists may employ tactics used in Nandigram in other regions scheduled for development projects with similar environments of political protest, believes Banerjee. ¶6. (SBU) Echoing Banerjee's sentiments, former Home Secretary Ray acknowledged that the Maoist presence in West Bengal is a concern for the GOWB as a threat to security in the state. Ray differed with Banerjee on his prediction of future Maoist attacks, claiming that the Maoists were still at this point content to maintain a relatively low profile and avoid full-scale confrontations with government. Ray emphasized that the GOWB must address the issue through initiatives in the public sector in addition to law and order efforts. ¶7. (SBU) Ray refuted claims that Maoists were definitely present in Nandigram, and offered a nuanced view of the situation. He believed that some ultra-left groups were part of the struggle in Nandigram because they saw it as an opportunity to exploit the tense situation for political means. Ray was emphatic, however, that there was not a Maoist presence in the village, saying "I can tell you for sure that there are no hardcore Maoists in Nandigram." (Comment: Differing reports from government leaders, journalists and eyewitnesses on the presence of Maoists in Nandigram have played out extensively in the press. Ray's differing assessment from that of some senior CPM leaders may have played a part in his removal from the Home Secretary post. Regardless of the truth of the situation, SIPDIS ultimately any rumor or hint that the militant group has a presence and capacity to undermine governance in areas as sensitive as Nandigram will have some impact on the public impression of the group's relative strength. End Comment.) -------------- Targeting the Marxists -------------- ¶8. (SBU) As has been the case for some time, Ray explained that Maoists were continuing to target grassroots CPM party officials. The tactics appear to be working. Ray surmised that block level officials in West Bengal are now probably afraid of entering certain areas known for their Maoist presence, much as is the case in neighboring Jharkhand state. In addition to physical attacks on party workers, Ray said that he believes the Maoists have allied with legally recognized political parties in order to undermine the ruling CPM. ¶9. (SBU) Both Ray and Banerjee think that the Maoist's ultimate strategic goal is to wrest power from the CPM government, but Ray's impression is that the more immediate concern is to slowly but surely expand areas of Maoist influence in the state. Ray expects that violence in Maoist areas will increase during the run-up to May's village-level panchayat election as the group attempts to help allies gain toe-holds in local government. Ray did not anticipate a Maoist imposed boycott of the elections, which he took as further evidence that the Maoists have an interest in seeing the political process bring its allies into power. -------------- A Multi-Pronged Approach -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The GOWB recently conducted a survey of 1,400 villages and found that 900 of them had direct or marginal Maoist activity. Banerjee said the GOWB generally has been dismissive of the Maoist influence and movements in the state in the past. Ray acknowledged that the state government had been tardy in its response to the Maoists in West Bengal, but said that the bureaucracy and government officials were now committed to addressing the problem. The GOWB, acting an a tip, recently arrested CPI-Maoist state secretary Himadri Sen Ray (aka Soumen) last month on multiple murder charges. ¶11. (SBU) The GOWB is looking to tackle the problem not just with law enforcement, but also through public sector initiatives. According to Ray, the GOWB is trying to address the underlying problems that create the social breeding ground for Maoists in the state. Ray was emphatic that improvements in water, health, education, and employment must be made available KOLKATA 00000104 003 OF 003 to families living in areas susceptible to Maoist incursions and recruitment. However, these efforts to stabilize Maoist hotspots were not progressing as quickly as Ray would have liked. He also complained that recruitment of police and security forces in the Maoist impacted areas has been inadequate thus far. Of the four thousand new recruits last year, only three hundred were from the Maoist identified areas. He worried that the current plans for security during the upcoming May local panchayat elections were inadequate. According to Ray, there will not be enough security forces to monitor election sites if the polls are held during a three-day period as currently planned and he thought rather that if the polls were over four days, adequate security could be provided. ¶12. (SBU) Though there have been recent indications that cooperation is improving, inter-state coordination against the Maoists generally has been limited. In fact, Ray pointed out that the Maoists have not presented as great a threat to governance in West Bengal as they have in Chhattisgarh. However, Ray was relatively sanguine about the impact joint security efforts with other states could have, and believed that the GOWB will attempt to address the problem with other states in a more coordinated manner. ¶13. (SBU) Comment: Getting GOWB officials to discuss the Maoist problem is generally a difficult proposition. Although it's tempting to conclude that officials are close-lipped on security grounds, what becomes apparent is that for a number of reasons the GOWB really has little handle on the Maoist problem. First, the manpower to sufficiently investigate, identify, and conduct operations against Maoists is lacking. Second, the police, are often afraid to enter Maoist-dominated territories and the Maoists know this, giving them tremendous influence in underdeveloped areas of the state. So far, the GOWB appears content to let the Maoists operate in rural areas. But as Nandigram-like confrontations over land acquisition make headlines and increasing signs of Maoist urban presence continue, the GOWB may not have the luxury to ignore the problem in the near future. JARDINE