NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS CRISIS PLAN TO DEAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KINSHASA 000973 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS CRISIS PLAN TO DEAL WITH CRISIS IN COUNTRY'S EASTERN REGION ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The National Assembly adopted on October 28 a non-binding plan for the DRC to deal with the crisis in eastern DRC. (Note: An unofficial embassy translation of the plan begins at para. 9. End note.) The plan proposes alternatives for political, military, and diplomatic dialogue between GDRC, CNDP, Rwanda and regional and international partners. The plan suggests direct negotiations between the GDRC and CNDP (level undetermined), heretofore a redline for President Joseph Kabila. The deployment of a multinational deterrent force to North Kivu under UN mandate is recommended in the plan, as is continued DRC security sector reform. The Assembly plan calls for a renewed effort at regional economic cooperation and international monitoring of illegal mineral exports to choke off financing for armed groups. The plan represents an important forward step in the evolution of the Assembly as an institution to be reckoned with. Also, the plan may represent political cover for the GDRC to open discrete direct negotiations with Nkunda without sacrificing ground to hawks in Kabila's inner circle. End summary. ¶2. (U) The National Assembly, meeting in a special plenary session October 28, adopted a non-binding proposal to resolve the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The crisis "exit plan" was conceived by the Executive Bureau of the Assembly as a continuum of the peace processes started in Lusaka, Pretoria, Luanda, and Sun City. The plan places an emphasis on political and diplomatic dialogue, but incorporates military and economic considerations as well. ¶3. (U) The plan, after recounting the current positions of the GDRC and dissident general Laurent Nkunda's CNDP and noting the urgent need for action, proposes direct political and military dialogue between the GDRC and CNDP. In exhorting the CNDP to honor its Amani Program commitments and follow the MONUC disengagement plan, the plan also calls for direct negotiations between the FARDC and CNDP via a MONUC-led Joint Military Committee. The military dialogue would occur outside of the Amani framework, which the Assembly labels as "too bureaucratic." ¶4. (U) The plan proposes a political dialogue incorporating the GDRC, CNDP, armed groups, local North Kivu community leaders, and civil society. The goal would be a signed agreement, possibly at the AU in Addis Ababa or another suitable location, with the support of the GDRC, rotational presidency of AU, AU Commission Chair, UN, and EU. The terms of the dialogue would be defined by a preparatory committee representing all the participants. ¶5. (U) In addition to direct political dialogue between the CDRC and CNDP, the proposal calls for a renewal of diplomatic dialogue between GDRC and Rwanda. The pathway to the restored relations would include a review of the process initiated by the Nairobi Communique, reactivation of the Mobutu-era regional economic forum (CEPGL - "Communaute economique des pays des grand lacs" in French), DRC-Rwanda ministerial-level meetings, and a series of regional and international partner summits preceding a DRC-Rwanda head of state summit publicly announcing a program to resume diplomatic relations. ¶6. (U) The Assembly also endorsed the deployment, under UNSC mandate, of a multinational intervention force of the type utilized in 2003 during the Operation Artemis in Ituri District. The purpose of the force would be to deter refractory armed groups and the force would be led by the UN with support from the EU, AU, SADC, and U.S. The plan cites progress towards peace as providing a window for the reform of the FARDC, which must prioritize the recruitment of competent, new soldiers and draw upon the institutional knowledge of highly trained ex-FAZ ("Forces armees Zairoises" in French) officers. ¶7. (U) The plan identifies three areas of economic focus to assist in resolving the crisis: the need for emergency economic programs as presented in the Amani Program; the re-launching of CEPGL initiatives and other regional economic projects; and the application of illegal mineral export (coltane, cassiterite, and gold) monitoring measures by the international community. The plan notes the material and economic benefit that armed groups derive from illegal exports and the need to monitor airport transit points in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Kenya. The plan references the precedent of the UNSC sponsored monitoring measures applied in Sierra Leone to counter the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) trade in conflict diamonds. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: The genesis of the plan by the National Assembly represents a forward step in the continuing evolution of the institution and its relationship with the Presidency. National Assembly president Vital Kamerhe of North Kivu is heavily invested KINSHASA 00000973 002 OF 005 politically in the Amani process as a member of the Wise Men's Committee ("Comite des sages" in French) during the Goma Conference; his political interest in spearheading functional alternatives to the crisis cannot be discounted. The statement by the newly confirmed GDRC government November 3 rejecting direct talks with Nkunda, which was criticized by several North Kivu deputies, would appear to signal a partial rejection of the Assembly plan. However, and perhaps more likely, it may represent the creation of political cover for the GDRC to open discrete direct negotiations with Nkunda without sacrificing ground to hawks in the Kabila circle. End Comment. ¶9. (U) Unofficial embassy translation of exit plan follows. Begin unofficial embassy translation: Democratic Republic of Congo National Assembly EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CRISIS EXIT PLAN ADOPTED AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF WEDNESDAY 29 OCTOBER 2008 October 2008 EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CRISIS EXIT PLAN INTRODUCTION In light of the events that our population in the East of the country are currently living, it can be said, one the one hand, that history repeats itself, and on the other, that they represent the last obstacle in a long process that began in Victoria Falls on 8 August 1998, went through the Lusaka, Pretoria, Luanda, and Sun City Agreements, up to the elections. In either case, there is no need to be pessimistic or defeatist. Problems in North Kivu are not much more complex than those that were seen at other times in Boende, Lisala, Kabinda and Kabalo, when the plans being implemented were called the Kampala Disengagement Plan and the Sub-plans of Harare. As those of the past, the current problem can also be untangled through political and diplomatic dialogue. Thus, in its plenary session of this Wednesday 29 October 2008, devoted exclusively to the crisis in the East, the National Assembly has just adopted the present Crisis Exit Plan. ¶A. PLAN SPECIFICS ¶I. Emergency humanitarian plan The situation on the ground has degraded badly these last few days, causing a veritable humanitarian catastrophe. This calls for a general mobilization on both national and international levels. Available statistics indicate that at least 50 children die each day in camps for displaced persons, not counting adults, especially pregnant women and the elderly, who perish from lack of basic medical care. Others, especially children, die from lack of food and potable water. This picture takes on apocalyptic tones when we receive information describing attacks on camps where people displaced by war were assembled, i.e. defenseless civilians, who are now dispersed in the bush and in the forest, at the mercy of all sorts of diseases, wild animals, weather, and are thus exposed to unimaginable violence and suffering. This is genocide in all but name. We will never say it loud enough: in North Kivu, there are nearly two million internally displaced people who are without assistance right now. This situation is five times worse than Darfur! In this context, the question to be asked is how many displaced people, how many deaths, in short, how many casualties will it take to turn the International Community's attention to the tragedy that is taking place today in North Kivu, in Ituri, Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele? A large-scale humanitarian plan is now more urgent than ever. II. Background on the Government and CNDP Positions ¶1. CNDP Position -- direct negotiations with the Government outside the AMANI Program and outside the country. KINSHASA 00000973 003 OF 005 ¶2. DRC Government Position -- the CNDP must unconditionally implement the resolutions of the Goma Conference which include a statement of commitment to which it freely subscribed; -- the AMANI Program remains the only framework for discussion and for resolving the conflict in North Kivu; -- no direct political negotiations between the Government and the CNDP; -- the CNDP must adopt the disengagement plan and apply it scrupulously. ¶3. Compromise Positions Here, the objective is to bring both camps toward a median position so that there is no clear winner and loser. This position requires, therefore, concessions on both parts. a. Concessions of both parties -- Concession on the part of CNDP: Return to the AMANI Program; Adopt the disengagement plan. -- Concession on the part of the Government: On the one hand, accept military and political dialogue with the CNDP, and on the other hand, accept diplomatic dialogue with Rwanda. III. Military Dialogue Discussion between the FARDC and CNDP Operations Commanders in the presence of MONUC, with a view to: -- obtain a cease-fire; -- explore all possible modalities to make the disengagement effective; -- set up joint verification mechanisms. Note: Keeping in mind the experience of the Kampala Disengagement Plan, a permanent military dialogue should be maintained in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. To do this, a Joint Military Commission (JMC) shall be established, chaired by MONUC and the two Operations Commanders from the FARDC and CNDP. This formula has the advantage of being at the same time effective and pragmatic, and to restrict the problem to a strictly military context, thus removing it from the AMANI Program which has become too bureaucratic. It also offers more guarantees to the parties in conflict. To be clear, the Joint Military Commission that will arise from this dialogue will set up a realistic calendar to which all parties will commit to accept. IV. Political Dialogue -- Examine the CNDP's list of grievances -- The location will be determined according to constraints of the moment, and, if not held in DRC, this dialogue may be held in Addis Ababa, seat of the African Union, or in Dar Es Salaam, this year's Chair of the African Union; -- In addition to the Government and the CNDP, these talks will include the participation of delegates of armed groups of various axes, as well as representatives of grassroots communities and civil society; -- A political compromise shall be adopted and signed by these representatives in the presence of the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the then-President of the African Union, the President of the African Union Commission, and representatives of the United Nations and the European Union; -- A Joint Preparatory Committee will be set up to prepare and elaborate the terms of reference of this dialogue. ¶V. Diplomatic Dialogue KINSHASA 00000973 004 OF 005 -- Evaluate the Nairobi Process; -- Launch the CEPGL by designating three representatives for the DRC, in accordance with the Goma Conference; -- Begin the process to normalize diplomatic relations with Rwanda, following the steps below: ¶1. Symbolic restitution of the Rwandan Embassy building, located on Avenue de la Justice, currently occupied by squatters; ¶2. Meeting between the two Foreign Affairs Ministers, which shall end with a simple statement of intent to normalize diplomatic relations; ¶3. Quadripartite meeting in the presence of delegates from the United States and the European Union, between the DRC, Rwanda, the United Nations and the African Union, to explore mechanisms to reinforce the Nairobi Plan as achieved by operation Kimia; ¶4. Preparatory meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers for a Mini-Summit of the DRC and Rwandan Heads of State; ¶5. Mini-summit of the Presidents of DRC and Rwanda, facilitated by the African Union or the United Nations Secretary General; ¶6. As the outcome of this Summit, a solemn statement shall be published announcing a program to reestablish diplomatic relations. VI. Deploying an Artemis-type intervention force Guaranteeing the success of the military, political and diplomatic dialogues will require a strong commitment of the International Community, headed by the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the SADC and the United States of America. We think that adopting a Security Council Resolution creating Artemis-type special force in the East will constitute a dissuasive challenge to the persistent groups in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces in particular, and in the Great Lakes region in general. VI. Economic Development To maximize the plan's chances of success, the poverty that underlies the violence in the Sub-Region must be addressed. Thus, concomitantly with the military, political and diplomatic work, the rapid launching of development projects to use the manpower that will be made available by demobilization is essential. On this topic, the Goma Conference had elaborated an Emergency Development Plan taking into account the need to establish a healthy economy completely under the control of the state. VII. Restart of CEPGL In the same order of ideas, wishing to consolidate the peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region, it will be necessary to restart economic projects of common interest. The projects to be restarted include: a. BDGEL; b. exploitation of methane gas (SOCIGAZ); c. construction of Ruzizi III; d. roads and telecommunications. IX. Measures to control the illicit exploitation and commercialization of coltan, cassiterite and gold It has been established that the ex-FAR Interahamwe and all armed groups obtain supplies, among other things, from the illicit exploitation of cassiterite, coltan and gold. Therefore, measures to control and certify these materials are essential. The International Community will have to establish surveillance posts in export areas of DRC airports, and transit areas in Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya airports. This is nothing new, for the Security Council had at one time taken analogous measures against "blood diamonds" in Sierra Leone to cut off RUF rebel supplies. To make this measure successful, the Federation of Congo Businesses and other employer organizations of the transit countries mentioned above will have to be involved, by making their affiliates aware of the evils of this illicit precious metals "blood" trade, under KINSHASA 00000973 005 OF 005 penalty of prosecution and severe sanctions. The International Community, however, with disconcerting complacency, takes into account import statistics of these countries. Great works will also have to be carried out in Ituri, Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele to eliminate all the demobilized combatants currently roving in these areas. ¶X. National Army Reform Applying the peace plan will thus allow the State seriously to work on the meteoric rise of a professional and dissuasive Army capable of protecting the lives and goods of people living on Congolese territory. This vast reform of the Army will focus on recruiting young soldiers according to criteria such as physical aptitude, civic values and patriotism. Officers trained in military schools of higher education, who served in the national army in the Zaire era, and are currently inactive (commonly called ex-FAZ),will also be called upon. Peace, or at least a similarly intervening respite, is essential to the in-depth reform of the Army. Kinshasa, October 29, 2008 Vital KAMERHE End unofficial embassy translation. BROCK