(C) AZARIAS RUBERWA ON GOMA, AMANI,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000928

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS CG
SUBJECT: (C) AZARIAS RUBERWA ON GOMA, AMANI,
RWANDAN-CONGOLESE RELATIONS, AND ALLEGED GDRC TARGETING OF
TUTSI OFFICIALS

Classified By: Charges d'Affaires a.i. Samuel Brock for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Former Vice-President and current Chairman
of the Congolese Rally for Democracy party (RCD --
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie) Azarias Ruberwa
told emboffs that, while the Goma Accords contained a solid
basis for a lasting political settlement, implementation had
been virtually non-existent, leading to a resumption of
hostilities. The GDRC and CNDP were caught in a vicious
circle with the CNDP expecting the FARDC to move first on
encouraging repatriation and demonstrating resolve to combat
the FDLR, while the FARDC wanted the CNDP to first show good
faith through demobilization and integration. Rwanda,
according to Ruberwa, would not intervene in the DRC, because
it realizes it would further destabilize its border region
and the international community would condemn its actions.
The USG, in Ruberwa's view, was the only actor with
sufficient standing in Kigali and Kinshasa necessary to
unblock deteriorating Rwandan-DRC relations. Ruberwa warned
that there was a "campaign of hate" being waged against the
Tutsi community in the DRC. Ruberwa claimed that two
prominent Tutsi generals were questioned, then released, by
the security services October 17, accused of "plotting
something" with Ruberwa. End Summary.

Implementation of Goma Accords Has Failed
--------------


2. (C) PolCouns and POLOFF met on October 21 with former
Vice-President and current Chairman of the Congolese Rally
for Democracy party (RCD -- Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Democratie) Azarias Ruberwa. Ruberwa said that he had become
very concerned by the on-going fighting in the East and the
lack of will to find a political solution. The Goma Accords,
in Ruberwa's view, had laid the foundation to address the
root causes of the conflict. The accords dealt with the most
important issues: amnesty; demobilization of armed groups;
integration of armed groups into the national army; return of
refugees; and combating the FDLR. However, while the accords
had been sufficient to stop the fighting in January, the
resolutions had not been implemented. Moreover, the
cease-fire had dragged on without any real movement on
disengagement. This only ensured that hostilities would
resume.


3. (C) Ruberwa noted that the Amnesty Law was held up in the
Senate, raising questions of the GDRC's real commitment to
the concept. The law was also problematic because it allowed
for reversing the amnesty, if the individual subsequently
committed an offense. As for demobilization, integration,
repatriation, and combating the FDLR, Ruberwa maintained that
President Kabila and CNDP rebel leader Nkunda were in a
vicious circle. Kabila was waiting for Nkunda to first move
on demobilization and integration, while Nkunda expected
Kabila to move first on repatriation of Rwandans and
addressing the FDLR problem. Ruberwa said that he had
recently advised SRSG Doss that some sort of package needed
to be developed that would enable simultaneous, symmetrical
movement in all areas.


4. (C) Ruberwa emphasized that the Amani framework remains
the best chance for a political settlement. However, maybe
it should be a "lighter" version, i.e., with issues such as
economic development removed and perhaps with a revamped
commission without GDRC representative Etumba. It would be
important to keep Malumalu as the driver behind the process.

Rwandan-DRC Relations: Only the USG Can Unblock the Impasse
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Ruberwa noted that DRC-Rwandan relations were at an
impasse, as Rwanda accused the FARDC of fighting alongside
the FDLR, while the GDRC pointed to Rwanda's alleged support
of the CNDP. Ruberwa said that the situation today was
dramatically different from the situation in 1996 and 1998
when Rwanda intervened in the DRC. First, in 1996 and 1998,
Rwanda was fighting against "illegitimate and unelected"
Congolese governments, as opposed to Nkunda's battle with
Kinshasa today. Second, in Ruberwa's view, Rwanda does not
want more instability on its border. Finally, it fully
understands that the international community would strongly
criticize any Rwandan intervention in the DRC.


6. (C) Ruberwa thanked the USG for its involvement in the

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Nairobi Process, particularly its participation in the
Tripartite Plus framework. Ruberwa lamented the lack of
diplomatic relations between Kigali and Kinshasa, as well as
the lack of contact at the heads of state level. MONUC,
according to Ruberwa, is trying to facilitate improved
relations between the GDRC and GOR, but "MONUC cannot replace
the USG." The U.S. is the only country with sufficient
influence and respect in Kinshasa and Kigali able to unblock
the impasse.

Tutsi Generals in Kinshasa Questioned by Security Service
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Ruberwa said that there was a "campaign of hate"
being waged against the Tutsi community throughout the DRC,
including in Kinshasa. The media, when it employs phrases
such as "the enemy is not far away" and "the enemy is in
Kinshasa," is clearly referring to Tutsis and the RCD.
Ruberwa said that he could not exclude problems developing.
The USG should urge the GDRC to turn down the rhetoric.


8. (C) Ruberwa claimed that on October 24 National Security
Advisor Kaumba and senior intelligence officials (ANR)
detained and questioned two senior Congolese Tutsi generals,
General Malik Kjege and General Charles Bisengimana, one of
Police Inspector General John Numbi's deputies. According to
Ruberwa, the GDRC security officials accused Kjege and
Bisengimana of conspiring with Ruberwa on "some kind of
plot." Ruberwa denied the charges, maintaining that he had
not had any recent contacts with either general. According
to Ruberwa, he had protested the incident to MONUC, but has
not received a satisfactory response. Ruberwa opined that,
if the CNDP found about this incident, it would certainly
claim that "not even generals of Tutsi ethnicity were safe in
the DRC."


9. (C) Comment: While he is an interesting and savvy
interlocutor, Ruberwa does carry significant baggage from the
1998 war when he was essentially a Rwandan surrogate and his
later period as Vice-President in the unelected transition
government. A Banyamulenge (South Kivu Tutsi),he frequently
harps on the anti-Tutsi theme. His implied claims of a
government-led anti-Tutsi campaign appear somewhat
exaggerated, but ethnic tensions are indeed on the increase
as the war in the east drags on. End comment.
BROCK