(C) AZARIAS RUBERWA ON GOMA, AMANI,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000928 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS CG SUBJECT: (C) AZARIAS RUBERWA ON GOMA, AMANI, RWANDAN-CONGOLESE RELATIONS, AND ALLEGED GDRC TARGETING OF TUTSI OFFICIALS Classified By: Charges d'Affaires a.i. Samuel Brock for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Former Vice-President and current Chairman of the Congolese Rally for Democracy party (RCD -- Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie) Azarias Ruberwa told emboffs that, while the Goma Accords contained a solid basis for a lasting political settlement, implementation had been virtually non-existent, leading to a resumption of hostilities. The GDRC and CNDP were caught in a vicious circle with the CNDP expecting the FARDC to move first on encouraging repatriation and demonstrating resolve to combat the FDLR, while the FARDC wanted the CNDP to first show good faith through demobilization and integration. Rwanda, according to Ruberwa, would not intervene in the DRC, because it realizes it would further destabilize its border region and the international community would condemn its actions. The USG, in Ruberwa's view, was the only actor with sufficient standing in Kigali and Kinshasa necessary to unblock deteriorating Rwandan-DRC relations. Ruberwa warned that there was a "campaign of hate" being waged against the Tutsi community in the DRC. Ruberwa claimed that two prominent Tutsi generals were questioned, then released, by the security services October 17, accused of "plotting something" with Ruberwa. End Summary. Implementation of Goma Accords Has Failed -------------- ¶2. (C) PolCouns and POLOFF met on October 21 with former Vice-President and current Chairman of the Congolese Rally for Democracy party (RCD -- Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie) Azarias Ruberwa. Ruberwa said that he had become very concerned by the on-going fighting in the East and the lack of will to find a political solution. The Goma Accords, in Ruberwa's view, had laid the foundation to address the root causes of the conflict. The accords dealt with the most important issues: amnesty; demobilization of armed groups; integration of armed groups into the national army; return of refugees; and combating the FDLR. However, while the accords had been sufficient to stop the fighting in January, the resolutions had not been implemented. Moreover, the cease-fire had dragged on without any real movement on disengagement. This only ensured that hostilities would resume. ¶3. (C) Ruberwa noted that the Amnesty Law was held up in the Senate, raising questions of the GDRC's real commitment to the concept. The law was also problematic because it allowed for reversing the amnesty, if the individual subsequently committed an offense. As for demobilization, integration, repatriation, and combating the FDLR, Ruberwa maintained that President Kabila and CNDP rebel leader Nkunda were in a vicious circle. Kabila was waiting for Nkunda to first move on demobilization and integration, while Nkunda expected Kabila to move first on repatriation of Rwandans and addressing the FDLR problem. Ruberwa said that he had recently advised SRSG Doss that some sort of package needed to be developed that would enable simultaneous, symmetrical movement in all areas. ¶4. (C) Ruberwa emphasized that the Amani framework remains the best chance for a political settlement. However, maybe it should be a "lighter" version, i.e., with issues such as economic development removed and perhaps with a revamped commission without GDRC representative Etumba. It would be important to keep Malumalu as the driver behind the process. Rwandan-DRC Relations: Only the USG Can Unblock the Impasse -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Ruberwa noted that DRC-Rwandan relations were at an impasse, as Rwanda accused the FARDC of fighting alongside the FDLR, while the GDRC pointed to Rwanda's alleged support of the CNDP. Ruberwa said that the situation today was dramatically different from the situation in 1996 and 1998 when Rwanda intervened in the DRC. First, in 1996 and 1998, Rwanda was fighting against "illegitimate and unelected" Congolese governments, as opposed to Nkunda's battle with Kinshasa today. Second, in Ruberwa's view, Rwanda does not want more instability on its border. Finally, it fully understands that the international community would strongly criticize any Rwandan intervention in the DRC. ¶6. (C) Ruberwa thanked the USG for its involvement in the KINSHASA 00000928 002 OF 002 Nairobi Process, particularly its participation in the Tripartite Plus framework. Ruberwa lamented the lack of diplomatic relations between Kigali and Kinshasa, as well as the lack of contact at the heads of state level. MONUC, according to Ruberwa, is trying to facilitate improved relations between the GDRC and GOR, but "MONUC cannot replace the USG." The U.S. is the only country with sufficient influence and respect in Kinshasa and Kigali able to unblock the impasse. Tutsi Generals in Kinshasa Questioned by Security Service -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ruberwa said that there was a "campaign of hate" being waged against the Tutsi community throughout the DRC, including in Kinshasa. The media, when it employs phrases such as "the enemy is not far away" and "the enemy is in Kinshasa," is clearly referring to Tutsis and the RCD. Ruberwa said that he could not exclude problems developing. The USG should urge the GDRC to turn down the rhetoric. ¶8. (C) Ruberwa claimed that on October 24 National Security Advisor Kaumba and senior intelligence officials (ANR) detained and questioned two senior Congolese Tutsi generals, General Malik Kjege and General Charles Bisengimana, one of Police Inspector General John Numbi's deputies. According to Ruberwa, the GDRC security officials accused Kjege and Bisengimana of conspiring with Ruberwa on "some kind of plot." Ruberwa denied the charges, maintaining that he had not had any recent contacts with either general. According to Ruberwa, he had protested the incident to MONUC, but has not received a satisfactory response. Ruberwa opined that, if the CNDP found about this incident, it would certainly claim that "not even generals of Tutsi ethnicity were safe in the DRC." ¶9. (C) Comment: While he is an interesting and savvy interlocutor, Ruberwa does carry significant baggage from the 1998 war when he was essentially a Rwandan surrogate and his later period as Vice-President in the unelected transition government. A Banyamulenge (South Kivu Tutsi),he frequently harps on the anti-Tutsi theme. His implied claims of a government-led anti-Tutsi campaign appear somewhat exaggerated, but ethnic tensions are indeed on the increase as the war in the east drags on. End comment. BROCK