GOMA NOTES OCTOBER 17: NORTH KIVU PROVINCIAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000901 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES OCTOBER 17: NORTH KIVU PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT ON DEFECTIONS TO CNDP; ALLEGATIONS OF TUTSI HARRASSMENT ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Goma poloff spoke with the North Kivu Provincial Assembly President, Leon Bariyanga, and two colleagues to discuss recent governmental defections to the CNDP, alleged harassment of Tutsis, and general security in North Kivu. They complained that the CNDP problem was inhibiting all efforts to deal with the more serious issue of the FDLR. He acknowledged recent defections of two members of the provincial assembly to the CNDP, but minimized the effect this would have on the assembly. They also downplayed the level of ethnic targeting against Tutsis, but acknowledged that the situation should be monitored closely. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Goma poloff met October 16 with Leon Bariyanga, President of the Provincial Assembly of North Kivu; Jean Baumbilia, Assembly Vice-President; and two assembly members, Kayisavera Mbake and Gilbert Kalinda. (Note: Embassy Kinshasa nominated Bariyanga for the 2009 African Regional Transparency and Good Governance IVP and Kalinda participated in the 2008 July-August Provincial Legislator IVP. End Note) Defections to CNDP -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Bariyanga said that he had heard that two deputies (one RCD and one MLC) had defected to the CNDP. However, he noted that, because the assembly was currently in recess, this could not be confirmed until the next plenary scheduled for January 15, 2009. At that time, if any deputies have left their post, the assembly would strip them of their mandate and they would be replaced via established assembly procedures. Any evidence of actual material support to the CNDP would, of course, be more serious and would likely result in charges of high treason. Bariyanga and his staff named only one of the alleged defectors from the assembly, Francois Gachaba, but conceded that at least one special advisor to the governor and two provincial cabinet directors also reportedly defected. ¶4. (SBU) Note: Late October 16, CNDP website http://Kivupeace.org listed 16 provincial officials and local citizens who had allegedly defected to the organization. Gachaba was listed, as was a second provincial deputy, Nzeyi Mashagiro. Two provincial ministry cabinet directors, as well as professors, students, and businessmen were also on the list. An interesting footnote is that both defecting assemblymen are Hutus, yet another indication that the Tutsi-led CNDP is more diverse that many foreign observers seem to realize, and that the dynamics of Tutsi-Hutu relations in the DRC are quite different than in Rwanda. End Note. ¶5. (SBU) As to a motive for the defections, Bariyanga explained that some individuals were probably convinced that Nkunda would take Goma one day and they therefore wanted to position themselves favorably in advance. Nkunda was already offering positions on his staff. Bariyanga stressed that the departure of two deputies would not have a serious effect on the 42-seat assembly. It was not unusual for a deputy to leave his position for a different job elsewhere in the government. According to the provincial parliamentarians, the local population had spoken out against those who had defected. Kalinda noted that there had been a false rumor that he had also defected to the CNDP; his constituents had warned him not to do so. Security situation in North Kivu -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Bariyanga and his colleagues clearly blamed Rwanda and "Rwanda's proxy" Laurent Nkunda for the majority of the problems in North Kivu. The most serious result of the ongoing conflict was the GDRC's inability to focus on the FDLR, either militarily or through psychological operations -- "sensitization." The provincial assembly, according to Bariyanga, had been in the process of convincing significant elements of the FDLR to disarm when Rwanda made public its list of 6,000 wanted genocide suspects, thus scaring off many potential defectors. Now Rwanda was actively supporting the CNDP, as evidenced by the care of wounded CNDP soldiers in Rwanda. For deputies from FDLR-affected areas, the lack of progress on disarmament and demobilization would make it difficult to get re-elected. Targeting of Tutsis -------------- ¶7. (SBU) When asked to comment on allegations of Tutsis being targeted in Goma, Bariyanga and his colleagues initially appeared to deny the claims altogether. They said that tensions in Goma were not ethnic-based, but economic in nature. No products from Masisi KINSHASA 00000901 002 OF 002 were able to reach Goma through CNDP-controlled Mushake. The Rutshuru road remained open, but because many of the local population in the area were now in IDP camps, they were unable to cultivate the fields. Inadequate and sporadic supply of agricultural products was fueling inflation and hunger. ¶8. (SBU) When pressed, the assembly members eventually acknowledged that, in the minds of the local population, problems in Goma could be blamed on Rwanda, the CNDP, and thus the Tutsi community. However, they seemed sincerely concerned that the international community was over-simplifying the issue - perhaps drawing too much from the experience of Rwanda. In the Kivus, according to Bariyanga, one could find all ethnicities side by side at soccer matches, in churches, and in bars. Tutsis held important national government and business posts, including six Tutsi generals. There was a Tutsi senator in Kinshasa who, because there were no Tutsis in the North Kivu provincial assembly, was obviously supported by non-Tutsis. In Goma, there were not separate Hutu, Nande, or Tutsi neighborhoods, as people were truly intermixed. ¶9. (SBU) Bariyanga maintained that, when rumors of Tutsi targeting in Goma emerged, the provincial assembly launched its own investigation, led by a Tutsi, to verify the claims. They reportedly found only two Tutsi prisoners in all of Goma. In fact, according to the assembly members, closer inspection of the humanitarian situation revealed that something closer to a "slow genocide of Hutus" was underway. It was true that Rutshuru and Masisi territories were roughly 75% and 65% Hutu, respectively. However, the vast majority in IDP camps were Hutus. ¶10. (SBU) Assembly Vice President Baumbilia asked what the United States expected from the local authorities on this issue. Poloff repeated that a proactive stance to counter messages of ethnic hatred would be an encouraging start. Poloff added that demonstrating more public support for MONUC would also be welcome, as MONUC was frequently misunderstood and misrepresented despite its clear mandate to protect innocent civilians. The assembly members agreed, but lamented that a real reduction in ethnic tensions would only result from an improvement in the security, humanitarian, and economic situations. ¶11. (SBU) Bariyanga asked for USG support to realize an idea to promote peaceful cohabitation. The provincial assembly wanted to send a delegation into the Congolese (and overwhelmingly Tutsi) refugee camps in Rwanda. Previous requests to do so had been denied by Rwanda. The assembly essentially only wanted to pass the message that the refugees would be welcomed back to North Kivu, when they felt comfortable returning. ¶12. (SBU) Comment: The defections of elected and appointed local officials to the CNDP, if confirmed as more than a CNDP propaganda exercise, is an embarrassment for the GDRC and exemplify its struggle to firmly establish state authority in the region. Expectations that Nkunda is poised to capture Goma would appear to be exaggerated, especially given MONUC's stronghold in that city. Nonetheless, many powerful people are clearly pondering an uncertain future for the Kivus. Post agrees that accusations of anti-Tutsi sentiment and actions in the region deserve close monitoring in the context of rising inter-ethnic tensions. End Comment. BROCK