DRC-RWANDAN TENSIONS MOUNT: WAR NOT LIKELY BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000875

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PINR MOPS PHUM KPKO CG
SUBJECT: DRC-RWANDAN TENSIONS MOUNT: WAR NOT LIKELY BUT
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST WORK WITH BOTH SIDES TO DEFUSE
TENSIONS AND AVERT WIDER CONFLICT

REF: A. (A) KINSHASA 844

B. (B) KINSHASA 786

C. (C) USUN 910

Classified By: CDA S. Brock for reason 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: A spike in tensions between the DRC and
Rwanda became palpable last week as officials of both
countries traded serious (but as yet) unfounded allegations.
The state of relations between the two nations may be worse
than at any time since Rwanda's 1998 invasion of the DRC.
The latest round of inflammatory rhetoric is likely linked to
recent statements by Congolese Tutsi rebel Laurent Nkunda
that his goal is to overthrow the government of the DRC.
Nkunda's statements and DRC hyperbole contribute to
widespread Congolese paranoia of Rwanda and its supposed
designs vis-a-vis North and South Kivu, a paranoia some
leaders here willingly fuel because it diverts attention away
from the government's many shortcomings. According to this
"Congo logic," Rwanda authorized Nkunda's statements and
intends to help him achieve his goals. Rwanda's allegations,
as this logic goes, are a strategic ploy to ensure
international support.


2. Summary (continued): We do not believe war is likely at
this time, although reckless statements could lead to an
explosion that would be difficult to contain, including a
scenario whereby Congolese Tutsis would be killed. We must
analyze carefully all official statements to determine what
leaders really mean. A measured response by the
international community, including specific actions to help
leaders focus on practical ways to defuse tensions, is needed
urgently, including calls from senior USG officials to the
presidents of both countries and greater use of existing
mechanisms (Tripartite Plus, JMG task force, MONUC mediation,
International Facilitation, P-3 plus 2, etc.) to air
grievances. It is vitally important that we maintain U.S.
support for MONUC's Comprehensive Disengagement Plan. We
might reconsider our diplomatic presence in Goma, with more
frequent and longer stays by high-ranking officials.
Finally, greater information sharing and coordination between
our embassies in Kampala, Kigali, and Kinshasa are needed to
ensure that all staffs have a better understanding of what is
happening in the three countries. End summary.

Nkunda's statement triggers latest DRC-Rwanda crisis
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3. (SBU) Laurent Nkunda's October 2 interview with the BBC
in which he redefined the goal of his armed group, the CNDP,
from protecting the Congo's Tutsis to instead "liberating"
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has unleashed waves of
competing allegations between Congolese and Rwandan
officials. According to many observers, relations between
the two countries are more tense than at any time since
Rwanda invaded the DRC in 1998. In a statement to P-5
ambassadors on October 4 (ref a),DRC Foreign Minister Mbusa
Nyamwisi stated Rwanda was "clearly
supporting the CNDP," and "is reinforcing its positions along
the border with our country from Bunagana to Kibumba, in
flagrant violation of all processes now underway." We and
others contacted MONUC officials to ask if these allegations
were based on documented troop movements. MONUC cannot
verify the allegations.


4. (C) On October 5 the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
issued a diplomatic note addressed to the Congolese Foreign
Ministry criticizing the GDRC for an "alliance" between the
DRC's armed forces (FARDC) and the ex-FAR Interhamwe/FDLR.
The note, delivered to MONUC's representative in Kigali for
forwarding to the Congolese Foreign Ministry, also states
that the GOR "expresses strong concern against recent
reported atrocious acts by DRC Security agencies in
abducting, torturing and even killing of innocent Rwandans in
Eastern DRC." We checked with a number of sources to learn
more. The British ambassador in Kinshasa (pls protect)
informed us that his officer in Goma had spoken with Human
Rights Watch and others in trying to obtain more information
on Rwandan allegations. The UK official reported that in
mid-September six persons posing as Rwandans (including five


Tutsis) were arrested in the Congo. When interrogated these
individuals claimed they were Congolese who work in Gisenyi
and that they had voted illegally in the Rwandan
parliamentary elections, as evidenced by inked fingers.
Three of them were still in custody and, according to the UK
official, did not appear to have suffered any kind of abuse.

"Congo logic:" there's a Rwandan behind every tree
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5. (C) We discussed these developments with local observers.
Their view is that Nkunda's statements have fueled what can
only be described as "paranoia" among many Congolese
(particularly the political elite and populations in parts of
the country formerly occupied by Rwandan forces, including
Kinshasa and the Kivus) vis-a-vis Rwanda and Rwandans,
stemming from Rwanda's invasions of the DRC. In accordance
with the "Congo logic" flowing from this paranoia, (1) Rwanda
has never abandoned its most important national objective:
the annexation of North and South Kivu to create a "Greater
Rwanda" to ease demographic tensions and provide Rwanda with
much-needed agricultural land and mineral resources; (2)
Nkunda (who is a Congolese Tutsi) is really a Rwandan or, at
the very least, a surrogate of Rwanda; (3) the Government of
Rwanda approved Nkunda's October 2 statements, as it has all
previous Nkunda/CNDP statements; (4) the Government of Rwanda
can be expected to support Nkunda in his efforts to overthrow
the DRC's democratically elected government; (5) the
Government of Rwanda's unfounded allegations against the DRC
are a calculated ploy to reclaim international support for
its policies.


6. (C) Note: Embassy Kinshasa emphasizes that it does not
endorse this viewpoint but believes that it is a useful
framework for explaining many GDRC actions and statements.
We also believe many Congolese leaders cynically contribute
to anti-Rwandan sentiment to divert attention from the
FARDC's many humiliating defeats and to deflect criticism of
the GDRC's poor performance in almost every area since taking
office in 2006. End note.

Despite tensions, war now is not likely
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7. (C) Despite the ratcheting up of the rhetoric, we do not
believe an all-out war between opposing armies is likely at
this time. The GDRC knows that RwandaQ military forces are
faQsuperior to the FARDC and that it would Q quickly
defeated should the Rwandans invade the DRC. MONUC, despite
many limitations, is, nonetheless, a disciplined,
well-equipped fighting force that would not be easily made to
abandon its positions throughout North and South Kivu. And
MONUC represents the international community, which would
quickly condemn foreign aggression in the Kivus, a fact which
is not lost on the DRC's neighbors.


8. (C) We believe a more likely conflict scenario would be
an unexpected social "explosion" sparked by the heated
environment and heightened tensions of the present moment. A
minor "explosion" occurred in Goma on September 21 (ref b)
when widows of FARDC troops killed in the Sake area attacked
the Minister of Defense and the Governor of North Kivu who
had come to the mortuary to pay their respects. Defense
Minister Chikez, who on several occasions has used incendiary
language against MONUC in what can only be interpreted as an
effort to deflect attention from the FARDC's poor showing
against the CNDP, became himself the object of the angry
crowds he had stirred up. Crowds in Goma also turned against
Tutsi businessmen, destroying a Tutsi-owned gas station. No
reports of injuries or deaths, however, were reported.
Although Chikez has been more circumspect since this
incident, we are not optimistic he and other Congolese
officials have internalized the lessons of September 21.

If Tutsis were killed, would Rwanda intervene?
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9. (C) Many observers believe that although Rwanda is not
likely to attack the DRC at the present time, it would not
stand by if Congolese Tutsis were targeted and killed.


Embassy Kinshasa takes seriously all allegations of
persecution against Tutsis and has instructed its human
rights officer and its staff in Goma to investigate all such
claims. To date we have had no credible reports in this
connection. We would also note there is no history of
massacres of Tutsis in the DRC. The dynamics of Tutsi-Hutu
relations, as well as relations between Tutsis and other
ethnic groups in the DRC, are significantly different than in
Rwanda. Neither Tutsis nor Hutus are the main contenders for
power here at the national or provincial levels. In fact,
the CNDP itself has many non-Tutsi members, including Hutus.
Thousands of Tutsis lead normal lives in the Kivus, going to
work every day as ranchers, business owners, police officers,
lawyers, etc. These Tutsis are not ostracized and many are
involved in politics. At a meeting on October 4 North Kivu
Governor Paluku asked Tutsi community representatives if
recent DRC-Rwandan tensions have impacted their lives. We
understand that no major complaints were forthcoming.


10. (C) Anti-Tutsi sentiment in the DRC does exist, however,
as evidenced by the September 21 attack on a Tutsi-owned
business in Goma. In fact, anti-Tutsi sentiment has clearly
risen in recent years, undoubtedly as a result of Laurent
Nkunda, whose stated goal of defending Tutsis has had the
perhaps unintended effect of alienating tens of thousands of
non-Tutsis, particularly those who have become displaced
persons as a result of seizures of non-Tutsi properties by
Nkunda's forces. Another unintended consequence of Nkunda's
insurgency has been to make the Tutsis who have migrated to
the areas he controls more vulnerable if an attack against
them takes place. Should Nkunda exit the scene and a wave of
anti-Tutsi violence occur, most of North Kivu's Tutsi
civilian population is now conveniently clustered together in
just a few locations and thus more easily targeted than they
were just a few years ago.

Our challenge: to understand and to facilitate
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11. (C) A major challenge for the U.S. in the coming months
will be to read between the lines as leaders of both
countries make heated accusations. We must recognize that
the GDRC does not speak with one voice and that some
politicians make reckless and irresponsible statements for
political gain. Others weigh carefully their words and
intend to incite specific groups. We must improve our access
to the Congo's leadership to refine our understanding of what
leaders actually mean and intend. We must use to greater
advantage the credibility and the trust we have accrued in
both the DRC and Rwanda to urge a return to dialogue and a
lowering of tensions with greater outreach to the most senior
leaders in Kinshasa and Kigali, including calls or meetings
from or with the USG's most senior officials. Our assistance
programs, including military/security cooperation, should
provide implicit and explicit incentives when required to
bring leaders back from the precipice of military action.


12. (C) Engaging bilaterally with the Congolese and the
Rwandans, or with members of the international community
directly or through multilateral organizations, we also need
to use to greater advantage existing forums and mechanisms
for dialogue and the airing of differences. The upcoming
November gathering of foreign ministers under aegis of the
Tripartite Plus Joint Commission, a U.S. initiative to bring
together senior military staff and diplomats from the four
Great Lakes nations, is an excellent opportunity for
ministers to meet personally and discuss latest developments.
We noted that the Tri-Partite Plus' Joint Verification
Commission, created in December of last year, has not yet
been activated; this body, if called into session by
agreement of both countries, could help dispel many rumors
and restore confidence. Weekly Friday meetings in Goma of
the Joint Monitoring Group Task Force, with delegations from
Rwanda, the DRC, MONUC, the European Union, the United
States, and the African Union, could become more relevant to
lowering tensions if both sides were to refrain from
launching petty accusations. MONUC, with its political
affairs staff in Goma, can become more involved in mediation
efforts. In short, we believe that if the international
community were to challenge both sides to present their


allegations formally (to the Joint Verification Commission,
to the Joint Monitoring Group, or to MONUC) with a request
that they be investigated, the number of unfounded
allegations might go down.

Continued support for MONUC's plan is a must
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13. (C) Continued U.S. support for MONUC's comprehensive
disengagement plan is essential if the conflict in the east
of the Congo is to be resolved. The plan, which SRSG Doss
outlined at a meeting of the Security Council on October 6
(ref c),calls for the programming, in successive stages, of
an immediate ceasefire, the separation of armed groups
(including the FARDC),and the disarmament and demobilization
of combatant groups. Carefully developed by MONUC in
coordination with the international community and fully
supported by the GDRC, the plan is a sensible roadmap for
ending the fighting in North and South Kivu. Of particular
note is the plan's call for zones of separation. When the
zones have been created, MONUC troops will drive a wedge
between CNDP, FARDC, and FDLR positions, making continued
fighting much more difficult, if not impossible. Doss has
also called for specific U.S. support for certain aspects of
the plan, a request this embassy endorses.


14. (C) We need to consider carefully how we can best
organize ourselves to play the most positive role possible in
bringing peace to the eastern Congo. For one, we might
reconsider our diplomatic presence in Goma. An 01 foreign
service officer arrives next month on a two-year tour. The
presence of a of an experienced full-time, long-term officer
is a significant improvement over previous arrangements
whereby a series of WAE TDY'ers and junior officers from
Embassy Kinshasa have been "holding the fort" in Goma on a
short-time basis. We believe, however, that while the
arrival an 01 officer is much needed, the extended presence
(for 10 days or so each month) of a higher-ranking USG
official with the rank of ambassador or special envoy, and
with direct access to the ambassador in Kinshasa and the
Assistant Secretary in Washington, could give extra muscle to
our efforts. (Note: The European Union's senior envoy is in
Goma every three weeks; his frequent visits, we believe, have
ceded to the EU increased influence and leadership in the
east relative to the United States. End note.)


15. (C) Finally, greater information sharing and
coordination between our embassies in Kampala, Kigali and
Kinshasa are needed to ensure that staffs have an in-depth
understanding of what is happening in all three countries.
Continued exploitation of eastern DRC,s natural resources
also reflects a risk to stability. For example, a greater
understanding of the impact of illegal natural resource
exploitation and cross-boarder trade must be better
integrated into international and bilateral efforts to reduce
tensions. We would encourage embassies Kampala and Kigali to
send political officers, USAID officers, members of the
Defense Attache's staff and USG employees from other
concerned sections and agencies to see for themselves what is
going on inside the DRC. We also propose that ambassadors,
DCM's, political and econ officers, USAID and DOD employees
meet and discuss events in the east on a regular basis.
BROCK