October 3 discussion with Colonel Mamba,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000845 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG SUBJECT: October 3 discussion with Colonel Mamba, head of the DRC delegation to the JWG ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Goma poloff spoke October 3 with the head of the Congolese delegation to the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) Task Force, Colonel Augustin Mamba. Mamba claimed the RUD disarmament in Kasiki was overall a success story. He explained that working together with certain figures that might be wanted in Rwanda was sometimes necessary for the sake of achieving repatriation results. The GDRC was not willing to accept allegations of collaboration with the FDLR, but Rwanda's decision to "boycott" the most recent task force meeting right after CNDP leader Nkunda's October 2 statement was "proof" that the GOR was lending him support. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Goma poloff, in role as current chair of the JMG Task Force, spoke October 3 with the head of the Congolese JMG delegation, Colonel Augustin Mamba to discuss issues relevant to the Nairobi Communique. Coincidently, this meeting took place during the usual time for the weekly JMG meeting, which had been canceled due to the Rwandan delegation's refusal to attend. The meeting with Mamba was not prompted by the Rwandans' decision but rather had been requested two weeks prior. Kasiki Camp -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The conversation started with a discussion of Kasiki Camp, where 64 combatants from the FDLR group RUD (Ralliement pour l'unite et la democratie) had disarmed on July 31 and were now residing with their families. The question was how to finally get these individuals repatriated and continue moving the process forward since this issue is constantly raised at the task force meetings -- usually by the Rwandans -- as evidence that the Nairobi process is going nowhere, with the subtext that the DRC is to blame. In the small picture, the Kasiki issue was preventing productive discussion at the weekly task force meeting and the other task force members were growing tired of it. In the bigger picture, it had become more a symbol for the challenges of implementing Nairobi rather than an example of a successful repatriation process. ¶4. (SBU) Poloff explained that though much hope had been put into the camp as the start of a longer disarmament process, it was disappointing that the combatants had not been able to repatriate after over two months. There were technical problems with the camp, such as the fact that it was still in RUD territory and that MONUC 
Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement or Reintegration (DDRRR) teams had only minimal access. When DDRRR finally did manage to register the residents, 95% of them declared their desire to return home, although their leaders outside the camp still insisted on such issues as an inter-Rwandan dialogue as a pre-condition to return. Poloff continued to explain that there had been other problems with the July 31 disarmament ceremony itself -- some of which some might be considered a violation of the Nairobi Communique. For example, RUD executive secretary Felicien Kanyamubwa was allowed to give a political speech to a rather large audience, much to the anger of the Rwandan delegation in attendance. ¶5. (SBU) Mamba recognized that the Kasiki camp was a source of frustration for many and said the "Rwandans would always have the camp to fall back on when there was nothing else to complain about." He also admitted that the RUD leadership had been very difficult to work with. Still, he said, "if you expect them to disarm you should be willing to listen to what they have to say." Mamba continued: "Despite what the Rwandans might say, giving the floor to Kanyamubwa at the disarmament ceremony was not a violation of Nairobi but rather a common courtesy since the combatants had been nice enough to disarm. No harm had been done because the main gist of his speech was well known already. What really counted was the speech of the DRC Foreign Minister, who praised the courage of the disarmed combatants and encouraged them to go home." ¶6. (SBU) According to Mamba, the real violation of the Nairobi Communique had been committed by Rwandan President Paul Kagame himself when, in a recent interview for Le Soir, he openly supported Nkunda and claimed that even if Nkunda were gone someone would quickly take his place, "with, of course, the support of Rwanda." (Note: This may be one interpretation of Kagame's interview but is certainly not shared by many other members of the task force. End note.) Mamba went on to complain about the Rwandans' demand to have extensive biographical information on the camp residents before they repatriated. This was ridiculous, he said, since through intelligence or personal contacts the Rwandans already knew precisely who was in the camp. Shady Characters -------------- KINSHASA 00000845 002 OF 003 ¶7. (SBU) Poloff continued on the subject of why the GDRC felt the need to deal with such figures as Felicien Kanyamubwa and John Muhindo (a.k.a. Rafiki),the latter wanted in Rwanda for links to the Interahamwe during the 1994 genocide. Was working with them really that necessary given the fact that it absolutely infuriated the Rwandans? The task force itself had recently recommended to the special envoys that additional pressure be put on the overseas leadership of RUD and FDLR. If the GDRC was claiming that these figures were essential interlocutors, would it see any move to pressure or even arrest them as counterproductive? ¶8. (SBU) Mamba said that his government had been working with John Muhindo since 2002 to get members of the FDLR to return home. His status at home was less a concern of theirs since, according to Mamba, he had good access to Rwandan armed groups and had delivered solid results. Why suddenly cut him off? This would cut off the GDRC from several good contacts within the FDLR and RUD. Then again, the GDRC doesn't want to be seen as hiding a potential genocidaire, so Rwanda should produce evidence and the DRC would fulfill its obligations as per the Nairobi Communique. In any case, Rwanda's complaining about Muhindo was just another attempt to block the whole process. With regards to Kanyamubwa, he had been essential in delivering the combatants at Kasiki. Still, if the international community is really serious about arresting leaders overseas then they should do so instead of complaining when the GDRC talks to them. Mamba admitted that the arrest of such figures would have a tremendous impact on the RUD and FDLR members in the bush. FARDC - FDLR Collaboration -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Poloff then gingerly raised the issue of alleged FARDC collaboration with the FDLR, stating that he had never personally seen proof of this, but that it seemed to be widely accepted as a given fact. Collocation in particular was assumed, but now there were allegations of recent joint operations being carried out against the CNDP. (Note: The CNDP has claimed joint FARDC-FDLR operations since early September. MONUC does not acknowledge that it has strong evidence of this, but does claim to have seen collocation of FDLR and PARECO forces. End note.) ¶10. (SBU) Mamba said one should not compare 2004 with the present. Since December 2007 all links to the FDLR had been severed. For example, since the signing of the Nairobi Communique, 15 FDLR barriers had been removed. The FARDC had pushed the FDLR out of towns they previously possessed including Nyabiondo, where FDLR wives were now paying government taxes rather than their husbands demanding their own. Joint verification missions had been undertaken with the Rwandans that did not reveal evidence of collaboration. Even captured FDLR soldiers questioned during a previous JMG visit, Mamba asserted, claimed there were no links to the FARDC. ¶11. (SBU) Mamba went on to say that collaboration had indeed been an issue earlier on, but there were strict guidelines against this now. Also, the word collocation itself was often misused. For example, stating that FDLR and the FARDC both operated in Mwenga could lead one to believe they were both located in the same town when in fact Mwenga was also a territory and the units could be 10 kilometers apart. As for the CNDP's claims of joint operations, Nkunda's men just weren't used to the FARDC not running away when attacked. Naturally, they would claim that any unit that stands its ground must be FDLR (or - he added - Zimbabwean) when in fact the FARDC had replaced unreliable units with more loyal ones -- meaning units that for example had no former Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) members in them. Indeed, he said, the FARDC was much better prepared and equipped this time and could have easily continued its push into CNDP territory if MONUC hadn't asked them to respect zones of separation. Rwanda does not attend October 3 JWG meeting -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Finally, Poloff asked Col Mamba's opinion on the reasoning behind Rwanda's decision to skip the October 3 JMG meeting. (Note: The previous day CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda had released a statement claiming his movement was now a liberation movement for all of the DRC and that all Congolese should stand up to fight their treacherous government. End note.) Mamba's first reaction (and a very passionate one) was that the timing of Rwanda's refusal to attend the JMG and Nkunda's statement were proof that Rwanda was aware that CNDP was planning something. ¶13. (SBU) He continued that Rwanda was playing games with the JMG and that "we were much too accommodating to their mood swings and KINSHASA 00000845 003 OF 003 indecisiveness." He continued: "How many times had Rwanda changed the task force minutes - sometimes arguing for hours over a single word? They felt they could tell the task force where to hold its meetings (Gisenyi) and were even willing to cancel a meeting by not showing up. Meanwhile, even while heavy fighting was going on against the CNDP in Sake during the second week in September, the Congolese sent a delegation to the task force. Now they were being asked to go to Rwanda where there was no MONUC to protect them like for the Rwandans in the DRC." Mamba finished by saying that Rwanda's decision not to attend the task force was disappointing. He asked the United States to help his country figure out what was going on. ¶14. Comment: (SBU) The GDRC will certainly use the Rwandan's decision to not attend the October 3 task force meeting as an indication that Rwanda is not serious about respecting the Nairobi Communique. In a phone conversation with poloff, Jean Damascene Rudasingwa, the deputy head of Rwanda's delegation to the task force, gave assurances that insecurity in Goma was the only reason why they would not attend. He even noted Nkunda's statement of October 2 as a sign that things could get "explosive" in Goma. In the same conversation, however, he repeatedly referred to the issue of the FARDC's collaboration with the FDLR, to the extent that he seemed to be implying the task force meetings were hardly worth the effort as long as this issue was not adequately addressed. He did not say so explicitly, however. ¶15. (SBU) Comment continued: In closing the meeting with Colonel Mamba, poloff made three statements: (1) For the sake of the people in Kasiki Camp, but also for the sake of finally taking the issue off the task force meeting agenda, the GDRC should use whatever influence it has over RUD's political leadership to encourage them to allow the camp residents to repatriate to Rwanda; (2) though the GDRC claims there to be no collaboration between its armed forces and the FDLR, the international community remains concerned over such collaboration; therefore the FARDC leadership should acknowledge and investigate any and all allegations of FARDC/FDLR collaboration; and (3) The discussions at task force meetings had become quite cordial but could easily be poisoned by dwelling on issues that were outside the purview of the task force to resolve. Accordingly, it would be helpful at the next task force gathering if the DRC delegation did not dwell on Rwanda's decision to skip the October 3 meeting. End comment. BROCK