Goma Report September 23:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000797 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG SUBJECT: Goma Report September 23: Goma quite, FARDC Makes Promises ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Despite FARDC's misbehavior at Sake September 20 and 22, MinDef promised September 23 that FARDC would withdraw, as scheduled in the disengagement plan, from forward positions in the Rutshuru corridor beginning September 25. However, the populace is still blocking MONUC in the area. Meanwhile, FARDC has occupied Kashuga, at the far northwest extremity of CNDP territory. Life appeared to return to normal in Goma, with FARDC's artillery quiet at Sake. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) September 23 was an unexpectedly quiet day, both in Goma and on the military front. The only significant military development to come to light was FARDC's apparent occupation of Kashuga, at the far northwestern part of the territory which was occupied by CNDP prior to August 28. Kivus commander General Lukama two days earlier had told the North Kivu brigade commander Brigadier General Rawat that he "might do something" in the Mweso area as a way to relieve CNDP pressure on Masisi and Sake, and MONUC had detected a FARDC build-up at Katsiru, from which FARDC might be expected to launch an attack against Mweso. ¶3. (SBU) Already on September 22 CNDP complained that FARDC had occupied Kashuga, but North Kivu brigade did not send a patrol into the area until late on September 23 and still had no absolute confirmation. (Note: CNDP vacated Kashuga during its advance north beginning September 5, apparently because it could not spare its forces to continue to hold Kashuga. Other armed groups -- variously thought to be PARECO, Mai Mai Mongol, or FDLR -- had immediately filled the vacuum. After the September 11 unilateral withdrawal by CNDP, North Kivu brigade believed that these armed groups had departed Kashuga, leaving it looted and largely devoid of inhabitants. End note.) As the road from Katsiru to Kashuga passes through CNDP-controlled territory at Mweso, the FARDC would have had to get to Kashuga by foot. A FARDC presence there may be small, but would nonetheless constitute another ceasefire violation by FARDC. ¶4. (SBU) In a press statement issued at 1630, CNDP spoke of clashes in Kashuga, with attacks by the "FARDC/FDLR/ PARECO coalition". The statement goes on to say that either the government has no intention of honoring its cease-fire declaration, or its own forces are acting in defiance of orders. ¶5. (SBU) Mid-morning September 23 MONUC, led by Rawat, had what it considered a "good meeting" with Minister of Defense Chikez, Lukama, General Etumba, Abbe Malu Malu, and North Kivu Governor Paluku. According to Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Cunliffe, Chikez re-reaffirmed the government's "total adherence" to the ceasefire and to the disengagement plan which it had embraced on "D-Day" September 18. He said that he had now issued orders for the army to abide by the ceasefire and that those orders should "very soon" be filtering their way down the chain of command. He claimed that FARDC would stick closely to the timetable outlined in that plan, working intimately with MONUC as partners. He said that FARDC would have to defend itself against imminent attack, but it would put itself in "active defensive mode." ¶6. (SBU) Cunliffe said that Rawat stated to Chikez and the others that MONUC was "prepared to continue to use force against the armed groups (i.e., CNDP) if they do not disengage." (Note: This formulation would suggest that the North Kivu brigade intends to tell CNDP what the disengagement lines will have to be and to force CNDP out of positions held prior to August 28, where MONUC determines that CNDP's present positions are too threatening.) The most important test case will be at Rugari, the southernmost town on the Rutshuru road within Rutshuru territory, where CNDP occupies the strategic prominence called Himbi Height a mere kilometer (i.e., within easy artillery range) from the road. MONUC's present plan (not yet presented to CNDP) calls for CNDP's withdrawal a further three kilometers eastward of Himbi Height. ¶7. (SBU) According to Cunliffe, Minister of Defense Chikez concurred that, as foreseen in the disengagement plan, the first disengagement of forces is to occur in the eastern sector (the Rutshuru corridor) at D-Day plus seven, i.e., Thursday September 25. Chikez stated that FARDC would withdraw on that day from its forward positions at Ntamugenga, Mutabo, and Kisherero, held since August 28-29. He appeared to agree that FARDC would not await a CNDP further withdrawal (for example, from Himbi Height). (CNDP has already withdrawn from the one forward position it occupied on August 28, at Kanombe.) ¶8. (SBU) At the meeting, according to Col. Cunliffe, Rawat raised the issue of sensitization of the populace to stop blocking the North Kivu brigade and allow it to move forward into the eastern KINSHASA 00000797 002 OF 002 zone of separation. (North Kivu brigade has been blocked for several weeks from moving forward to Ntamugenga, has continued to be stoned intermittently by the populace all over Rutshuru area, and on September 23 was blocked by the populace from moving beyond Mutabo toward the area of Rugarama and Kishebero.) Rawat called for beginning "information operations" (sensitization of the populace) simultaneously with FARDC's withdrawal from the zone of separation. ¶9. (SBU) Governor Paluku objected that the populace would "go mad" if FARDC attempted to withdraw from (and MONUC attempted to occupy) Ntamugenga, Mutabo, and Kisherero. We have now learned that MONUC plans to dispatch a francophone team to Rutshuru tomorrow September 24, a day before the scheduled establishment of the eastern zone of separation, to try to persuade the fiery territorial administrator, local Hutu chief, plus Col. Delphin and Col. Mushimba to ensure popular acceptance of the plan. (Note: What is not clear is whether the populace would be amenable to "sensitization" even if these individuals, so active for many weeks in stirring up the populace, were assumed to want to comply.) ¶10. (SBU) September 22's sustained but indiscriminate artillery barrage by FARDC against CNDP positions on the escarpment west of Sake ceased with nightfall and did not recommence September 23. (Note: We have ascertained that the multi-barreled rocket launchers, mortars, tanks, and BMPs that participated in this barrage were clustered close to the North Kivu brigade's base at Kimoka, with the evident intent of incurring a CNDP riposte which would inevitably have harmed the base; however, CNDP did not rise to the bait.) ¶11. (SBU) With the absence of military activity at Sake, the anxiety level in Goma subsided markedly September 23. The women who led the protest went back to their subsistence lives as mothers and market ladies. The only evidence of the previous day's rock-throwing roaming mobs was two entirely gutted, Tutsi-owned gas stations on the western road and a greater than usual number of boulders and rocks along the side of the road, which the previous day had covered the road for two kilometers. Otherwise, life seemed to have returned to what passes for normal in Goma. BROCK